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HERMÈS

OR

A PHILOSOPHICAL INQUIRY

CONCERNING

UNIVERSAL GRAMMAR

BY JAMES HARRIS ESQ.

ΕΙΣΙΕΝΑΙ ΘΑΡΡΟΥΝΤΑΣ ΕΙΝΑΙ ΤΑΡ ΚΑΙ ΕΝΤΑΘΑ ΘΕΟΥ

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Annex

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1765

To the Right Honourable
PHILIP *Lord* **HARDWICKE**,
 Lord High Chancellor of *Great*
*Britain**.

My Lord,

AS no one has exercised
 the Powers of Speech
 with juster and more universal
 applause, than yourself; I
 have presumed to inscribe the
 following Treatise to your
 Lordship, its End being to
 investigate the Principles of
 those Powers. It has a far-
 ther claim to your Lord-
 ship's Patronage, by being
 connected in some degree with
 that politer Literature, which,
 in the most important scenes

A 2 of

* The above Dedication is printed as it originally stood, the Author being desirous that what he intended as real Respect to the noble Lord, when living, should now be considered, as a Testimony of Gratitude to his Memory.

of Business, you have still found time to cultivate. With regard to myself, if what I have written be the fruits of that Security and Leisure, obtained by living under a mild and free Government; to whom for this am I more indebted, than to your Lordship, whether I consider you as a Legislator, or as a Magistrate, the first both in dignity and reputation? Permit me therefore thus publicly to assure your Lordship, that with the greatest gratitude and respect I am, My Lord,

Your Lordship's most obliged,

and most obedient humble Servant,

Cloſe of Salifbury,

Oct. 1, 1751.

James Harris.

P R E F A C E.

THE chief End, proposed by the Author of this Treatise in making it public, has been to excite his Readers to curiosity and inquiry; not to teach them himself by prolix and formal Lectures, (from the efficacy of which he has little expectation) but to induce them, if possible, to become Teachers to themselves, by an impartial use of their own understandings. He thinks nothing more absurd than the common notion of Instruction, as if Science were to be poured into the Mind, like water into a cistern, that passively waits to receive all that comes. The growth of Knowledge he rather thinks to resemble the growth of Fruit; however external causes may in some degree co-operate, 'tis the internal vigour, and virtue of

the tree, that must ripen the juices to their just maturity.

This then, namely, the exciting men to inquire for themselves into subjects worthy of their contemplation, this the Author declares to have been his first and principal motive for appearing in print. Next to that, as he has always been a lover of Letters, he would willingly approve his studies to the liberal and ingenuous. He has particularly named these, in distinction to others ; because, as his studies were never prosecuted with the least regard to lucre, so they are no way calculated for any lucrative End. The liberal therefore and ingenuous (whom he has mentioned already) are those, to whose perusal he offers what he has written. Should they judge favourably of his attempt, he may not perhaps hesitate to confess,

Hoc juvat et melli est. —

For

For tho' he hopes, he cannot be charged with the foolish love of vain Praise, he has no desire to be thought indifferent, or insensible to honest Fame.

*From the influence of these sentiments, he has endeavoured to treat his subject with as much order, correctness, and perspicuity as in his power ; and if he has failed, he can safely say (according to the vulgar phrase) that the failure has been his misfortune, and not his fault. He scorns those trite and contemptible methods of anticipating pardon for a bad performance, that “ it was the hasty
“ fruits of a few idle hours ; written
“ merely for private amusement ;
“ never revised ; published against
“ consent, at the importunity of
“ friends, copies (God knows how)
“ having by stealth gotten abroad ;” with other stale jargon of equal falsehood and inanity. May we not ask such Prefacers, If what they allege*

be true, what has the world to do with them and their crudities?

As to the Book itself, it can say this in its behalf, that it does not merely confine itself to what its title promises, but expatiates freely into whatever is collateral; aiming on every occasion to rise in its inquiries, and to pass, as far as possible, from small matters to the greatest. Nor is it formed merely upon sentiments that are now in fashion, or supported only by such authorities as are modern. Many Authors are quoted, that now a-days are but little studied; and some perhaps, whose very names are hardly known.

The Fate indeed of antient Authors (as we have happened to mention them) is not unworthy of our notice. A few of them survive in the Libraries of the learned, where some venerable Folio, that still goes by their name,
just

just suffices to give them a kind of nominal existence. The rest have long fallen into a deeper obscurity, their very names, when mentioned, affecting us as little, as the names, when we read them, of those subordinate Heroes,

*Alcandrumque, Haliumque, No-
emonaque, Prytanimque.*

Now if an Author, not content with the more eminent of antient Writers, should venture to bring his reader into such company as these last, among people (in the fashionable phrase) that no body knows; what usage, what quarter can he have reason to expect?—Should the Author of these speculations have done this (and 'tis to be feared he has) what method had he best take in a circumstance so critical?—Let us suppose him to apologize in the best manner he can, and in consequence of this, to suggest as follows—

He hopes there will be found a pleasure in the contemplation of ancient sentiments, as the view of ancient Architecture, tho' in ruins, has something venerable. Add to this, what from its antiquity is but little known, has from that very circumstance the recommendation of novelty; so that here, as in other instances, Extremes may be said to meet. Farther still, as the Authors, whom he has quoted, lived in various ages, and in distant countries; some in the full maturity of Grecian and Roman Literature; some in its declension; and others in periods still more barbarous, and depraved; it may afford perhaps no unpleasing speculation, to see how the SAME REASON has at all times prevailed; how there is ONE TRUTH, like one Sun, that has enlightened human Intelligence through every age, and saved it from the darkness both of Sophistry and Error.

Nothing

Nothing can more tend to enlarge the Mind, than these extensive views of Men, and human Knowledge; nothing can more effectually take us off from the foolish admiration of what is immediately before our eyes, and help us to a juster estimate both of present Men, and present Literature.

'Tis perhaps too much the case with the multitude in every nation, that as they know little beyond themselves, and their own affairs, so out of this narrow sphere of knowledge, they think nothing worth knowing. As we BRITONS by our situation live divided from the whole world, this perhaps will be found to be more remarkably our case. And hence the reason, that our studies are usually satisfied in the works of our own Countrymen; that in Philosophy, in Poetry, in every kind of subject, whether serious or ludicrous, whether sacred or profane, we think

2

per-

perfection with ourselves, and that 'tis superfluous to search farther.

The Author of this Treatise would by no means detract from the just honours due to those of his Countrymen, who either in the present, or preceding age, have so illustriously adorned it. But tho' he can with pleasure and sincerity join in celebrating their deserts, he would not have the admiration of these, or of any other few, to pass thro' blind excess into a contempt of all others. Were such Admiration to become universal, an odd event would follow; a few learned men, without any fault of their own, would contribute in a manner to the extinction of Letters.

A like evil to that of admiring only the authors of our own age, is that of admiring only the authors of one particular Science. There is indeed in this last prejudice something pecu-

peculiarly unfortunate, and that is, the more excellent the Science, the more likely it will be found to produce this effect.

*There are few Sciences more intrinsically valuable, than MATHEMATICS. 'Tis hard indeed to say, to which they have more contributed, whether to the Utilities of Life, or to the sublimest parts of Science. They are the noblest Praxis of LOGIC, or UNIVERSAL REASONING. 'Tis thro' them we may perceive, how the stated Forms of Syllogism are exemplified in one Subject, namely the Predicament of Quantity. By marking the force of these Forms, as they are applied here, we may be enabled to apply them of ourselves elsewhere. Nay farther still—by viewing the MIND, during its process in these syllogistic employments, we may come to know in part, what kind of Being it is; since MIND, like other Powers, can
be*

be only known from its Operations. Whoever therefore will study Mathematics in this view, will become not only by Mathematics a more expert Logician, and by Logic a more rational Mathematician, but a wiser Philosopher, and an acuter Reasoner, in all the possible subjects either of science or deliberation.

But when Mathematics, instead of being applied to this excellent purpose, are used not to exemplify Logic, but to supply its place; no wonder if Logic pass into contempt, and if Mathematics, instead of furthering science, become in fact an obstacle. For when men, knowing nothing of that Reasoning which is universal, come to attach themselves for years to a single Species, a species wholly involved in Lines and Numbers only; they grow insensibly to believe these last as inseparable from all Reasoning, as the poor Indians thought every

every horseman to be inseparable from his horse.

And thus we see the use, nay the necessity of enlarging our literary views, lest even Knowledge itself should obstruct its own growth, and perform in some measure the part of ignorance and barbarity.

Such then is the Apology made by the Author of this Treatise, for the multiplicity of antient quotations, with which he has filled his Book. If he can excite in his readers a proper spirit of curiosity; if he can help in the least degree to enlarge the bounds of Science; to revive the decaying taste of antient Literature; to lessen the bigotted contempt of every thing not modern; and to assert to Authors of every age their just portion of esteem; if he can in the least degree contribute to these ends, he hopes it may be allowed, that he has done a service

service to mankind. Should this service be a reason for his Work to survive, he has confest already, 'twould be no unpleasing event. Should the contrary happen, he must acquiesce in its fate, and let it peaceably depart to those destined regions, where the productions of modern Wit are every day departing,

——in vicum vendentem tus et
odores.

T H E

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HERMES

OR A PHILOSOPHICAL INQUIRY CONCERNING UNIVERSAL GRAMMAR

BOOK. I.

CHAP. I.

INTRODUCTION.

Design of the Whole.

IF Men by nature had been framed Ch. I.
for Solitude, they had never felt an
Impulse to converse one with another: And if, like lower Animals, they had been by nature irrational, they could not have recognized the proper Subjects of Discourse. Since SPEECH then is the joint Energie of our best and noblest Faculties (*a*), (that is to say, of our Reason
B son

(*a*) See V. I. p. 147 to 169. See also Note xv. p. 292, and Note xix. p. 296. of the same Volume.

Ch. I. *son* and our *social Affection*) being withal
 { our *peculiar Ornament* and *Distinction*, as
Men; those *Inquiries* may surely be deemed
 interesting as well as liberal, which either
 search how *SPEECH* may be naturally *re-*
solved; or how, when resolved, it may
 be again *combined*.

HERE a large field for speculating opens
 before us. We may either behold *SPEECH*,
 as divided into *its constituent Parts*, as a
 Statue may be divided into its several
 Limbs; or else, as resolved into its *Matter*
 and *Form*, as the same Statue may be re-
 solved into its *Marble* and *Figure*.

THESE different *Analyzings* or *Reso-*
lutions constitute what we call * *PHILO-*
SOPHICAL, or *UNIVERSAL GRAMMAR*.

WHEN

(b) *Grammaticam etiam bipartitam ponemus, ut alia sit literaria, alia philosophica &c. Bacon. de Augm. Scient. VI. I. And soon after he adds—Verumtamen hâc ipsâ re moniti, cogitatione complexi sumus Grammaticam quandam, quæ non analogiam verborum ad invicem, sed analogiam inter verba et res sive rationem sedulo inquirat.*

WHEN we have viewed SPEECH thus *analyzed*, we may then consider it, as *compounded*. And here in the first place we may contemplate that (c) *Syntbesis*, which *by combining simple Terms* produces a *Truth*; then *by combining two Truths* produces a *third*; and thus others, and others, in continued Demonstration, till we are led, as by a road, into the regions of SCIENCE.

Now this is that *superior* and most excellent *Syntbesis*, which alone applies itself to our *Intellect* or *Reason*, and which to

B 2 conduct

(c) *Aristotle* says — τῶν δὲ κατὰ μηδεμίαν συμπλοκὴν λεγομένων ὁδὲν ἔτε ἀληθές ἔτε ψευδές ἐστὶν οἷον ἄνθρωπος, λεῦκος, τρέχει, νικά — *Of those words which are spoken without Connection, there is no one either true or false; as for instance, Man, white, runneth, conquereth.* Cat. C. 4. So again in the beginning of his Treatise *De Interpretatione*, περὶ γὰρ σύνθεσιν καὶ διαίρεσιν ἔστι τὸ ψευδὸς τε καὶ τὸ ἀληθές. *True and False are seen in Composition and Division.* Composition makes *affirmative Truth*, Division makes *negative*, yet both alike bring Terms together, and so far therefore may be called *synthetical*.

Ch. I. conduct according to Rule, constitutes
the Art of LOGIC.

AFTER this we may turn to those
(d) *inferior* Compositions, which are pro-
ductive

(d) *Ammonius* in his Comment on the Treatise *Περὶ Ἑρμηνείας*, p. 53. gives the following Extract from *Theophrastus*, which is here inserted at length, as well for the Excellence of the Matter, as because it is not (I believe) elsewhere extant.

Δι' τῆς γὰρ ὕψους τῆς λόγου σχέσεως, (καθὰ διώρισεν ὁ Φιλόσοφος Θεόφραστος) τῆς τε ΠΡΟΨ ΤΟΤΩΣ Ἀκροωμένων, οἷς καὶ σημαίνει τι, καὶ τῆς ΠΡΟΨ ΤΑ ΠΡΑΓΜΑΤΑ, ὑπὲρ ὧν ὁ λέγων πείσσαι προσίθεται τὰς ἀκροωμένους, περὶ μὲν ὧν τὴν σχεῖσιν αὐτῷ τὴν ΠΡΟΨ ΤΟΤΩΣ Ἀκροατὰς καθάγινουσαι ποιητικὴ καὶ ῥητορικὴ, διότι ἔργον αὐταῖς ἐκλέγεσθαι τὰ σεμνότερα τῶν ὀνομάτων, ἀλλὰ μὴ τὰ κοινὰ καὶ δεδημευμένα, καὶ ταῦτα ἐναρμονίως συμπλέκειν ἀλλήλοις, ὥστε διὰ τέτων καὶ τῶν τέτοις ἐπομένων, οἷον σαφηνείας, γλυκύτητος, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἰδεῶν, ἔτι τε μακρολογίας καὶ βραχυλογίας, κατὰ καιρὸν πάντων παραλαμβανομένων, οἷσαι τε τὸν ἀκροατὴν, καὶ ἐκπληῆσαι. καὶ πρὸς τὴν πείθω χειρωθέντα ἔχειν. τῆς δὲ γε ΠΡΟΨ ΤΑ ΠΡΑΓΜΑΤΑ τῆς λόγου σχέσεως ὁ Φιλόσοφος προσηγμένως ἐπιμελήσεται, τό, τε ψεῦδος διελέγχων,

ductive of the *Pathetic*, and the *Pleasant* in all their kinds. These latter Com-
positions

Ch. I.

καὶ τὸ ἀληθὲς ἀποδεικνύς. *The Relation of Speech being twofold (as the Philosopher Theophrastus hath settled it) one to the HEARERS, to whom it explains something, and one to the THINGS, concerning which the Speaker proposes to persuade his Hearers: With respect to the first Relation, that which regards the HEARERS, are employed Poetry and Rhetoric. Thus it becomes the business of these two, to select the most respectable Words, and not those that are common and of vulgar use, and to connect such Words harmoniously one with another, so as thro' these things and their consequences, such as Perspicuity, Delicacy, and the other Forms of Eloquence, together with Copiousness and Brevity, all employed in their proper season, to lead the Hearer, and strike him, and hold him vanquished by the power of Persuasion. On the contrary, as to the Relation of Speech to THINGS, here the Philosopher will be found to have a principal employ, as well in refuting the False, as in demonstrating the True.*

Sanctius speaks elegantly on the same Subject. Creavit Deus hominem rationis participem; cui, quia Sociabilem esse voluit, magno pro munere dedit Sermonem. Sermoni autem perficiendo tres opifices adhibuit. Prima est Grammatica, quæ ab oratione solacissimos & barbarissimos expellit; secunda Dialectica, quæ in Sermonis veritate versatur; tertia Rhetorica, quæ ornatum Sermonis tantum exquirat, Min. l. 1, c. 2.

Ch. I. positions aspire not to the Intellect, but being addressed to the *Imagination*, the *Affections*, and the *Sense*, become from their different heightnings either RHETORIC or POETRY.

NOR need we necessarily view these Arts distinctly and apart; we may observe, if we please, how perfectly they co-incide. GRAMMAR is equally requisite to every one of the rest. And though LOGIC may indeed subsist without RHETORIC or POETRY, yet so necessary to these last is a sound and correct LOGIC, that without it, they are no better than warbling Trifles.

Now all these Inquiries (as we have said already) and such others arising from them as are of still sublimer Contemplation, (of which in the Sequel there may be possibly not a few) may with justice be deem'd Inquiries both interesting and liberal.

AT

AT present we shall postpone the whole Ch. I.
 synthetical Part, (that is to say, *Logic* and
Rhetoric) and confine ourselves to the
 analytical, that is to say UNIVERSAL
 GRAMMAR. In this we shall follow the
 Order, that we have above laid down,
 first dividing SPEECH, as a WHOLE into its
 CONSTITUENT PARTS; then resolving it,
 as a COMPOSITE, into its MATTER and
 FORM; two Methods of Analysis very
 different in their kind, and which lead
 to a variety of very different Specula-
 tions.

SHOULD any one object, that in the
 course of our Inquiry we sometimes de-
 scend to things, which appear trivial and
 low; let him look upon the effects, to
 which those things contribute, then from
 the Dignity of the Consequences, let him
 honour the Principles.

THE following Story may not impro-
 perly be here inserted. “ When the Fame

Ch. I. “ of *Heraclitus* was celebrated through-
 “ out *Greece*, there were certain persons,
 “ that had a curiosity to see so great a
 “ Man. They came, and, as it happened,
 “ found him warming himself in a
 “ Kitchen. The Meanness of the place
 “ occasioned them to stop; upon which
 “ the Philosopher thus accosted them—
 “ ENTER (says he) BOLDLY, FOR HERE
 “ TOO THERE ARE GODS (*d*).”

WE shall only add, that as there is no part of Nature too mean for the Divine Presence; so there is no kind of Subject, having its foundation in Nature, that is below the Dignity of a philosophical Inquiry.

(e) See *Aristot. de Part. Animal.* l. i. c. 5.

C H A P. II.

Concerning the Analysing of Speech into its smallest Parts.

THOSE things, which are *first to Na-* Ch. II.
ture, are not *first to Man*. *Nature*
 begins from *Causes*, and thence descends
 to *Effects*: *Human Perceptions* first open
 upon *Effects*, and thence by slow degrees
 ascend to *Causes*. Often had Mankind
 seen the sun in Eclipse, before they knew
 its Cause to be the Moon's Interposition;
 much oftner had they seen those unceasing
 Revolutions of Summer and Winter, of
 Day and Night, before they knew the
 Cause to be the Earth's double Motion (a).
 Even

(a) This Distinction of *prior to Man* and *prior to Nature*, was greatly regarded in the Peripatetic Philosophy. See *Arist. Phys. Auscult.* l. i. c. i. *Themistius's* Comment on the same, *Poster. Analyt.* l. i. c. 2. *De Anima*, l. 2. c. 2. It leads us, when properly regarded, to a very important Distinction between

Ch. II. Even in Matters of Art and *human* Creation, if we except a few Artists and critical

tween Intelligence *Divine* and Intelligence *Human*. GOD may be said to view the First, as first; and the Last, as last; that is, he views *Effects* thro' *Causes* in their *natural Order*. MAN views the Last, as first; and the First, as last; that is, he views *Causes* thro' *Effects*, in an *inverse Order*. And hence the Meaning of that Passage in *Aristotle*: ὡς περ γὰρ τὰ τῶν νυκτερίδων ὄμμαλα πρὸς τὸ φέγγος ἔχει τὸ μεθ' ἡμέραν, ἔτω καὶ τῆς ἡμετέρας ψυχῆς ὁ Νῆς πρὸς τὰ τῇ φύσει φανερώτατα πάντων. *As are the Eyes of Bats to the Light of the Day, so is Man's Intelligence to those Objects, that are by Nature the brightest and most conspicuous of all Things*, Metaph. l. 2. c. 1. See also l. 7. c. 4. and *Ethic. Nicom.* l. 1. c. 4. *Ammonius*, reasoning in the same way, says very pertinently to the Subject of this Treatise—'Αγαπητὸν τῇ ἀνθρωπίνῃ φύσει, ἐκ τῶν ἀτελεσέρων καὶ συνθέτων ἐπὶ τὰ ἀπλότερα καὶ τελειότερα προΐέναι· τὰ γὰρ σύνθετα μᾶλλον συνήθη ἡμῖν, καὶ γνωριμώτερα. "Οὕτω γένε καὶ ὁ παῖς εἶραι μὲν λόγον, καὶ ἐπεῖν, Σωκράτης περιπαλεῖ, οἷδε· τῆτον δὲ ἀναλῦσαι εἰς ὄνομα καὶ ῥῆμα, καὶ ταῦτα εἰς συλλαβὰς, καὶ κεῖνα εἰς σοιχεῖα ἐκέτι. *Human Nature may be well contented to advance from the more imperfect and complex to the more simple and perfect; for the complex Subjects are more familiar to us, and better known. Thus therefore it is that even a Child knows how to put a Sentence together, and say, Socrates walketh;*

tical Observers, the rest look no higher Ch. II.
 than to the *Practice* and mere *Work*,
 knowing nothing of those *Principles*, on
 which the whole depends.

THUS in SPEECH for example—All men, even the lowest, can speak their Mother-Tongue. Yet how many of this multitude can neither write, nor even read? How many of those, who are thus far literate, know nothing of that Grammar, which respects the Genius of their own Language? How few then must be those, who know GRAMMAR UNIVERSAL; *that Grammar*, which without regarding the several Idioms of particular Languages, *only respects those Principles, that are essential to them all?*

'Tis our present Design to inquire about this Grammar; in doing which we shall follow

walketh; but how to resolve this Sentence into a Noun and Verb, and these again into Syllables, and Syllables into Letters or Elements, here he is at a loss. Am. in Com. de Prædic. p. 28.

Ch. II. follow the Order consonant to *human* Perception, as being for that reason the more easy to be understood.

WE shall begin therefore first from a *Period* or *Sentence*, that combination in Speech, which is obvious to all, and thence pass, if possible, to those its *primary Parts*, which, however essential, are only obvious to a few.

WITH respect therefore to the different Species of Sentences, who is there so ignorant, as, if we address him in his Mother-Tongue, not to know when 'tis we *assert*, and when we *question*; when 'tis we *command*, and when we *pray* or *wish*?

FOR example, when we read in *Shakespeare**,

*The Man, that hath no music in himself.
And is not mov'd with concord of sweet
sounds,
Is fit for Treasons——*

Or

* Merchant of Venice.

Or in *Milton**,

Ch. II.

*O Friends, I hear the tread of nimble
feet,*

Hasting this way—

'tis obvious that these are *assertive Sentences*, one founded upon Judgment, the other upon Sensation.

WHEN the Witch in *Macbeth* says to her Companions,

*When shall we three meet again
In thunder, lightning and in rain?*

this 'tis evident is an *interrogative Sentence*.

WHEN *Macbeth* says to the Ghost of *Banquo*,

—Hence, horrible Shadow,
Unreal Mock'ry hence! —

he speaks an *imperative Sentence*, founded upon the passion of hatred.

WHEN

Ch. II. WHEN *Milton* says in the character of
his *Allegro*,

*Haste thee, Nymph, and bring with thee
Jest and youthful Jolity,*

he too speaks an *imperative Sentence*, tho' founded on the passion, not of hatred but of love.

WHEN in the beginning of the *Paradise Lost* we read the following address,

*And chiefly thou, O Spirit, that do'st prefer
Before all temples th' upright heart, and
pure,*

Instruct me, for thou know'st—

this is not to be called an *imperative Sentence*, tho' perhaps it bear the same Form, but rather (if I may use the Word) 'tis a Sentence *precativè* or *optative*.

WHAT then shall we say? Are Sentences to be quoted in this manner without ceasing, all differing from each other in
their

their stamp and character? Are they no Ch. II.
 way reducible to certain definite Classes?
 If not, they can be no objects of *rational*
 comprehension.—Let us however try.

'Tis a phrase often apply'd to a man,
 when speaking, that *he speaks his MIND*;
 as much as to say, that his Speech or Dis-
 course is *a publishing of some Energie or*
Motion of his Soul. So it indeed is in every
 one that speaks, excepting alone the Dis-
 sembler or Hypocrite; and he too, as far
 as possible, affects the appearance.

Now the POWERS OF THE SOUL (oyer
 and above the meer† nutritive) may be in-
 cluded all of them in those of PERCEP-
 TION, and those of VOLITION. By the
 Powers of PERCEPTION, I mean the
Senses and the *Intellect*; by the Powers of
 VOLITION, I mean, in an extended sense,
 not only the *Will*, but the several *Passions*
 and *Appetites*; in short, *all that moves to*
Action, whether rational or irrational.

IF

† Vid. Aristot. de An. II. 4.

Ch. II. IF then the leading Powers of the Soul
 be these two, 'tis plain that every Speech
 or Sentence, as far as it exhibits the Soul,
 must of course respect one or other of
 these.

IF we *assert*, then is it a Sentence which
 respects the Powers of PERCEPTION. For
 what indeed is to *assert*, if we consider the
 examples above alleged, but to *publish*
some Perception either of the Senses or
the Intellect?

AGEN, if we *interrogate*, if we *com-*
mand, if we *pray*, or if we *wish*, (which
 in terms of Art is to speak Sentences *in-*
terrogative, imperative, precative, or op-
tative) what do we but publish so many
 different VOLITIONS?—For who is it that
questions? He that has a *Desire* to be in-
 formed.—Who is it that *commands?* He
 that has a *Will*, which he would have
 obey'd.—What are those Beings, who
 either *wish* or *pray?* Those, who feel
 certain

certain wants either for themselves, or Ch. II.
others.

If then the *Soul's leading Powers* be the two above mentioned, and it be true that *all Speech is a publication of these Powers*, it will follow that EVERY SENTENCE WILL BE EITHER A SENTENCE OF ASSERTION, OR A SENTENCE OF VOLITION. And thus, by referring all of them to one of these two classes, have we found an expedient to reduce their infinitude (b).

THE

(b) Ῥητίον ἔν ὅτι τῆς ψυχῆς τῆς ἡμετέρας διτλαῖς ἐχέσης δυνάμεις, τὰς μὲν γνωστικὰς, τὰς δὲ ζωτικὰς, τὰς καὶ ὁρεκτικὰς λεγόμενάς· (λέγω δὲ γνωστικὰς μὲν, καθ' ἃς γινώσκομεν ἕκαστον τῶν ὄντων, οἷον νῦν, διάνοιαν, δόξαν, Φαντασίαν καὶ αἰσθησιν· ὁρεκτικὰς δὲ, καθ' ἃς ὀρεγόμεθα τῶν αἰσθητῶν, ἢ τῶν ὄντων, ἢ τῶν δοκούντων, οἷον βάλῃσιν λέγω, προαίρεσιν, θυμὸν, καὶ ἐπιθυμίαν) τὰ ΜΕΝ τέτλαρα εἶδη τῷ λόγῳ (τὰ παρὰ τὸν ἀποφαντικόν) ἀπὸ τῶν ὁρεκτικῶν δυνάμεων προέρχονται τῆς ψυχῆς, ἐκ αὐτῆς καθ' αὐτὴν ἐνεργείας, ἀλλὰ πρὸς ἕτερον ἀποτειτομένης (τὸν συμβάλλεσθαι δοκῶντος πρὸς τὸ τυχεῖν τῆς ὀρέξεως) καὶ ἦτοι λόγον παρ' αὐτῆς

C

ζητήσεως,

Ch. II. THE Extensions of Speech are quite indefinite, as may be seen if we compare the

ζητήσεως, καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῷ ΠΥΣΜΑΤΙΚΟΥ καὶ
 ΕΡΩΤΗΜΑΤΙΚΟΥ καλεσμένῳ λόγῳ, ἢ πρᾶγμα,
 καὶ ἐν πρᾶγμα, ἥτοι αὐτῷ ἐκείνῳ τυχεῖν ἐφιεμένης, πρὸς δὲ
 τὸν λόγον, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῷ ΚΛΗΤΙΚΟΥ, ἢ τινὸς παρ'
 αὐτοῦ πράξεως· καὶ ταύτης, ἢ ὡς παρὰ κρείττου, ὡς ἐπὶ
 τῆς ΕΥΧΗΣ, ἢ ὡς παρὰ χείρονος, ὡς ἐπὶ τῷ κυρίως
 καλεσμένῳ ΠΡΟΣΤΑΞΕΩΣ· μόνον ΔΕ τὸ ΑΠΟ-
 ΦΑΝΤΙΚΟΝ ἀπὸ τῶν γνωστικῶν, καὶ ἔστι τῷτο
 ἐξαγγελτικὸν τῆς γενομένης ἐν ἡμῖν γνώσεως τῶν πραγ-
 μάτων ἀληθῶς, ἢ Φαινομένης, διὸ καὶ μόνον τῷτο δεκτι-
 κὸν ἐστὶν ἀληθείας ἢ ψεύδους, τῶν δὲ ἄλλων εἰδέν. The
 Meaning of the above passage being implied in the
 Text, we take its translation from the *Latin Interpreter*. *Dicendum igitur est, cum anima nostra duplicem
 potestatem habeat, cognitionis, & vitæ, quæ etiam appe-
 titiois ac cupiditatis appellatur; quæ vero cognitionis est,
 vis est, quâ res singulas cognoscimus, ut mens, cogitatio,
 opinio, phantasia, sensus: appetitus vero facultas est, quâ
 bona, vel quæ sunt, vel quæ videntur, concupiscimus, ut
 sunt voluntas, consilium, ira, cupiditas: quatuor orationis
 species, præter enunciantem, a partibus animi profisciscun-
 tur, quæ concupiscunt; non cum animus ipse per se agit,
 sed cum ad alium se convertit, qui ei ad consequendum id,
 quod cupit, conducere posse videatur; atque etiam vel ra-
 tionem ab eo exquirat, ut in oratione, quam Percunctan-
 tem,*

the *Eneid* to an Epigram of *Martial*. But Ch. II. the *longest Extension*, with which Grammar has to do, is the Extension here consider'd, that is to say a SENTENCE. The greater Extensions (such as Syllogisms, Paragraphs, Sections, and complete Works) belong not to Grammar, but to Arts of higher order; not to mention that all of them are but Sentences repeated.

NOW a SENTENCE (c) may be sketch'd in the following description—a compound

C 2 Quantity

tem, aut Interrogantem vocant; vel rem: sique rem, vel cum ipsum consequi cupit, quicum loquitur, ut in optante oratione, vel aliquam ejus actionem: atque in hac, vel ut a præstantiore, ut in Deprecatione; vel ut ab inferiore, ut in eo, qui proprie Jussus nominatur. Sola autem Enuncians a cognoscendi facultate profiscitur: hæcque nunciat rerum cognitionem, quæ in nobis est, aut veram, aut simulatam. Itaque Hæc sola verum falsumque capit: præterea vero nulla. Ammon. in Libr. de Interpretatione.

(c) Λόγος δὲ φωνῇ συνθετὴ σημαντικὴ, ἥς ἔστι μέγιστον καὶ αὐτὰ σημαίνει τι. Arist. Poet. c. 20. See also de Interpret. c. 4.

Ch. II. *Quantity of Sound significant, of which certain Parts are themselves also significant.*

THUS when I say [*the Sun shineth*] not only the *whole quantity* of Sound has a meaning, but *certain Parts* also, such as [*Sun*] and [*shineth*.]

BUT what shall we say? Have these Parts again other Parts, which are in like manner significant, and so may the progress be pursued to infinite? Can we suppose all meaning, like Body to be divisible, and to include within itself other Meanings without end? If this be absurd, then must we necessarily admit, that there is such a thing as *a Sound significant, of which no Part is of itself significant.* And this is what we call the proper character of a (*d*) WORD. For thus, though the
Words

(*d*) Φωνὴ σημαντική, — ἥς μέρος ἕδεν ἐστὶ καθ' αὐτὸ σημαντικόν. De Poetic. c. 20. De Interpret. c. 2. & 3. Priscian's Definition of a Word (Lib. 2.) is as follows

Words [*Sun*] and [*shineth*] have each a Ch. II.
 Meaning, yet is there certainly no Mean-
 ing in any of their Parts, neither in the
 Syllables of the one, nor in the Letters of
 the other.

IF therefore ALL SPEECH whether in
 prose or verse, every Whole, every Sec-
 tion, every Paragraph, every Sentence,
 imply a certain *Meaning, divisible into other*
Meanings, but WORDS imply a *Meaning,*
which is not so divisible: it follows that
 WORDS *will be the smallest parts of speech,*
 in as much as nothing less has any Mean-
 ing at all.

C 3

To

follows—*Dictio est pars minima orationis constructæ, id est, in ordine compositæ. Pars autem, quantum ad totum intelligendum, id est, ad totius sensus intellectum. Hoc autem ideo dictum est, nequis conetur vires in duas partes dividere, hoc est, in vi & res; non enim ad totum intelligendum hæc fit divisio.* To Priscian we may add *Theodore Gaza*.—Λέξις δὲ, μέρος ἐλάχιστον κατὰ σύνταξιν λόγου. *Introd. Gram. l. 4.* Plato shewed them this characteristic of a Word—See *Cratylus*, p. 385. Edit. Serr.

Ch. II. *To know therefore the species of Words*
must needs contribute *to the knowledge of*
Speech, as it implies a knowledge of its
minuteſt Parts.

THIS therefore must become our next
Inquiry.

C H A P.

CHAP. III.

*Concerning the species of Words, the smallest
Parts of Speech.*

LET us first search for the *Species* of Ch. III.
Words among those Parts of Speech, {
commonly received by Grammarians. For
example, in one of the passages above
cited.—

*The Man, that hath no music in himself,
And is not mov'd with concord of sweet
sounds,
Is fit for treasons—*

Here the Word [*The*] is an ARTICLE;—
[*Man*] [*No*] [*Music*] [*Concord*] [*Sweet*]
[*Sounds*] [*Fit*] [*Treasons*] are all NOUNS,
some *Substantive*, and some *Adjective*—
[*That*] and [*Himself*] are PRONOUNS—
[*Hath*] and [*is*] are VERBS—[*moved*] a
PARTICIPLE—[*Not*] an ADVERB—[*And*]
a CONJUNCTION—[*In*] [*with*] and [*For*]

Ch.III. are PREPOSITIONS. In one sentence we have all those Parts of Speech, which the *Greek* Grammarians are found to acknowledge. The *Latins* only differ in having no Article, and in separating the INTERJECTION, as a Part of itself, which the *Greeks* include among the Species of *Adverbs*.

WHAT then shall we determine? why are there not more Species of Words? why so many? or if neither more nor fewer, why these and not others?

To resolve, if possible, these several Queries, let us examine any Sentence that comes in our way, and see what differences we can discover in its Parts. For example, the same Sentence above,

The Man that hath no music, &c.

ONE Difference soon occurs, that some Words are *variable*, and others *invariable*. Thus the Word *Man* may be varied into *Man's* and *Men*; *Hath*, into *Have*, *Hast*,

Had, &c. Sweet into Sweeter and Sweetest; Ch III.
Fit into Fitter and Fittest. On the con-
 trary the Words, *The, In, And,* and some
 others, remain as they are, and *cannot be*
altered.

AND yet it may be questioned, how far
 this Difference is essential. For in the first
 place, there are Variations, which can be
 hardly called necessary, because only some
 Languages have them, and others have
 them not. Thus the *Greeks* have the *dual*
Variation, which is unknown both to the
 Moderns and to the ancient *Latins*. Thus
 the *Greeks* and *Latins* vary their Adjectives
 by the *triple Variation* of Gender, Case,
 and Number ; whereas the *English* never
 vary them in any of those ways, but thro'
 all kinds of Concord preserve them still
 the same. Nay even those very Variations,
 which appear most necessary, may have
 their places supplied by other methods;
 some by *Auxiliars*, as when for *Bruti*, or
Bruto we say of *Brutus*, *to Brutus*; some
 by

Ch. III. *by meer Position*, as when for *Brutum amavit Cassius*, we say, *Cassius lov'd Brutus*. For here the *Accusative*, which in *Latin* is known *any where* from its *Variation*, is in *English* only known from its *Position* or place.

IF then the Distinction of Variable and Invariable will not answer our purpose, let us look farther for some other more essential.

SUPPOSE then we should dissolve the Sentence above cited, and view its several *Parts* as they stand *separate* and detached. Some 'tis plain *still preserve a Meaning*, (such as *Man, Music, Sweet, &c.*) others on the contrary *immediately lose it* (such as, *And, The, With, &c.*) Not that these last have no meaning at all, but in fact they never have it, but when *in company*, or *associated*.

Now it should seem that this Distinction, if any, was essential. For if all
Words

Words are significant, or else they wou'd Ch III.
 not be Words; and if every thing not *ab-*
solute, is of course *relative*; then will all
 Words be significant either *absolutely* or
relatively.

WITH respect therefore to this Distinc-
 tion, the first sort of Words may be call'd
significant by themselves; the latter may be
 call'd *significant by relation*; or if we like
 it better, the first sort may be call'd *Prin-*
cipals, the latter *Accessories*. The first are
 like those stones in the basis of an Arch,
 which are able to support themselves, even
 when the Arch is destroyed; the latter are
 like those stones in its Summit or Curve,
 which can no longer stand, than while the
 whole subsists (*e.*)

§ THIS

(*e*) *Apollonius of Alexandria* (one of the acuteſt Au-
 thors that ever wrote on the ſubject of Grammar) il-
 luſtrates the different power of Words, by the differ-
 ent power of Letters. "Ετι, ὁν τρόπον τῶν στοιχείων
 τὰ μὲν εἰς Φωνήεντα, ἃ καὶ καθ' ἑαυτὰ Φωνὴν ἀποτελεῖ-
 τὰ

Ch III. § THIS Distinction being admitted, we
 thus pursue our Speculations. All things
 what-

τὰ δὲ σύμφωνα, ἅπερ ἄνευ τῶν Φωνηέντων ἔκ ἔχει ρητὴν
 τὴν ἐκφώνησιν· τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ἐστὶν ἐπινοῆσαι καὶ πρὸς τῶν
 Ἀέξεων. αἱ μὲν γὰρ αὐτῶν, τρόπον τινα τῶν Φωνηέντων,
 ῥηταὶ εἰσι· καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ῥημάτων, ὀνομάτων, ἀν-
 τωνυμιῶν, ἐπιρρήμάτων·—αἱ δὲ, ὥσπερ εἰ σύμφωνα,
 ἀναμένεσι τὰ Φωνήεντα, ἔ δυνάμενα κατ' ἰδίαν ρητὰ
 εἶναι·—καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν προθέσεων, τῶν ἄρθρων, τῶν
 συνδέσμων· τὰ γὰρ ταῦτα αἰεὶ τῶν μορίων συσσημαίνει.
*In the same manner, as of the Elements or Letters some
 are Vowels, which of themselves complete a Sound; others
 are Consonants, which without the help of Vowels have no
 express Vocality, so likewise may we conceive as to the na-
 ture of Words. Some of them, like Vowels, are of them-
 selves expressive, as is the case of Verbs, Nouns, Pro-
 nouns, and Adverbs; others, like Consonants, wait for
 their Vowels, being unable to become expressive by their
 own proper strength, as is the case of Prepositions, Arti-
 cles, and Conjunctions; for those parts of Speech are al-
 ways Consignificant, that is, are only significant, when as-
 sociated to something else.* Apollon. de Syntaxi. L. I.
 c. 3. Itaque quibusdam philosophis placuit NOMEN &
 VERBUM SOLAS ESSE PARTES ORATIONIS; cætera
 vero, ADMINICULA vel JUNCTURAS earum: quomodo
 navium partes sunt tabulæ & trabes, cætera autem (id est,
 cæra, stuppa, & clavi & similia) vincula & conglutina-
 tiones

whatever either exist as the *Energies*, or *Affections* of some other thing, or without being the *Energies* or *Affections* of some other thing. If they exist as the *Energies* or *Affections* of something else, then are they called **ATTRIBUTES**. Thus *to think* is the attribute of a Man; *to be white*, of a Swan; *to fly*, of an Eagle; *to be four-footed*, of a Horse. If they exist not after this manner, then are they call'd **SUBSTANCES***. Thus *Man*, *Swan*, *Eagle* and *Horse* are none of them Attributes, but all Substances, because however they may exist in Time and Place, yet neither of these, nor of any thing else do they exist as *Energies* or *Affections*. Ch.III.

AND

iones partium navis, (hoc est, tabularum & trabium) non partes navis dicuntur. Prisc. L. IX. 913.

* **SUBSTANCES**] Thus Aristotle. Νῦν μὲν ἔν τύπῳ ἔρηται, τί ποτ' ἐστὶν ἡ οὐσία, ὅτι τὸ μὴ καθ' ὑποκει- μένου, ἀλλὰ καθ' ἑ τὰ ἄλλα. *Metaph. Z. γ. p. 106. Ed. Sylb.*

Ch III. AND thus all things whatsoever being either (*f*) *Substances* or *Attributes*, it follows of course that all Words, *which are significant as Principals*, must needs be significant of either the one or the other. If they are *significant of Substances*, they are call'd *Substantives*; if of *Attributes*, they are call'd *Attributives*. So that ALL WORDS *whatever, significant as Principals, are either SUBSTANTIVES or ATTRIBUTIVES*.

AGAIN, as to Words, which are only significant as *Accessories*, they acquire a Signification either from being associated to one Word, or else to many. If to one Word alone, then as they can do no more than in some manner *define* or *determine*, they may justly for that reason be called

DE-

(*f*) This division of things into *Substance* and *Accident* seems to have been admitted by Philosophers of all Sects and Ages. See *Categor.* c. 2. *Metaphys.* L. VII, c. 1. *De Cælo*, L. III. c. 1.

DEFINITIVES. If *to many Words at* Ch.III.
once, then as they serve to no other pur-
 pose than *to connect*, they are call'd for
 that reason by the name of CONNEC-
 TIVES.

AND thus it is that all WORDS what-
 ever are either *Principals* or *Accessories*;
 or under other Names, either *significant*
from themselves, or *significant by relation*.
 —If *significant from themselves*, they are
 either *Substantives* or *Attributives*; if
significant by relation, they are either
Definitives or *Connectives*. So that un-
 der one of these four Species, SUB-
 STANTIVES, ATTRIBUTIVES, DE-
 FINITIVES and CONNECTIVES, are
 ALL WORDS, however different, in a
 manner included.

IF any of these Names seem new and
 unusual, we may introduce others more
 usual, by calling the *Substantives*, NOUNS;
 the *Attributives*, VERBS; the *Definitives*,

Ch.III. ARTICLES; and the *Connectives*, CON-
JUNCTIONS.

SHOU'D it be ask'd, what then becomes of *Pronouns*, *Adverbs*, *Prepositions*, and *Interjections*; the answer is, either they must be found included within the Species above-mentioned, or else must be admitted for so many Species by themselves.

§ THERE were various opinions in ancient days, as to the *number* of these Parts, or Elements of Speech.

Plato in his * *Sophist* mentions only two, the *Noun* and the *Verb*, *Aristotle* mentions no more, where he treats of † *Propositions*. Not that those acute Philosophers were ignorant of the other Parts, but they spoke with reference to *Logic* or
Dia-

* Tom. I. p. 261. Edit. Ser.

† De Interpr. c. 2 & 3.

Dialectic (g), considering the Essence of Ch. III.
 Speech as contain'd in these two, because }
these alone combin'd make a perfect *affermative*
Sentence, which none of the rest without them are able to effect. Hence therefore *Aristotle* in his * *treatise of Poetry*
 (where he was to lay down the elements
 of

(g) *Partes igitur orationis sunt secundum Dialecticos duæ, NOMEN & VERBUM; quia hæ solæ etiam per se conjunctæ plenam faciunt orationem; alias autem partes συνηρηγορήματα, hoc est, consignificantia appellabant.* Priscian. l. 2. p. 574. Edit. Putschii. *Existit hic quædam quæstio, cur duo tantum, NOMEN & VERBUM, se (Aristoteles sc.) determinare promittat, cum plures partes orationis esse videantur. Quibus hoc dicendum est, tantum Aristotelem hoc libro diffinisse, quantum illi ad id, quod instituerat tractare, suffecit. Tractat namque de simplici enuntiativa oratione, quæ scilicet hujusmodi est, ut junctis tantum Verbis & Nominibus componatur. — Quare superfluum est quærere, cur alias quoque, quæ videntur orationis partes, non proposuerit, qui non totius simpliciter orationis, sed tantum simplicis orationis instituit elementa partiiri.* Boetius in Libr. de Interpretat. p. 295. *Apollonius* from the above principles elegantly calls the NOUN and VERB, τὰ ἐμψυχότατα μέρη τῷ λόγῳ, *the most animated parts of Speech.* De Syntaxi l. i. c. 3. p. 24. See also *Plutarch. Quæst. Platon.* p. 1009.

* *Poet. Cap. 20.*

Ch.III. of a more variegated speech) adds the *Article* and *Conjunction* to the Noun and Verb, and so adopts the same Parts, with those established in this Treatise. To *Aristotle's* authority (if indeed better can be required) may be added that also of the elder *Stoics* (*b*).

THE latter *Stoics* instead of four Parts made five, by dividing the Noun into the *Appellative*, and *Proper*. Others increas'd the number, by detaching the *Pronoun* from the Noun; the *Participle* and *Adverb* from the Verb; and the *Preposition* from the Conjunction. The *Latin Grammarians* went farther, and detach'd the *Interjection* from the Adverb, within which by the *Greeks* it was always included, as a Species.

WE

(*b*) For this we have the authority of *Dionysius of Halicarnassus*, *De Struct. Orat. Sect. 2.* whom *Quintilian* follows, *Infl. l. 1. c. 4.* *Diogenes Laertius* and *Priscian* make them always to have admitted five Parts. See *Priscian*, as before, and *Laertius*, *Lib. VII. Segm. 57.*

WE are told indeed by (i) *Dionysius* of Ch.III. *Halicarnassus* and *Quintilian*, that *Aristotle*, with *Theodectes*, and the more early writers, held but *three Parts* of speech, the *Noun*, the *Verb*, and the *Conjunction*. This, it must be own'd, accords with the oriental Tongues, whose Grammars (we are (k) told) admit no other. But as to *Aristotle*, we have his own authority to assert the contrary, who not only enumerates the *four Species* which we have adopted, but ascertains them each by a proper Definition*.

D 2

To

(i) See the plates quoted in the note immediately preceding.

(k) *Antiquissima eorum est opinio, qui tres classes faciunt. Estque hæc Arabum quoque sententia—Hebræi quoque (qui, cum Arabes Grammaticam scribere desinerent, artem eam demum scribere cœperunt, quod ante annos contigit circiter quadringentos) Hebræi, inquam hac in re secuti sunt magistros suos Arabes.—Immo vero trium classium numerum aliæ etiam Orientis linguæ retinent. Dubium, utrum eâ in re Orientales imitati sunt antiquos Græcorum, an hi potius secuti sunt Orientalium exemplum. Utut est, etiam veteres Græcos tres tantum partes agnovisse, non solum auctor est Dionysius, &c. Voss. de Analog. l. I. c. I. See also Sanctii Miner. l. I. c. 2.*

* Sup. p. 34.

Ch.III. To conclude—the Subject of the following Chapters will be a distinct and separate consideration of the NOUN, the VERB, the ARTICLE, and the CONJUNCTION; which four, the better (as we apprehend) to express their respective natures, we chuse to call SUBSTANTIVES, ATTRIBUTIVES, DEFINITIVES and CONNECTIVES.

C H A P.

C H A P. IV.

Concerning Substantives, properly so called.

SUBSTANTIVES are *all those principal* Ch.IV.
Words, which are significant of Sub-
stances, considered as Substances.

THE first sort of *Substances* are the NATURAL, such as Animal, Vegetable, Man, Oak.

THERE are other Substances of *our own making*. Thus by giving a Figure *not natural* to *natural* Materials we create such Substances, as House, Ship, Watch, Telescope, &c.

AGAIN, by a *more refin'd operation* of our *Mind alone*, we *abstract any Attribute* from its necessary subject, and consider it *apart*, devoid of its dependence. For example, from Body we abstract *to Fly*; from Sur-

Ch.IV. face, *the being White*; from Soul, *the being temperate*.

AND thus 'tis we convert even *Attributes into Substances*, denoting them on this occasion by proper *Substantives*, such as *Flight, Whiteness, Temperance*; or else by others more general, such as *Motion, Colour, Virtue*. These we call ABSTRACT SUBSTANCES; the second sort we call ARTIFICIAL.

Now all those several Substances have their Genus, their Species, and their Individuals. For example in *natural Substances*, *Animal* is a Genus; *Man*, a Species; *Alexander*, an Individual. In *artificial Substances*, *Edifice* is a Genus; *Palace*, a Species; *the Vatican*, an Individual. In *abstract Substances*, *Motion* is a Genus; *Flight*, a Species; *this Flight or that Flight* are Individuals.

As therefore every (a) GENUS may be found *whole and intire in each one of its Species*; (for thus Man, Horfe, and Dog are each of them distinctly a complete and intire Animal) and as every SPECIES may be found *whole and intire in each one of its Individuals*; (for thus Socrates, Plato, and Xenophon are each of them completely and distinctly a Man) hence it is, that every Genus, tho' ONE, is multiply'd into MANY; and every Species, tho' ONE, is also multiply'd into MANY, by reference to those beings, which are their proper subordinates. Since then no Individual has any such Subordinates, it can never in strictness be considered as MANY, and so is truly an INDIVIDUAL as well in Nature as in Name.

D 4

FROM

(a) This is what *Plato* seems to have express'd in a manner somewhat mysterious, when he talks of *μία ἰδέαν διὰ πολλῶν, ἐνὸς ἐκάστω κεκλιμένη χωρὶς, πάντῃ διατεταμένη—ἢ πολλὰς, ἑτέρας ἀλλήλων, ὑπὸ μιᾶς ἔξωθεν περιεχομένης*. *Sophist.* p. 253. *Edit. Serrani*. For the common definition of Genus and Species, see the *Isagoge* or Introduction of *Porphyrus* to *Aristotle's Logic*.


Ch-IV. FROM these Principles it is, that *Words* following the nature and genius of *Things*, such *Substantives* admit of NUMBER as denote *Genera* or *Species*, while those, which denote (*b*) *Individuals*, in strictness admit it not,

BESIDES

(*b*) Yet sometimes *Individuals* have plurality or *Number*, from the causes following. In the first place the *Individuals* of the human race are so large a multitude even in the smallest nation, that 'twould be difficult to invent a new Name for every new born *Individual*. Hence then instead of *one* only being call'd *Marcus*, and *one* only *Antonius*, it happens that *many* are called *Marcus* and *many* call'd *Antonius*; and thus 'tis the *Romans* had their *Plurals*, *Marci*, and *Antonii*, as we in later days have our *Marks* and our *Anthonies*. Now the *Plurals* of this sort may be well called *accidental*, because 'tis meerly by chance that the Names coincide.

There seems more reason for such *Plurals*, as the *Ptolemies*, *Scipios*, *Catos*, or (to instance in modern names) the *Howards*, *Pelhams*, and *Montagues*; because a *Race* or *Family* is like a *smaller sort of Species*; so that the *family Name* extends to the *Kindred*, as the *specific Name* extends to the *Individuals*.

A third cause which contributed to make proper Names become *Plural*, was the *high Character* or *Eminence* of some one *Individual*, whose *Name* became afterwards a kind of *common Appellative*, to denote all

BESIDES *Number*, another character- Ch.IV.
 istic, visible in Substances, is that of SEX. 
 Every Substance is either *Male* or *Female*;
 or *both Male and Female*; or *neither one*
nor the other. So that with respect to *Sexes*
 and their *Negation*, all Substances conceive-
 able are comprehended under this *fourfold*
 consideration.

Now the existence of *Hermaphrodites*
 being rare, if not doubtful; hence Lan-
 guage, only regarding those distinctions
 which

those, who had pretensions to merit in the same way.
 Thus every great *Critic* was call'd an *Aristarchus*; every
 great *Warrior*, an *Alexander*; every great *Beauty*, a *He-*
len, &c.

A Daniel come to Judgment! yea a Daniel,
 cries *Shylock* in the Play, when he would express the
 wisdom of the young Lawyer.

So *Martial* in that well known verse,
Sint Mæcenates, non deerunt, Flacce, Marones.

So *Lucilius*,
Αἰγίλιποι montes, Æthnæ omnes, asperi Athones.

πόσοι Φαέθοντες, ἢ Δευκαλιώνες. Lucian in *Timon*.
 T. I. p. 108.

Ch.IV. which are more obvious, considers *Words* denoting *Substances* to be either MASCULINE, FEMININE, or NEUTER *.

As to our own Species and all those animal Species, which *have reference to common Life*, or of which the Male and the Female, by their size, form, colour, &c. are *eminently distinguished*, most Languages have different Substantives, to denote the Male and the Female. But as to those animal Species, which either *less frequently occur*, or of which one Sex is *less apparently distinguished* from the other, in these a single Substantive commonly serves for both Sexes,

IN

* After this manner they are distinguished by *Aristotle*. Τῶν ὀνομάτων τὰ μὲν ἄρρενα, τὰ δὲ θήλεα, τὰ δὲ μεταξύ. Poet. cap. 21. *Protagoras* before him had established the same Distinction, calling them ἄρρενα, θήλεα, καὶ σκέυη. *Aristot. Rhet. L. III. c. 5*. Where mark what were afterwards called ὑδέτερα, or Neuters, were by these called τὰ μεταξύ καὶ σκέυη.

† IN the *English* Tongue it seems a ge- Ch. IV.
 neral rule (except only when infringed by
 a figure of Speech) that no Substantive is
Masculine, but what denotes a *Male ani-*
mal Substance; none *Feminine*, but what
 denotes a *Female animal Substance*; and
 that where the Substance *has no Sex*, the
 Substantive is always *Neuter*.

BUT 'tis not so in *Greek*, *Latin*, and
 many of the *modern* Tongues. These all
 of them have Words, some masculine,
 some feminine (and those too in great
 multitudes) which have reference to Sub-
 stances, where Sex never had existence.
 To give one instance for many. MIND
 is surely neither male, nor female; yet is
 ΝΟΥΣ, in *Greek*, masculine, and MENS,
 in *Latin*, feminine.

IN

† Nam quicquid per Naturam Sexui non assignatur,
 neutrum haberi oporteret, sed id Ars &c. Consent. apud
 Putsch. p. 2023, 2024.

The whole Passage from *Genera Hominum, quæ na-*
turalia sunt &c. is worth perusing.

Ch.IV. IN some Words these distinctions seem owing to nothing else, than to the meer casual structure of the Word itself: 'Tis of such a Gender, from having such a Termination; or from belonging perhaps to such a Declension. In others we may imagine a more subtle kind of reasoning, a reasoning which discerns even *in things without Sex* a distant analogy to that great NATURAL DISTINCTION, *which* (according to *Milton*) *animates the World*†.

IN this view we may conceive such SUBSTANTIVES to have been considered, as MASCULINE, which were “ conspicuous
“ for the Attributes of imparting or communicating; or which were by nature
“ active, strong, and efficacious, and that
“ indiscriminately whether to good or to
“ ill; or which had claim to Eminence,
“ either laudable or otherwise.”

THE

† Mr. *Linnaeus*, the celebrated Botanist, has traced the *Distinction of Sexes* throughout the whole *Vegetable World*, and made it the Basis of his Botanic Method.

THE FEMININE on the contrary were Ch.IV.
 “ such, as were conspicuous for the At-
 “ tributes either of receiving, of contain-
 “ ing, or of producing and bringing forth;
 “ or which had more of the passive in
 “ their nature, than of the active; or
 “ which were peculiarly beautiful and
 “ amiable; or which had respect to such
 “ Excesses, as were rather Feminine, than
 “ Masculine.”

UPON these Principles the two greater
 Luminaries were considered, one as Mas-
 culine, the other as Feminine; the SUN
 (Ἡλιός, *Sol*) as *Masculine*, from commu-
 nicating Light, which was native and ori-
 ginal, as well as from the vigorous warmth
 and efficacy of his Rays; the MOON (Σελήνη, *Luna*) as *Feminine*, from being the
 Receptacle only of another's Light, and
 from shining with Rays more delicate and
 soft.

THUS

Ch.IV. *Thus Milton,*

*First in HIS East the glorious Lamp was seen;
Regent of Day, and all th' Horizon round
Invested with bright rays; jocund to run
His longitude thro' Heav'n's high road:
the gray*

*Dawn, and the Pleiades before HIM danc'd,
Shedding sweet influence. Less bright the
Moon*

*But opposite, in levell'd West was set,
HIS mirrour, with full face borrowing HER
Light*

From HIM; for other light SHE needed none.

P.L. VII. 370.

By *Virgil* they were considered as *Brother* and *Sister*, which still preserves the same distinction.

Nec FRATRIS radiis obnoxia surgere LUNA.

G. I. 396.

THE SKY or ETHER is in *Greek* and *Latin Masculine*, as being the source of those showers, which impregnate the Earth.

The

* The EARTH on the contrary is univer- Ch.IV.
sally *Feminine*, from being the grand Re-
ceiver, the grand *Container*, but above all
from being the *Mother* (either mediately or
immediately) of every sublunary Substance,
whether animal or vegetable.

THUS *Virgil*,

*Tum PATER OMNIPOTENS fœcundis im-
bribus ÆTHER*

*CONJUGIS in gremium LÆTÆ descendit,
& omnes*

Magnus alit magno commixtus corpore fœtus.

G. II. 325.

THUS *Shakespear*,

—— † COMMON MOTHER, *Thou*

*Whose Womb unmeasurable, and infinite
Breast*

Teems and feeds all— Tim. of Athens.

So *Milton*,

*Whatever Earth, ALL-BEARING MOTHER,
yields.* P. L. V.

So

* Senecæ Nat. *Quæst.* III. 14.

† Παμμήτωρ γῆ χαίρει— Græc. Anth. p. 281.

Ch.IV. So *Virgil*,

Non jam MATER alit TELLUS, viresque ministrat (c). Æn. XI. 71.

AMONG *artificial* Substances the SHIP (Ναῦς, *Navis*) is *feminine*, as being so eminently a *Receiver* and *Container* of various things, of Men, Arms, Provisions, Goods, &c. Hence Sailors, speaking of their Vessel, say always, “ SHE *rides at anchor*,” “ SHE *is under sail*.”

A CITY (Πόλις, *Civitas*) and a COUNTRY (Πάτρις, *Patria*) are *feminine* also, by being (like the Ship) *Containers* and *Receivers*, and farther by being as it were the *Mothers* and *Nurses* of their respective Inhabitants.

THUS

(c) —διὸ καὶ ἐν τῇ ὅλῃ τὴν Γῆς φύσιν, ὡς ΘῆΛΥ καὶ ΜΗΤΕΡΑ νομίζουσιν· ΟΥΡΑΝΟΝ δὲ καὶ ἍΛΙΟΝ, καὶ εἰ τι τῶν ἄλλων τῶν τοιούτων, ὡς ΓΕΝΩΝΤΑΣ καὶ ΠΑΤΕΡΑΣ προσαγορεύουσι. *Arist. de Gener. Anim.* l. i. c. 2.

THUS *Virgil*,

Ch.IV.

Salve, MAGNA PARENS FRUGUM, Satur-
nia Tellus,

MAGNA VIRUM—— Geor. II. 173.

So, in that Heroic Epigram on those
brave *Greeks*, who fell at *Chæroneæ*,

Γαῖα δὲ Πάτρις ἔχει κόλποις τῶν πλείζα κα-
μόντων

Σώματα ——

Their PARENT COUNTRY in HER bosom
holds

*Their wearied bodies.—**

So *Milton*;

The City, which Thou seest, no other deem
Than great and glorious Rome, QUEEN of
the Earth. Par. Reg. L. IV.

As to the OCEAN, tho' from its being
the *Receiver* of all Rivers, as well as the
Container

* Demosth. in Orat. de Coronâ.

Ch IV. *Container* and *Productress* of so many Vegetables and Animals, it might justly have been made (like the Earth) *Feminine*; yet its *deep Voice* and *boisterous Nature* have, in spite of these reasons, prevailed to make it *Male*. Indeed the very Sound of *Homer's*

—μέγξ σθένΩ 'Ωκεανοῖο,

would suggest to a hearer, even ignorant of its meaning, that the Subject was incompatible with *female* delicacy and softness.

TIME (ΧρόνΩ) from his mighty Efficacy upon every thing around us, is by the Greeks and English justly considered as *Masculine*. Thus in that elegant distich, spoken by a decrepit old Man,

* 'Ο γὰρ ΧρόνΩ μ' ἔκαμψε, τέκλων ἔσφοδς,
"Απάνλα δ' ἐργαζόμενΩ ἀσθενέερα †.

Me TIME hath bent, that sorry Artist, HE
That surely makes, whate'er he handles,
worse.

So

* Ω Χρόνε, παντοῖων συνῆων πανεπίσκοπε Δαΐμον.
Græc. Anth. p. 290.

† Stob. Ecl. p. 591.

So too *Shakespear*, speaking likewise of Ch. IV.
 TIME, }

Orl. *Whom doth HE gallop withal?*

Ros. *With a thief to the gallows.—*

As you like it.

THE Greek Θάνατος or "Αἰδης, and the English DEATH, seem from the same irresistible Power to have been considered as *Masculine*. Even the Vulgar with us are so accustomed to this notion, that a FEMALE DEATH they would treat as ridiculous (*d*).

TAKE a few Examples of the masculine Death.

E 2

Calli-

(*d*) Well therefore did *Milton* in his *Paradise Lost* not only adopt DEATH as a *Person*, but consider him as *Masculine*: in which he was so far from introducing a Phantom of his own, or from giving it a *Gender not supported by Custom*; that perhaps he had as much the *Sanction of national Opinion* for his *Masculine Death*, as the ancient Poets had for many of their Deities.

Ch IV. *Callimachus* upon the Elegies of his
 Friend *Heraclitus*—

‘Αἰ δὲ τεαὶ ζώουσιν ἀήδονες, ἥσιν ὁ πάντων
 Ἀρπάκῃη Ἀΐδης ἐκ ἐπὶ χεῖρα βαλεῖ.

—yet thy sweet warbling strains
 Still live immortal, nor on them shall DEATH
 His hand e’re lay, tho’ Ravager of all.

IN the *Alceſtis* of *Euripides*, Θάνατος or DEATH is one of the Persons of the drama; the beginning of the play is made up of dialogue between *Him* and *Apollo*; and towards its end, there is a fight between *Him* and *Hercules*, in which *Hercules* is conqueror, and rescues *Alceſtis* from his hands.

’Tis well known too, that SLEEP and DEATH are made *Brothers* by *Homer*. ’Twas to this old *Gorgias* elegantly alluded, when at the extremity of a long life he lay slumbering on his Death-bed. A Friend asked him, “ *How he did?* ”——

“ SLEEP

“ SLEEP (replied the old Man) *is just upon* Ch.IV.
 “ *delivering me over to the care of his*
 “ BROTHER (e).”

THUS *Shakespear*, speaking of Life,
 — *merely Thou art Death's Fool;*
 For HIM Thou labour'st by thy flight to
 shun,
 And yet run'st tow'rds HIM *still.*
 Meas. for Meas.

So *Milton*,
Dire was the tossing, deep the groans;
 Despair
Tended the sick, busiest from couch to couch:
And over them triumphant DEATH HIS
 dart
Shook; but delay'd to strike——
 P. L. XI. 489 (f).

THE

(e) Ἦδη με 'Ο ὙΠΝΟΣ ἀρχεται πνευματοῦ
 θεοῦ Τ'ΑΔΕΛΦΩΙ. Stob. Ecl. p. 600.

(f) Suppose in any one of these examples we introduce a female Death; suppose we read,

Ch.IV. THE supreme Being (GOD, Θεός, *Deus*, *Dieu*, &c.) is in all languages *Masculine*, in as much as the masculine Sex is the superior and more excellent; and as He is the Creator of all, the Father of Gods and Men. Sometimes indeed we meet with such words as Τὸ Πρῶτον, Τὸ Θεῖον, *Numen*, DEITY (which last we *English* join to a neuter, saying *Deity itself*) sometimes I say we meet with these *Neuters*. The reason in these instances seems to be, that as GOD is prior to all things, both in dignity and in time, this Priority is better characterized and exprest by a *Negation*, than by any of those Distinctions which are *co-ordinate with some Opposite*, as Male
for

*And over them triumphant Death HER dart
Shook, &c.*

What a falling off? How are the nerves and strength of the whole Sentiment weakened?

for example is co-ordinate with Female, Ch. IV. }
 Right with Left, &c. &c. (g).

VIRTUE (Ἀρετή, *Virtus*) as well as most of its Species are all *Feminine*, perhaps from their Beauty and amiable Appearance, which are not without effect even upon the most reprobate and corrupt.

E 4

—abash'd

(g) Thus *Ammonius*, speaking on the same Subject — Ἰὸ' ΠΡΩΤΟΝ λέγομεν, ἐφ' ᾧ μὴ δὲ τῶν διὰ μυθολογίας παραδόντων ἡμῶν τὰς θεολογίας ἐτόλμησέ τις ἢ ἀρρένωπὸν, ἢ θυληπρεπὴ (lege θυληπρεπὴ) διαμόρφωσιν φέρειν· καὶ τῆτο ἐικότως· τῷ μὲν γὰρ ἀρρένει τὸ θῆλυ σύσσιχον· τὸ (lege τῷ) δὲ ΠΑΝΘΙ ἈΠΛΩΣ ἈΙΤΙΩΙ σύσσιχον ἔδεν. ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅταν ἀρσενικῶς ΤΟΝ ΘΕΟΝ ὀνομάζομεν, [πρὸς] τὸ σεμνότερον τῶν γενῶν τῷ ὑφειμένῳ προτιμῶντες, ἕτως αὐτὸν προσαγορεύομεν. PRIMUM dicimus, quod nemo etiam eorum, qui theologiam nobis fabularum integumentis obvolutam tradiderunt, vel maris vel fœminæ specie fingere ausus est: idque merito: conjugatum enim mari fœmininum est. CAUSÆ autem omnino ABSOLUTÆ AC SIMPLICI nihil est conjugatum. Immo vero cum DEUM masculino genere appellamus, ita ipsum nominamus, genus præstantius submisso atque humili præferentes. Ammon. in Lib. de Interpr. p. 30 b.—καὶ γὰρ ἐναντίον τῷ Πρωτῷ ἔδεν. Aristot. Metaph. Α. p. 210. Sylb.

Ch. IV.

——abash'd the Devil stood,
 And felt, how awful Goodness is, and saw
 VIRTUE in her shape how lovely; saw,
 and pin'd
 His loss ——

P. L. IV. 846.

THIS being allowed, VICE (*Κακία*) becomes *Feminine* of course, as being, in the *συγχοιχία* or Co-ordination of things, Virtue's natural Opposite (*b*).

THE Fancies, Caprices, and fickle Changes of FORTUNE would appear but awkwardly under a Character, that was Male: but taken together they make a
 very

(*b*) They are both represented as *Females* by *Xenophon*, in the celebrated Story of *Hercules*, taken from *Prodicus*. See *Memorab.* L. II. C. I. As to the *συγχοιχία* here mentioned, thus *Varro*.—*Pythagoras Samius ait omnium rerum initia esse bina: ut finitum & infinitum, bonum & malum, vitam & mortem, diem & noctem.* De Ling. Lat. L. IV. See also *Arist. Metaph.* L. I. c. 5. and *Ecclesiasticus*, Chap. lxii. §. 24.

very natural *Female*, which has no small Ch IV.
 resemblance to the Coquette of a modern
 Comedy, bestowing, withdrawing, and
 shifting her favours, as different Beaus
 succeed to her good graces.

*Transmutat incertos honores,
 Nunc mihi, nunc alii benigna.* Hor.

WHY the FURIES were made *Female*,
 is not so easy to explain, unless it be that
 female Passions of all kinds were confi-
 dered as susceptible of greater excess, than
 male Passions; and that the *Furies* were
 to be represented, as Things superlatively
 outrageous.

Talibus Aleſto dictis exarſit in iras.

*At Juveni oranti ſubitus tremor occupat
 artus :*

*Diriguere oculi : tot Erinnyſ ſibilat Hy-
 dris,*

*Tantaque ſe facies aperit ; tum flammea
 torquens*

Ch. IV.

*Lumina cunctantem & quærentem dicere
plura*

*Reppulit, & geminos erexit crinibus an-
gues,*

*Verberaque insonuit, rabidoque hæc ad-
didit ore :*

En! Ego victa situ, &c.

Æn. VII. 445 (i).

HE,

(i) The Words above mentioned, *Time, Death, Fortune, Virtue, &c.* in *Greek, Latin, French,* and most modern Languages, though they are diversified with Genders in the manner described, yet never vary the Gender, which they have once acquired, except in a few instances, where the Gender is doubtful. We cannot say $\eta \alpha\rho\epsilon\lambda\eta$ or $\delta \alpha\rho\epsilon\lambda\eta$, *hæc Virtus* or *hic Virtus, la Vertu* or *le Vertu*, and so of the rest. But 'tis otherwise in *English*. We in our own language say, *Virtue is its own Reward*, or *Virtue is her own Reward*; *Time maintains its wonted Pace*, or *Time maintains his wonted Pace*.

There is a singular advantage in this liberty, as it enables us to mark, with a peculiar force, the Distinction between the severe or *Logical* Stile, and the ornamental or *Rhetorical*. For thus when we speak of the above Words, and of all others naturally devoid of Sex,

HE, that would see more on this Sub- Ch.IV.
ject, may consult *Ammonius* the Peripate-
tic

as *Neuters*, we speak of them as *they are*, and as becomes a *logical* Inquiry. When we give them *Sex*, by making them Masculine or Feminine, they are from thenceforth *personified*; are a kind of *intelligent Beings*, and become, as such, the proper ornaments either of *Rhetoric* or of *Poetry*.

Thus *Milton*,

—The *Thunder*


Wing'd with red light'ning and impetuous rage,
Perhaps hath spent HIS shafts— P. Loft. I. 174.

The Poet, having just before called the *Hail*, and *Thunder*, God's *Ministers of Vengeance*, and so personified them, had he afterwards said *its* Shafts for *his* Shafts, would have destroyed his own Image, and approached withal so much nearer to *Prose*.

The following Passage is from the same Poem.

Should intermitted Vengeance arm again
His red right hand— P. L. II. 173.

In this Place *His Hand* is clearly preferable either to *Her's* or *It's*, by immediately referring us to *God himself* the Avenger,

Ch.IV.  tic in his Commentary on the Treatise *de Interpretatione*, where the Subject is treated at large with respect to the Greek Tongue. We shall only observe, that as all such Speculations are at best but Conjectures, they should therefore be received with

I shall only give one instance more, and quit this Subject.

*At his command th' up-rooted Hills retir'd
Each to HIS place: they heard his voice and went
Obsequious: Heav'n HIS wonted face renew'd,
And with fresh flourers Hill and Valley smil'd.*

P. L. VI.

See also *ÿ*. 54, 55, of the same Book.

Here all things are personified; the Hills *hear*, the Valleys *smile*, and the *Face* of Heaven is renewed. Suppose then the Poet had been necessitated by the laws of his Language to have said—*Each Hill retir'd to ITS Place—Heaven renewed its wonted Face*—how prosaic and lifeless would these Neuters have appeared; how detrimental to the *Prosopopeia*, which he was aiming to establish? In this therefore he was happy, that the Language, in which he wrote, imposed no such necessity; and he was too wise a Writer, to impose it on himself. 'Twere to be wished, his Correctors had been as wise on their parts.

with candour, rather than scrutinized Ch. IV.
 with rigour. *Varro's* words on a Subject
 near akin are for their aptness and elegance
 well worth attending. *Non mediocres enim*
tenebræ in silvâ, ubi hæc captanda; neque
ed, quò pervenire volumus, semitæ tritæ;
neque non in tramitibus quædam objecta,
quæ euntem retinere possunt.*

To conclude this Chapter. We may collect, from what has been said, that both NUMBER and GENDER appertain to WORDS, because in the first place they appertain to THINGS; that is to say, *because Substances are Many, and have either Sex, or no Sex; therefore Substantives have Number, and are Masculine, Feminine, or Neuter.* There is however this difference between the two Attributes: NUMBER in strictness descends no lower, than
 to

* De Ling. Lat. L. IV.

Ch.IV. to *the last Rank of Species (k)*: GENDER
 on the contrary stops not here, but descends to *every Individual*, however diversified. And so much for SUBSTANTIVES, PROPERLY SO CALLED.

(k) The reason, why *Number* goes no lower, is, that it does not naturally appertain to *Individuals*; the cause of which see before, p. 39.

C H A P.

C H A P. V.

Concerning Substantives of the Secondary Order.

WE are now to proceed to a SECONDARY RACE of SUBSTANTIVES, Ch. V.
 a Race quite different from any already mentioned, and whose Nature may be explained in the following manner.

EVERY Object, which presents itself to the Senses or the Intellect, is either then perceived for the *first time*, or else is recognized, as having been perceived *before*. In the former case 'tis called an Object τῆς πρώτης γνώσεως, *of the first knowledge or acquaintance* (a); in the latter

(a) See *Apoll. de Syntaxi*, l. i. c. 16. p. 49. l. 2. c. 3. p. 103. Thus *Priscian*—*Interest autem inter demonstrationem & relationem hoc; quod demonstratio, interrogationi reddita, Primam Cognitionem ostendit;*
 Quis

Ch. V. ter 'tis called an Object τῆς δευτέρας γνώσεως, *of the second knowledge or acquaintance.*

Now as all Conversation passes between *Particulars* or *Individuals*, these will often happen to be reciprocally Objects τῆς πρώτης γνώσεως, that is to say, *till that instant unacquainted with each other.* What then is to be done? How shall the Speaker address the other, when he knows not his Name? or how explain himself by his own Name, of which the other is wholly ignorant? Nouns, as they have been described, cannot answer the purpose. The first expedient upon this occasion seems to have been Δειξις, that is, *Pointing*, or *Indication by the Finger or Hand*, some traces of which are still to be observed, as a part of that Action, which naturally attends our speaking. But the Authors of Language
were

Quis fecit? Ego: *relatio vero* Secundam Cognitionem significat, ut, Is, de quo jam dixi. *Lib. XII. p 936. Edit. Putschii.*

were not content with this. They invented a Race of *Words to supply this Pointing*; which Words, as they always stood for *Substantives or Nouns*, were characterized by the Name of *Ἀντωνυμίαι*, or PRONOUNS (*b*). These also they distinguished into three several sorts, calling them *Pronouns of the First, the Second, and the Third Person*, with a view to certain distinctions, which may be explained as follows.

SUPPOSE the Parties conversing to be wholly unacquainted, neither Name nor Countenance on either side known, and the

(*b*) Ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ Ἀντωνυμία, τὸ μετὰ ΔΕΪΞΕΩΣ ἢ ἀναφορᾶς ἈΝΤΟΝΟΜΑΖΟΜΕΝΟΝ. Apoll. de Synt. L. II. c. 5. p. 106. Priscian seems to consider them so peculiarly destined to the expression of *Individuals*, that he does not say they supply the place of any Noun, but that of the proper Name only. And this undoubtedly was their original, and still is their true and natural use. PRONOMEN est pars orationis, quæ pro nomine proprio uniuscujusque accipitur. Prisc. L. XII. See also Apoll. L. II. c. 9. p. 117, 118.

Ch. V. the Subject of the Conversation to be *the Speaker himself*. Here, to supply the place of Pointing by a Word of *equal* Power, they furnished the Speaker with the *Pronoun*, I. *I write, I say, I desire, &c.* and as the Speaker is always principal with respect to his own discourse, this they called for that reason *the Pronoun of the First Person*.

AGAIN, suppose the Subject of the Conversation to be *the Party addrest*. Here for similar reasons they invented the *Pronoun*, THOU. *Thou writest, Thou walkest, &c.* and as the Party addrest is next in dignity to the Speaker, or at least comes next with reference to the discourse ; this Pronoun they therefore called *the Pronoun of the Second Person*.

LASTLY, suppose the Subject of Conversation neither the Speaker, nor the Party addrest, but *some third Object, different from both*. Here they provided another *Pronoun*, HE, SHE, or IT, which
in

in distinction to the two former was called Ch. V,
the Pronoun of the Third Person.

AND thus it was that *Pronouns* came to be distinguished by their respective PERSONS (c).

As

(c) The Description of the different PERSONS here given is taken from *Priscian*, who took it from *Apollonius*. *Personæ Pronominum sunt tres, prima, secunda, tertia. Prima est, cum ipsa, quæ loquitur, de se pronuntiat; Secunda, cum de eâ pronuntiat, ad quam directo sermone loquitur; Tertia, cum de eâ, quæ nec loquitur, nec ad se directum accipit Sermonem. L. XII. p. 940. Theodore Gaza gives the same distinctions. Πρώτου (πρόσωπον sc.) ὃ περὶ ἑαυτῆς φράζει ὁ λέγων· δεύτερου, ὃ περὶ τῆς, πρὸς ἣν ὁ λόγος· τρίτου, ὃ περὶ ἑτέρας. Gaz. Gram. L. IV. p. 152.*

This account of *Persons* is far preferable to the common one, which makes the First the *Speaker*; the Second, the Party *address*; and the Third, the *Subject*. For tho' the First and Second be as commonly described, one the *Speaker*, the other the Party *address*; yet till they become *subjects of the discourse*, they have no existence. Again as to the Third Person's being the *subject*, this is a character, which it *shares in common*

Ch. V. As to NUMBER, the Pronoun of each
 Person has it : (I) has the plural (We),
 because

with both the other Persons, and which can never therefore be called a peculiarity of its own. To explain by an instance or two. When *Eneas* begins the narrative of his adventures, the *second Person* immediately appears, because he makes *Dido*, whom he *addresses*, the immediate subject of his Discourse.

Infandum, Regina, jubes, renovare dolorem.

From hence forward for 1500 Verses (tho' she be all that time the party address'd) we hear nothing farther of this *Second Person*, a variety of other Subjects filling up the Narrative.

In the mean time the *First Person* may be seen every where, because the *Speaker* every where is himself the Subject. They were indeed Events, as he says himself,

—*quæque ipse miserrima vidi,*
Et quorum pars magna fui—

Not that the *Second Person* does not often occur in the course of this Narrative ; but then it is always by a Figure of Speech, when those, who by their absence are in fact so many *Third Persons*, are converted into *Second*

because there may be many Speakers at once of the same Sentiment; as well as one, who, including himself, speaks the Sentiment of many. (THOU) has the plural (YOU), because a Speech may be spoken to many, as well as to one. (HE) has the plural (THEY) because the Subject of discourse is often many at once.

BUT tho' all these Pronouns have *Number*, it does not appear either in *Greek*, or *Latin*, or any modern Language, that those of the first and second Person carry the distinctions of *SEX*. The reason seems

F 3

to

second Persons by being introduced as *present*. The *real* Second Person (*Dido*) is never once hinted.

Thus far as to *Virgil*. But when we read *Euclid*, we find neither *First* Person, nor *Second* in any part of the whole Work. The reason is, that neither Speaker nor Party address (in which light we may always view the Writer and his Reader) can possibly become the Subject of pure Mathematics, nor indeed can any thing else, except abstract Quantity, which neither speaks itself, nor is spoken to by another.

Ch. V. to be, that the Speaker and Hearer being generally present to each other, it would have been superfluous to have mark'd a distinction by Art, which from Nature and even Dress was commonly (*d*) apparent on both sides. But this does not hold with respect to the third Person, of whose Character and Distinctions, (including Sex among the rest) we often know no more, than what we learn from the discourse. And hence it is that in most Languages *the third Person* has its *Genders*, and that even *English* (which allows its Adjectives no Genders at all) has in this Pronoun the triple (*e*) distinction of *He*, *She*, and *It*.

HENCE

(*d*) *Demonstratio ipsa secum genus ostendit.* Priscian. L. XII. p. 942. See *Apoll. de Syntax.* L. II. c. 7. p. 109.

(*e*) The Utility of this Distinction may be better found in supposing it away. Suppose for example we should read in history these words—*He caused him*

HENCE too we see the reason why a *Ch. V.*
single Pronoun (f) to each Person, an I }
 F 4 to

to destroy him—and that we were to be informed the [He], which is here thrice repeated, stood each-time for something different, that is to say, for a Man, for a Woman, and for a City, whose Names were *Alexander*, *Thais*, and *Persepolis*. Taking the Pronoun in this manner, divested of its Genders, how would it appear, which was destroyed; which was the destroyer; and which the cause, that moved to the destruction? But there are no such doubts, when we hear the Genders distinguished; when instead of the ambiguous Sentence, *He* caused *him* to destroy *him*, we are told with the proper distinctions, that *SHE* caused *HIM* to destroy *IT*. Then we know with certainty, what before we could not; that the Promoter was the Woman; that her Instrument was the Hero; and that the Subject of their Cruelty was the unfortunate City.

(f) *Quæritur tamen cur prima quidem Persona & secunda singula Pronomina habeant, tertiam vero sex diversæ indicent voces? Ad quod respondendum est, quod prima quidem & secunda Persona ideo non egent diversis vocibus, quod semper præsentibus inter se sunt, & demonstrativæ; tertia vero Persona modo demonstrativa est, ut, Hic, Ille; modo relativa, ut Is, Ipse, &c. Priscian, L. XII. p. 933.*

Ch. V. to the *First*, and a *Thou* to the *Second*, are abundantly sufficient to all the purposes of Speech. But 'tis not so with respect to the *Third* Person. The various relations of the various Objects exhibited by this (I mean relations of near and distant, present and absent, same and different, definite and indefinite, &c.) made it necessary that here there should not be one, but many Pronouns, such as *He*, *This*, *That*, *Other*, *Any*, *Some*, &c.

It must be confessed indeed, that all these Words do not always appear as *Pronouns*. When they stand by themselves, and represent some Noun, (as when we say, *THIS is Virtue*, or $\delta\epsilon\mu\lambda\iota\mu\omega\varsigma$, *Give me THAT*) then are they *Pronouns*. But when they are associated to some Noun (as when we say, *THIS Habit is Virtue*; or $\delta\epsilon\mu\lambda\iota\mu\omega\varsigma$, *THAT Man* defrauded me) then as they supply not the place of a Noun, but only serve to ascertain one, they fall rather into the Species of *Definitives* or *Articles*. That there is indeed

deed a near relation between *Pronouns* Ch. V. and *Articles*, the old Grammarians have all acknowledged, and some words it has been doubtful to which Class to refer. The best rule to distinguish them is this—The genuine PRONOUN *always stands by itself*, assuming the *Power* of a Noun, and supplying its *place*—The genuine ARTICLE *never stands by itself*, but appears at all times associated to something else, requiring a Noun for its support, as much as *Attributives* or (g) *Adjectives*.

As

(g) Τὸ Ἄρθρον μετὰ ὀνόματι, καὶ ἡ Ἀντωνυμία αὐτ' ὀνόματι. THE ARTICLE *stands with a Noun*; but THE PRONOUN *stands for a Noun*. Apoll. L. I. c. 3. p. 22. Ἀυτὰ ἐν τοῖς ἄρθροις, τῆς πρὸς τὰ ὀνόματα συναρτήσεως ἀποσάμτα, εἰς τὴν ὑποταγμένην ἀντωνυμίαν μεταπίπτει. *Noun Articles themselves, when they quit their Connection with Nouns, pass into such Pronoun, as is proper upon the occasion.* Ibid. Again—Ὅταν τὸ Ἄρθρον μὴ μετ' ὀνόματι παραλαμβάνηται, ποιήσῃ δὲ σύνταξιν ὀνόματι ἢ

προ-

Ch. V. As to the *Coalescence* of these Pronouns, it is, as follows. The First or Second

προεκτεθειμεθα, ἐκ πάσης ἀνάγκης εἰς ἀντωνυμίαν μεταληφθήσεται, εἴγε ἐκ ἐγλιόμενου μετ' ὀνόματ' ὀνόματι δυνάμει ἀντὶ ὀνόματ' παρελήφθη. *When the Article is assumed without the Noun, and has (as we explained before) the same Syntax, which the Noun has; it must of absolute necessity be admitted for a Pronoun, because it appears without a Noun, and yet is in power assumed for one.* Ejusd. L. II. c. 8. p. 113. L. I. c. 45. p. 96. *Inter Pronomina & Articulos hoc interest, quod Pronomina ea putantur, quæ, cum sola sint, vicem nominis complent, ut QUIS, ILLE, ISTE: Articuli vero cum Pronominibus, aut Nominibus, aut Participiis adjunguntur.* Donat. Gram. p. 1753.

Priscian, speaking of the Stoics, says as follows: ARTICULIS autem PRONOMINA connumerantes, FINITOS ea ARTICULOS appellabant; ipsos autem Articulos, quibus nos caremus, INFINITOS ARTICULOS dicebant. Vel, ut alii dicunt, Articulos connumerabant Pronominibus, & ARTICULARIA eos PRONOMINA vocabant, &c. Prisc. L. I. p. 574. *Varro, speaking of Quisque and Hic, calls them both ARTICLES, the first indefinite, the second definite. De Ling. Lat. L. VII. See also L. IX. p. 132. Vossius indeed in his Analogy (L. I. c. 1.) opposes this Doctrine, because Hic has not the same power with the Greek Article,*

Second will, either of them, by themselves coalesce with the 'Third, but not with each other. For example, 'tis good sense, as well as good Grammar, to say in any Language—I AM HE—THOU ART HE—but we cannot say—I AM THOU—nor THOU ART I. The reason is, there is no absurdity for the *Speaker* to be the *Subject* also of the Discourse, as when we say, *I am He*; or for the *Person addrest*; as when we say, *Thou art He*. But for the same Person, in the same circumstances, to be at once the *Speaker*, and the *Party addrest*, this is impossible; and so therefore is the Coalescence of the First and Second Person.

AND now perhaps we have seen enough of *Pronouns*, to perceive how they differ from

ticle, &c. But he did not enough attend to the antient Writers on this Subject, who considered all Words, as ARTICLES, which being associated to Nouns (and not standing in their place) served in any manner to ascertain, and determine their Signification.

Ch. V. from other Substantives. The others are
Primary, these are their *Substitutes*; a
 kind of secondary Race, which were taken
 in aid, when for reasons already (*b*) men-
 tioned the others could not be used. 'Tis
 moreover by means of these, and of Ar-
 ticles, which are nearly allied to them,
 that

(*b*) See these reasons at the beginning of this chap-
 ter, of which reasons the principal one is, that “no
 “Noun, properly so called, implies its own Presence.
 “'Tis therefore to ascertain such Presence, that the Pro-
 “noun is taken in aid; and hence 'tis it becomes
 “equivalent to $\delta\epsilon\iota\chi\epsilon\iota\varsigma$, that is, to *Pointing or Indication*
 “by the Finger.” 'Tis worth remarking in that Verse
 of *Perfius*,

Sed pulebram est DIGITO MONSTRARI, & dicier,
HIC EST,

how the $\delta\epsilon\iota\chi\epsilon\iota\varsigma$, and the Pronoun are introduced toge-
 ther, and made to co-operate to the same end.

Sometimes by virtue of $\delta\epsilon\iota\chi\epsilon\iota\varsigma$ the Pronoun of the
 third Person stands for the first.

Quod si militibus parces, erit HIC quoque Miles.

That is, *I also will be a Soldier.*

Tibul. L. II. El. 6. v. 7. See *Vulpinus*.

that "LANGUAGE, tho' in itself only significant of *general Ideas*, is brought down to denote *that infinitude of Particulars*, which are for ever arising, and ceasing to be." But more of this hereafter in a proper place. Ch. V.

As to the three orders of Pronouns already mentioned, they may be called *Prepositive*, as may indeed all Substantives, because they are capable of introducing or leading a Sentence, without having reference to any thing previous. But besides those there is ANOTHER PRONOUN (in

It may be observed too, that even in Epistolary Correspondence, and indeed in all kinds of Writing, where the Pronouns I and You make their appearance, there is a sort of *implied Presence*, which they are supposed to indicate, though the Parties are in fact at ever so great a distance. And hence the rise of that distinction in *Apollonius*, τὰς μὲν τῆς ὀψῆς εἶναι δεῖξεις, τὰς δὲ τῆς νοῦ, *that some Indications are ocular, and some are mental*. De Syntaxi, L. II. c. 3. p. 104.

Ch. V. (in Greek $\delta\varsigma$, $\omicron\varsigma$ (i); in Latin, *Qui*; in English, *Who, Which, That*) a Pronoun, having a character peculiar to itself, the nature of which may be explained as follows.

SUPPOSE I was to say—LIGHT is a Body, LIGHT moves with great celerity.—
These

(i) The Greeks, it must be confessed, call this Pronoun $\text{υποτακτικόν ἄρθρον}$, the *subjunctive Article*. Yet, as it should seem, this is but an improper Appellation. Apollonius, when he compares it to the προτακτικόν or true *prepositive Article*, not only confesses it to differ, as being expressed by a different Word, and having a different place in every Sentence; but in Syntax he adds, 'tis wholly different. De Syntax. L. I. c. 43. p. 91. Theodore Gaza acknowledges the same, and therefore adds— $\text{ὅθεν δὴ καὶ ὁ κυρίως ἐν τῷ ἄρθρῳ ταῦτι}$ —for these reasons this (meaning the *Subjunctive*) cannot properly be an Article. And just before he says, $\text{κυρίως γεμὴν ἄρθρον τὸ προτακτικόν}$ —however properly speaking 'tis the *Prepositive* is the Article. Gram. Introd. L. IV. The Latins therefore have undoubtedly done better in ranging it with the Pronouns.

These would apparently be two distinct Sentences. Suppose, instead of the Second, LIGHT, I were to place the prepositive Pronoun, IT, and say—LIGHT *is a Body*; IT *moves with great celerity*—the Sentences would still be distinct and two. But if I add a *Connective* (as for Example an AND) saying—LIGHT *is a Body*, AND *it moves with great celerity*—I then by Connection make the two into one, as by cementing many Stones I make one Wall.

Now 'tis *in the united Powers of a Connective, and another Pronoun*, that we may see the force, and character of the Pronoun here treated. Thus therefore, if in the place of AND IT, we substitute THAT, or WHICH, saying LIGHT *is a Body*, WHICH *moves with great celerity*—the Sentence still retains its *Unity and Perfection*, and becomes if possible more compact than before. We may with just reason therefore call this Pronoun the SUBJUNCTIVE, because it cannot (like the

Ch. V. the Prepositive) introduce an original Sentence, but only *serves to subjoin one to some other, which is previous (k)*.

THE

(k) Hence we see why the Pronoun here mentioned is always *necessarily* the Part of some *complex* Sentence, which Sentence contains, either exprest or understood, *two* Verbs, and *two* Nominatives.

Thus in that Verse of Horace,

QUI metuens vivit, liber mihi non erit unquam.

Ille non erit liber—is one Sentence; *qui metuens vivit*—is another. *Ille* and *Qui* are the *two Nominatives*; *Erit* and *Vivit*, the *two Verbs*; and so in all other instances.

The following passage from *Apollonius* (though somewhat corrupt in more places than one) will serve to shew, whence the above Speculations are taken. Τὸ ὑποτακτικὸν ἄρθρον ἐπὶ ῥῆμα ἴδιον φέρεται, συνδεδεμένου διὰ τῆς ἀναφορᾶς τῷ προκειμένῳ ὀνόματι· καὶ ἐντεῦθεν ἀπλῆν λόγον ἔπαρισσάνει κατὰ τὴν τῶν δύο ῥημάτων σύνταξιν (λέγω τὴν ἐν τῷ ὀνόματι, καὶ τὴν ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ ἄρθρῳ) ὅπερ πάλιν παρείπετο τῷ ΚΑΙ συνδέσμῳ. Κοινὸν μὲν (lege ΤΟ ΚΑΙ γὰρ κοινὸν μὲν) παρελάμ-

βαινε

THE Application of this SUBJUNCTIVE, Ch. V.
like the other Pronouns, is universal. It
may

Ἐστω τὸ ὄνομα τὸ προκείμενον, σύμπλεκτον δὲ ἕτερον λόγον πάντως ἢ ἕτερον ῥῆμα παρελάμβανε, ἢ ἔτω τὸ, ΠΑΡΕΓΕΝΕΤΟ Ο ΓΡΑΜΜΑΤΙΚΟΣ, ΟΣ ΔΙΕΛΕΞΑΤΟ, δυνάμει τὸν αὐτὸν ἀποτελεῖ τῷ (sors. τῷ) Ο ΓΡΑΜΜΑΤΙΚΟΣ ΠΑΡΕΓΕΝΕΤΟ, ΚΑΙ ΔΙΕΛΕΞΑΤΟ. *The subjunctive Article, (that is, the Pronoun here mentioned) is applied to a Verb of its own, and yet is connected withal to the antecedent Noun. Hence it can never serve to constitute a simple Sentence, by reason of the Syntax of the two Verbs, I mean that which respects the Noun or Antecedent, and that which respects the Article or Relative. The same too follows as to the Conjunction, AND. This Copulative assumes the Antecedent Noun, which is capable of being applied to many Subjects, and by connecting to it a new Sentence, of necessity assumes a new Verb also. And hence 'tis that the Words—the Grammarian came, WHO discoursed—form in power nearly the same sentence, as if we were to say—the Grammarian came, AND discoursed. Apoll. de Syntaxi, L. I. c. 43. p. 92. See also an ingenious French Treatise, called Grammaire generale & raisonnée, Chap. IX.*

The *Latins*, in their Structure of this Subjunctive, seem to have well represented its compound Nature of part Pronoun, and part Connective, in forming their

Ch. V. may be the Substitute of all kinds of Substantives, natural, artificial, or abstract; as well as general, special, or particular. We may say, the *Animal, Which, &c.* the *Man, Whom, &c.* the *Ship, Which, &c.* *Alexander, Who, &c.* *Bucephalus, That, &c.* *Virtue, Which, &c. &c.*

NAY, it may even be the Substitute of all the other Pronouns, and is of course therefore expressive of all three Persons. Thus we say, I, *WHO now read, have near finished this Chapter*; THOU, *WHO now readeſt*; HE, *WHO now readeth, &c. &c.*

AND thus is THIS SUBJUNCTIVE truly a Pronoun from its *Substitution*, there being

QUI & QUIS from QUE and IS, or (if we go with Scaliger to the Greek) from KAI and 'OΣ, KAI and 'O. Scal. de Caus. Ling. Lat. c. 127.

HOMER also expresses the Force of this *Subjunctive Pronoun* or *Article*, by help of the *Prepositive* and a *Connective*, exactly consonant to the Theory here established. See *Iliad*. A. v. 270, 553. N. 571. II. 54, 157, 158.

ing no Substantive existing, in whose place Ch. V.
 it may not stand. At the same time, it is
essentially distinguished from the other Pro-
 nouns, by this peculiar, that 'tis not only
a Substitute, but withal *a Connective* (1).

AND

(1) Before we quit this Subject, it may not be im-
 proper to remark, that in the *Greek* and *Latin* Tongues
 the two principal Pronouns, that is to say, the First
 and Second Person, the *Ego* and the *Tu* are implied in
 the very Form of the Verb itself (*γράφω, γράφεις,*
scribo, scribis) and are for that reason never *expressed*,
 unless it be to mark a Contradistinction; such as in
Virgil,

Nos patriam fugimus; Tu, Tityre, lentus in umbrâ
Formosam resonare doces &c.

This however is true with respect only to the *Casus*
rectus, or *Nominative* of these Pronouns, but not with
 respect to their *oblique Cases*, which must always be
 added, because tho' we see the *EGO* in *Amo*, and the
TU in *Amas*, we see not the *TE* or *ME* in *Amat*, or
Amant.

Yet even these *oblique Cases* appear in a different
 manner, according as they mark Contradistinction,
 or not. If they contradistinguish, then are they *com-*
monly placed at the beginning of the Sentence, or at
 least before the Verb, or leading Substantive.

Ch. V. AND now to conclude what we have
 said concerning Substantives. All SUB-
 STANTIVES

Thus *Virgil*,

— *Quid Thesea, magnum*
Quid memorem Alciden? Et MI genus ab Jove summo.

Thus *Homer*,

‘ΤΜΙΝ μὲν θεοὶ δοῖεν——
 Παῖδα δὲ ΜΟΙ λύσατε φίλην—— Ιλ. Α.

where the ‘Τμῖν and the Μοὶ stand, as contradistinguished, and both have precedence of their respective Verbs, the ‘Τμῖν even leading the whole Sentence. In other instances, these Pronouns commonly take their place behind the Verb, as may be seen in examples every where obvious. The *Greek Language* went farther still. When the oblique Cases of these Pronouns happened to contradistinguish, they assumed a peculiar Accent of their own, which gave them the name of ὀρθοτονούμεναι, or *Pronouns uprightly accented*. When they marked no such opposition, they not only took their place behind the Verb, but even gave it their Accent, and (as it were) inclined themselves upon it. And hence they acquired the name of Εγκλιτικά, that is; *Leaning or Inclining Pronouns*. The *Greeks* too had in the first person Ἐμῖ, Ἐμοί, Ἐμέ for *Contradistinctives*, and Μῖ, Μοί, Μὲ for *Enclitics*. And hence ’twas that *Apollonius* contended, that in the passage above quoted from the first *Iliad*, we should read παῖδα δ’ ἘΜΟΙ, for

STANTIVES are either *Primary*, or *Se-* Ch. V.
condary, that is to say, according to a Lan-
 guage more familiar and known, are ei-
 ther NOUNS or PRONOUNS. The NOUNS
 denote *Substances*, and those either *Nat-*
ural, *Artificial*, or *Abstract* *. They
 moreover denote Things either *General*, or
Special, or *Particular*. The PRONOUNS,
 their Substitutes, are either *Prepositive*,
 or *Subjunctive*. THE PREPOSITIVE is
 distinguished into *three* Orders called the
First, the *Second*, and the *Third* Person.
 THE SUBJUNCTIVE includes the powers

G 3 of

for *μοῖδ' ἐ* MOI', on account of the Contradistinction, which there occurs between the *Grecians* and *Chryses*. See *Apoll. de Syntaxi* L. I. c. 3. p. 20. L. II. c. 2. p. 102, 103.

This Diversity between the Contradistinctive Pronouns, and the Enclitic, is not unknown even to the *English* Tongue. When we say, *Give me Content*, the (*Me*) in this case is a perfect Enclitic. But when we say, *Give Mé Content*, *Give Him his thousands*, the (*Me*) and (*Him*) are no Enclitics, but as they stand in opposition, assume an Accent of their own, and so become the true ὀρθοτονούμεναι.

* See before p. 37, 38.

Ch. V. of all those three, having *superadded*, as of its own, the peculiar force of a *Connective*.

HAVING done with SUBSTANTIVES,
we now proceed to ATTRIBUTIVES.

C H A P.


CHAP. VI.

Concerning Attributives.


ATTIBUTIVES are *all those principal Words, that denote Attributes, considered as Attributes.* Such for example are the Words, *Black, White, Great, Little, Wise, Eloquent, Writeth, Wrote, Writing, &c (a).* Ch.VI.

How-

(a) In the above list of Words are included what Grammarians called *Adjectives, Verbs, and Participles*, in as much as *all of them equally denote the Attributes of Substance.* Hence 'tis, that as they are all from their very nature the Predicates in a Proposition (being all predicated of some Subject or Substance, *Snow is white, Cicero writeth, &c.*) hence I say the Appellation PHMA or VERB is employed by Logicians in an extended Sense to denote them all. Thus Ammonius explaining the reason, why Aristotle in his Tract *de Interpretatione* calls λευκός a Verb, tells us πᾶσαν Φωνήν, κακηγορούμενου ὅρου ἐν πρώτῳ ποιῶσαν, 'PHMA καλεῖσθαι, *that every Sound articulate, that forms the*

Ch. VI.  HOWEVER, previously to these, and to every other possible Attribute, whatever a thing may be, whether black or white, square or round, wise or eloquent, writing or thinking, it must *first* of necessity EXIST, before it can possibly be any thing else. For EXISTENCE may be considered as *an universal Genus*, to which all things of all kinds are at all times to be referr'd. The Verbs therefore, which denote it, claim precedence of all others, as being essential to the very being of every Proposition, in which they may still be found, either *express*, or by *implication*; express, as when we say, *The Sun is bright*; by im-

Predicate in a Proposition, is called a VERB. p. 24. Edit. Ven. Priscian's observation, though made on another occasion, is very pertinent to the present. *Non Declinatio, sed proprietates excutienda est significationis.* L. II. p. 576. And in another place he says—*non similitudo declinationis omnimodo conjungit vel discernit partes orationis inter se, sed vis ipsius significationis.* L. XIII. p. 970.

implication, as when we say, *The Sun* Ch.VI.
rises, which means, when resolved, *The* 
Sun is rising (b).

THE Verbs, *Is*, *Groweth*, *Becometh*,
Est, *Fit*, ὑπάρχει, ἐστὶ, πέλει, γίγνεται, are
all of them used to express this *general*
Genus. The *Latins* have called them
Verba substantiva, *Verbs substantive*, but
the *Greeks* ῥήματα ὑπαρκτικά, *Verbs of*
Existence, a Name more apt, as being
of greater latitude, and comprehending
equally as well *Attribute*, as *Substance*.
The principal of those Verbs, and which
we shall here particularly consider, is the
Verb, ἔστι, *Est*, *Is*.

NOW all EXISTENCE is either abso-
lute or qualified—*absolute*, as when we
say, B *is*; *qualified*, as when we say, B
IS AN ANIMAL; B IS BLACK, IS ROUND,
&c.

WITH

(b) See *Metaphys. Aristot.* L.V. c. 7. Edit. Du-Vall.

Ch. VI. WITH respect to this difference, the Verb (is) can by itself express *absolute Existence*, but never the *qualified*, without subjoining the particular Form, because the Forms of Existence being in number infinite, if the particular Form be not express'd, we cannot know which is intended. And hence it follows, that when (is) only serves to subjoin some such Form, it has little more force, than that of *a mere Assertion*. 'Tis under the same character, that it becomes a latent part in every other Verb, by expressing that Assertion, which is one of their Essentials. Thus, as was observed just before, *Riseth* means, *is rising*; *Writeth*, *is writing*.

AGAIN—As to EXISTENCE in general, it is either *mutable*, or *immutable*; *mutable*, as in the *Objects of Sensation*; *immutable*, as in the *Objects of Intellection and Science*. Now *mutable* Objects exist all in *Time*, and admit the several Distinctions

inctions of present, past, and future. Ch.VI.
 But *immutable Objects know no such Di-*
stinctions, but rather stand opposed to all
 things temporary.

AND hence two different Significations
 of the substantive Verb (IS) according
 as it denotes *mutable*, or *immutable* Be-
 ing.

FOR example, if we say, *This Orange*
is ripe, (IS) meaneth, *that it existeth so*
now at this present, in opposition to *past*
time, when it was green, and to *future*
time, when it will be rotten.

BUT if we say, *The Diameter of the*
Square is incommensurable with its side,
 we do not intend by (IS) that it is incom-
 mensurable *now*, having been *formerly*
 commensurable, or being to become so
hereafter; on the contrary we intend that
Perfection of Existence, to which *Time*
 and *its Distinctions* are utterly unknown.
 'Tis under the same meaning we employ
 this

Ch. VI. this Verb, when we say, TRUTH IS, or, GOD IS. The opposition is not of *Time present to other Times*, but of *necessary Existence to all temporary Existence whatever* (c). And so much for *Verbs of Existence*, commonly called *Verbs substantive*.

WE are now to descend to the common Herd of Attributives, such as *black* and *white*, *to write*, *to speak*, *to walk*, &c. among which when compared and opposed to each other, one of the most eminent distinctions appears to be this. Some, by being joined to a proper Substantive,

(c) *Cum enim dicimus, DEUS EST, non eum dicimus NUNC ESSE, sed tantum IN SUBSTANTIA ESSE, ut hoc ad immutabilitatem potius substantiæ, quam ad tempus aliquod referatur. Si autem dicimus, DIES EST, ad nullam diei substantiam pertinet, nisi tantum ad temporis constitutionem; hoc enim, quod significat, tale est, tanquam si dicamus, NUNC EST. Quare cum dicimus ESSE, ut substantiam designemus, simpliciter EST addimus; cum vero ita ut aliquid præsens significetur, secundum Tempus. Boeth. in Lib. de Interpr. p. 307. See also Plat. Tim. p. 37, 38. Edit. Serrani.*

stantive *make* without farther help a perfect assertive Sentence; while the rest, tho' otherwise perfect, are in this respect deficient.

To explain by an example. When we say, *Cicero eloquent*, *Cicero wise*, these are imperfect Sentences, though they denote a Substance and an Attribute. The reason is, that they want an *Assertion*, to shew that such Attribute appertains to such Substance. We must therefore call in the help of an Assertion elsewhere, an (*is*) or a (*was*) to complete the Sentence, saying, *Cicero is wise*, *Cicero was eloquent*. On the contrary, when we say, *Cicero writeth*, *Cicero walketh*, in instances like these there is no such occasion, because the Words (*writeth*) and (*walketh*) imply in their own Form not an Attribute only, but an Assertion likewise. Hence 'tis they may be resolved, the one into *Is* and *Writing*, the other into *Is* and *Walking*.

Now

Ch.VI. Now all those Attributives, which have this complex Power of denoting both an Attribute and an Assertion, make that Species of Words, which Grammarians call VERBS. If we resolve this complex Power into its distinct Parts, and take *the Attribute alone* without the Assertion, then have we PARTICIPLES. All other Attributives, besides the two Species before, are included together in the general Name of ADJECTIVES.

AND thus is it, that ALL ATTRIBUTIVES are either VERBS, PARTICIPLES, or ADJECTIVES.

BESIDES the Distinctions abovementioned, there are others, which deserve notice. Some Attributes have their Essence in *Motion*; such are *to walk, to fly, to strike, to live*. Others have it in the *privation of Motion*; such are *to stop, to rest, to cease, to die*. And lastly, others have it in subjects, *which have nothing to*

do with either Motion or its Privation; Ch. VI.
 such are the Attributes of, *Great and Little, White and Black, Wise and Foolish,*
 and in a word the several *Quantities*, and
Qualities of all Things. Now these last
 are ADJECTIVES; those which denote
Motions, or their *Privation*, are either
 VERBS or PARTICIPLES.

AND this Circumstance leads to a farther Distinction, which may be explain'd as follows. That *all Motion is in Time*, and therefore, wherever it exists, implies *Time* as its concomitant, is evident to all and requires no proving. But besides this, *all Rest or Privation of Motion implies Time likewise*. For how can a thing be said to rest or stop, by being in *one Place* for *one Instant* only?—so too is that thing, which moves with the greatest velocity. † To stop therefore or rest, is to be in *one Place* for *more than one Instant*, that is to say,
during

† Thus Proclus in the Beginning of his Treatise concerning Motion. Ηρεμῶν ἐστὶ τὸ ἀπώτερον καὶ ὕστερον ἐν τῇ αὐτῇ τόπῳ ὄν, καὶ αὐτὸ, καὶ τὰ μέγ.

Ch. VI. *during an Extension between two Instants,*
 and *this* of course gives us the Idea of
 TIME. As therefore *Motions* and their *Pri-*
vation imply *Time* as their Concomitant, so
 VERBS, which denote them, come to de-
 note TIME also (d). And hence the Origin
 and Use of TENSES, “ which are so many
 “ different Forms, assigned to each Verb,
 “ to shew, without altering its principal
 “ Meaning, the various TIMES in which
 “ such Meaning may exist.” Thus *Scri-*
bit, Scripsit, Scripserat, and Scribet, denote
 all equally the Attribute, *To Write*, while
 the difference between them, is, that they
 denote *Writing in different Times.*

SHOULD

(d) The antient Authors of Dialectic or Logic have well described this Property. The following is part of their Definition of a Verb—*ῥῆμα δὲ ἐστὶ τὸ προσσημαῖνον χρόνον, a Verb is something, which signifies Time* OVER AND ABOVE (for such is the force of the Proposition, Πρὸς.) If it should be asked, *over and above what?* It may be answered over and above its principal Signification, which is to denote some moving and energizing Attribute. See *Arist. de Interpret. c. 3.* together with his Commentators *Ammonius* and *Boethius.*

SHOULD it be asked, whether *Time* it- Ch.VI.
 self may not become upon occasion the
 Verb's *principal* Signification; 'tis answer-
 ed, No. And this appears, because *the*
same Time may be denoted by different
 Verbs (as in the Words, *writeth* and *speak-*
eth) and *different Times* by the same Verb
 (as in the Words, *writeth* and *wrote*) nei-
 ther of which could happen, were *Time*
 any thing more, than a meer *Concomitant*.
 Add to this, that when Words denote
 Time, not collaterally, but principally,
 they cease to be Verbs, and become either
 Adjectives, or Substantives. Of the Ad-
 jective kind are *Timely*, *Yearly*, *Dayly*,
Hourly, &c. of the Substantive kind are
Time, *Year*, *Day*, *Hour*, &c.

THE most obvious Division of TIME is
 into Present, Past, and Future, nor is any
 Language complete, whose Verbs have
 not TENSES, to mark these Distinctions.
 But we may go still farther. Time past
 and future are both *infinitely* extended.

H

Hence

Ch. VI. Hence 'tis that in *universal Time past* we may assume *many particular Times past*, and in *universal Time future*, *many particular Times future*, some more, some less remote, and corresponding to each other under different relations. Even *present Time itself* is not exempt from these Differences, and as necessarily implies *some degree of Extension*, as does every given Line, however minute.

HERE then we are to seek for the Reason, which first introduced into Language that variety of Tenses. It was not it seems enough to denote *indefinitely* (or by Aorists) mere Present, Past, or Future, but 'twas necessary on many occasions to define with more precision, *what kind* of Past, Present, or Future. And hence the multiplicity of Futures, Præterits, and even Present Tenses, with which all Languages are found to abound, and without which it would be difficult to ascertain our Ideas.

How-

HOWEVER as the Knowledge of TENSES Ch. VI. depends on the Theory of TIME, and this is a subject of no mean Speculation, we shall reserve it by itself for the following Chapter.

H 2 C H A P.

C H A P. VII.

Concerning Time, and Tenses.

C. VII. **T**IME and SPACE have this in common, that they are both of them by nature things *continuous*, and as such they both of them imply *Extension*. Thus between *London* and *Salisbury* there is the Extension of *Space*, and between *Yesterday* and *To-morrow*, the Extension of *Time*. But in this they differ, that all the Parts of Space exist *at once* and *together*, while those of Time only exist *in Transition* or *Succession* (a). Hence then we may gain some Idea of TIME, by considering it under the
 notion

(a) See Vol. I. p. 275. Note XIII. To which we may add, what is said by *Ammonius*—ὁ δὲ γὰρ ὁ χρόνος ὅλος ἅμα ὑφίσταται, ἀλλ' ἢ κατὰ μέρος τὸ ΝΥΝ· εἰ γὰρ τῷ γίνεσθαι καὶ φθείρεσθαι τὸ εἶναι ἔχει. TIME doth not subsist the whole at once, but only in a single NOW or INSTANT; for it hath its Existence in becoming and in ceasing to be. Amm. in Predicam. p. 82. b.

notion of a *transient Continuity*. Hence C.VII.
 also, as far as the affections and proper-
 ties of *Transition* go, Time is *different*
 from Space; but as to those of *Exten-*
sion and *Continuity*, they perfectly co-
incide.

LET us take, for example, such a part
 of Space, as a Line. In every given LINE
 we may assume any where a *Point*, and
 therefore in every given *Line* there may be
 assumed infinite *Points*. So in every given
 TIME we may assume any where a *Now*
 or *Instant*, and therefore in every given
Time there may be assumed infinite *Nows*
 or *Instants*.


FARTHER still—A POINT is the *Bound*
 of every finite *Line*; and A NOW or IN-
 STANT, of every finite *Time*. But altho'
 they are *Bounds*, they are neither of them
Parts, neither the *Point* of any *Line*, nor
 the *Now* or *Instant* of any *Time*. If this
 appear strange, we may remember, that
 the *Parts* of any thing *extended* are neces-

C.VII. *farily extended* also, it being essential to their character, *that they should measure their Whole.* But if a *Point* or *Now* were extended, each of them would contain within it self *infinite other Points*, and *infinite other Nows* (for these may be assumed infinitely within the minuteſt Extension) and this, 'tis evident, would be abſurd and impoſſible.

THESE Assertions therefore being admitted, and both *Points* and *Nows* being taken as *Bounds*, but not as *Parts* (b), it will follow,

(b) —Φανερόν ὅτι ἔδὲ μέρος τὸ ΝΥΝ τῷ χρόνῳ, ὥσπερ ἔδ' αἱ σιγμαὶ τῆς γραμμῆς· αἱ δὲ γραμμαὶ οὐ τῆς μίας μόρια. 'Tis evident that A NOW or Instant is no more a part of Time, than POINTS are of a Line. The Parts indeed of one Line are two other Lines. Natur. Aufc. L. IV. c. 17. And not long before.—Τὸ δὲ ΝΥΝ ἢ μέρος μετρεῖ, τε γὰρ τὸ μέρος, καὶ σύγκεισθαι δεῖ τὸ ὅλον ἐκ τῶν μερῶν· ὁ δὲ ΧΡΟΝΟΣ ἢ δοκεῖ σύγκεισθαι ἐκ τῶν ΝΥΝ. A NOW is no Part of Time; for a Part is able to measure its Whole, and the Whole is necessarily made up of its Parts; but TIME doth not appear to be made up of Nows. Ibid. c. 14.

follow, that in the same manner as *the same* C.VII.
Point may be the *End* of one Line, and the
Beginning of another, so the *same Now* or
Instant may be the *End* of one Time,
and the *Beginning* of another. Let us
suppose for example, the Lines. A B, B C.



I say that the Point B, is the End of the
Line A B, and the Beginning of the Line,
B C. In the same manner let us suppose
A B, B C to represent certain Times, and
let B be a *Now* or *Instant*. In such case
I say that the *Instant* B is the End of the
Time A B, and the Beginning of the Time,
B C. I say likewise of these two Times,
that with respect to the *Now* or *Instant*,
which they include, the first of them is
necessarily PAST TIME, as being *previous*
to it; the other is necessarily FUTURE, as
being *subsequent*. As therefore every Now

C.VII. or INSTANT always exists in Time, and without being Time, is *Time's Bound*; the Bound of *Completion* to the *Past*, and the Bound of *Commencement* to the *Future*; from hence we may conceive its nature or end, which is *to be the Medium of Continuity between the Past and the Future, so as to render Time, thro' all its Parts, one Intire and Perfect Whole* (c).

FROM the above Speculations, there follow some Conclusions, which may be perhaps called Paradoxes, till they have been attentively considered. In the first place *there cannot* (strictly speaking) *be any such*

(c) Τὸ δὲ ΝΤ~Ν ἐστὶ συνέχεια χρόνου, ὥσπερ ἐλέχθη· συνέχει γὰρ τὸν χρόνον, τὸν παρελθόντα καὶ ἐσόμενον, καὶ ὅλως πέρας χρόνον ἐστίν· ἐστὶ γὰρ τῷ μὲν ἀρχὴ, τῷ δὲ τελευτή. A Now or Instant is (as was said before) the Continuity or holding together of Time; for it makes Time continuous, the past and the future, and is in general its Boundary, as being the Beginning of one Time and the Ending of another. Natur. Aufcult. L. IV. c. 19. Συνέχεια in this place means not Continuity, as standing for Extension, but rather that *Junction* or *Holding together*, by which Extension is imparted to other things.

such thing as Time present. For if all Time C.VII.
 be *transient* as well as *continuous*, it cannot
 like a Line be present all together, but part
 will necessarily be gone, and part be com-
 ing. If therefore any portion of its Con-
 tinuity were to be present *at once*, it would
 so far quit its *transient* nature, and be *Time*
 no longer. But if no Portion of its Con-
 tinuity can be thus present, how can *Time*
 possibly be *present*, to which such Conti-
 nuity is essential?

FARTHER than this—If there be no
 such thing as *Time Present*, there can be *no*
Sensation of Time by any one of the Senses.
 FOR ALL SENSATION is of the † *Present only*,
 the Past being preserved not by *Sense* but by
Memory, and the Future being anticipated
 by *Prudence* only and wise *Forefight*.

BUT if *no Portion* of Time be the ob-
 ject of *any Sensation*; farther, if the Pre-
 sent

† Ταυτῇ γὰρ (αἰσθήσει sc.) οὔτε τὸ μέλλον, οὔτε
 τὸ γιγνόμενον γνωρίζομεν, ἀλλὰ τὸ παρὸν μόνον.
 Αἰσ. περὶ Μνήμ. Α. α.

C.VII. sent *never* exist; if the Past be *no more*; if the Future be not *as yet*; and if these are all the Parts, out of which TIME is compounded: how strange and shadowy a Being do we find it? How nearly approaching to a perfect Non-entity (*d*)? Let us try however, since the Senses fail us, if we have not Faculties of higher power, to seize this fleeting Being.

THE World has been likened to a variety of Things, but it appears to resemble no one more, than some moving Spectacle

(*d*) "Οτι μὲν ἔν ὅλῳς ἔκ ἔστιν, ἢ μόγις καὶ ἡμιδρῶς, ἐκ τῶν δὲ τις αὖ ὑποπτεύσει· τὸ μὲν γὰρ αὐτῷ γέγονε, καὶ ἔκ ἔστι· τὸ δὲ μέλλει, καὶ ἔπω ἔστιν· ἐκ δὲ τῶν καὶ ὁ ἄπειρος καὶ ὁ αἰὲ λαμβανόμενος χρόνος σύγκειται· τὸ δ' ἐκ μὴ ὄντων σύγκείμενον, αἰδύατον ἐν δόξει κατέχειν ποτὲ ἐσίας. *That therefore TIME exists not at all, or at least has but a faint and obscure existence, one may suspect from hence. A part of it has been, and is no more; a part of it is coming, and is not as yet; and out of these is made that infinite Time, which is ever to be assumed still farther and farther. Now that which is made up of nothing but Non-entities, it should seem was impossible ever to participate of Entity.* Natural. Aufc. L. IV. c. 14. See also Philop. M S. Com. in Nicomach. p. 10.

tacle (such as a Procession or a Triumph) C. VII. that abounds in every part with splendid Objects, some of which are still departing, as fast as others make their appearance. The Senses look on, while the sight passes, perceiving as much as is *immediately present*, which they report *with tolerable accuracy* to the Soul's superior Powers. Having done this, they have done their duty, being concerned with nothing, save what is present and instantaneous. But to the *Memory*, to the *Imagination*, and above all to the *Intellect*, the several *Nows* or *Instants* are not lost, as to the *Senses*, but are preserved and made Objects of *steady* comprehension, however in their own nature they may be *transitory* and *passing*. "Now 'tis from contemplating two
 "or more of these Instants under one view,
 "together with that Interval of Continuity,
 "which subsists between them, that we
 "acquire insensibly the Idea of TIME (*e*)."

For

(d) Τότε φαμέν γεγονέναι χρόνον, ὅταν τῷ προτέρῳ καὶ ὑστέρῳ ἐν τῇ κινήσει αἰσθησιν λάβωμεν. Ὅριζομεν

δὲ


C.VII. For example : *The Sun rises* ; this I remember ; *it rises again* ; this too I remember. These Events are not together ; there

16

ὅς τῳ ἄλλο καὶ ἄλλο ὑπολαβεῖν αὐτὰ, καὶ μεταξύ τι αὐτῶν ἕτερον· ὅταν γὰρ τὰ ἄκρα ἕτερα τῷ μέσῳ νοήσωμεν, καὶ δύο εἴπῃ ἡ ψυχὴ τὰ Νῦν, τὸ μὲν πρότερον, τὸ δὲ ὕστερον, τότε καὶ τῷτο φαμὲν εἶναι ΧΡΟΝΟΝ. 'Tis then we say there has been TIME, when we can acquire a Sensation of prior and subsequent in Motion. But we distinguish and settle these two, by considering one first, then the other, together with an interval between them different from both. For as often as we conceive the Extremes to be different from the Mean, and the Soul talks of two Nows, one prior and the other subsequent, then 'tis we say there is TIME, and this 'tis we call TIME. Natural. Aufcult. L. IV. c. 16. Themistius's Comment upon this passage is to the same purpose. Ὅταν γὰρ ὁ νῦν ἀναμνησθεὶς τῷ Νῦν, ὃ χθὲς εἶπεν, ἕτερον πάλιν εἶπῃ τὸ τήμερον, τότε καὶ χρόνον ἐκθὺς ἐνενόησεν, ὑπὸ τῶν δύο Νῦν ὀριζόμενον, οἷον ὑπὸ περάτων διῶν· καὶ ἔτω λέγειν ἔχει, ὅτι πρὸς ἑστὶ πεντεκάδεκα ὥρων, ἢ ἐκκάδεκα, οἷον ἐξ ἀπείρου γραμμῆς πεντακάδεκα σημεῖοις ἀποτεμνόμενος. For when the Mind, remembling the Now, which it talked of yesterday, talks again of another Now to-day, then 'tis it immediately has an idea of TIME, terminated by these two Nows, as by two Boundaries ; and thus is it enabled to say, that the Quantity is of fifteen, or of sixteen hours, as if it were to sever a Cubit's length from an infinite Line by two Points. Themist. Op. edit. Aldi, p. 45. b.

is an *Extension* between them—not how- C. VII.
 ever of *Space*, for we may suppose the Place
 of rising the same, or at least to exhibit no
 sensible difference. Yet still we recognize
some Extension between them. Now what
 is this Extension, *but a natural Day*? And
 what is that, but pure *Time*? 'Tis after the
 same manner, by recognizing two new
 Moons, and the Extension between these:
 two vernal Equinoxes, and the Extension
 between these; that we gain Ideas of other
 Times, such as *Months* and *Years*, which are
 all so many Intervals, described as above;
 that is to say, *passing Intervals of Continuity*
between two Instants viewed together.

AND thus 'tis THE MIND acquires the
 Idea of TIME. But this Time it must be
 remembred is PAST TIME ONLY, which
 is always the *first* Species; that occurs to
 the human Intellect. How then do we
 acquire the Idea of TIME FUTURE? The
 answer is, we acquire it *by Anticipation*.
 Should it be demanded still farther, *And*
what is Anticipation? We answer, that in
 2 this

C. VII.  this case 'tis a kind of reasoning by analogy from similar to similar; from Successions of Events, that are past already, to similar Successions, that are presumed hereafter. For example: I observe as far back as my memory can carry me, how every day has been succeeded by a night; that night, by another day; that day, by another night; and so downwards in order to the Day that is now. Hence then I *anticipate a similar Succession* from the present Day, and thus gain the Idea of Days and Nights *in futurity*. After the same manner, by attending to the periodical Returns of New and Full Moons; of Springs, Summers, Autumns and Winters, all of which in Time past I find never to have failed, I *anticipate a like orderly and diversified Succession*, which makes Months, and Seasons, and Years, *in Time future*.

WE go farther than this, and not only thus anticipate in these *natural* Periods, but even in matters of *human* and *civil* concern. For example: Having observed in many
past

past instances how Health had succeeded C. VII.
to Exercise, and Sickness to Sloth; we an-
ticipate *future* Health to those, who, being
now sickly, use exercise; and *future* Sick-
ness to those, who, being *now* healthy, are
slothful. 'Tis a variety of such observa-
tions, all respecting one subject, which when
systematized by just reasoning, and made
habitual by due practice, form the charac-
ter of a Master-Artist, or Man of *practical*
Wisdom. If they respect the human Body
(as above) they form the Physician; if mat-
ters military, the General; if matters na-
tional, the Statesman; if matters of private
life, the Moralist; and the same in other
Subjects. All these several Characters in
their respective ways may be said to possess
a kind of prophetic discernment, which not
only presents them *the barren prospect* of
Futurity (a prospect not hid from the mean-
est of Men) but shews withal those Events,
which are likely to attend it, and thus en-
ables them to act with superior certainty
and rectitude. And hence it is, that (if we
except those, who have had diviner assist-
ances)

C. VII. ances) we may justly say, as was said of old,
 { *He's the best Prophet, who conjectures
 well (f).*

FROM

(f) Μάντις δ' ἄριστος, ὅστις ἐκάζει καλῶς.

So Milton.

*Till old Experience do attain
 To something like Prophetic Strain.'*

*Et facile existimari potest, Prudentiam esse quodam-
 modo Divinationem.*

Corn. Nep. in Vit. Attici.

There is nothing appears so clearly an object of the MIND or INTELLECT ONLY, as *the Future* does, since we can find no place for its existence any where else. Not but the same, if we consider, is equally true of *the Past*. For tho' it may have once had another kind of being, when (according to common Phrase) *it actually was*, yet was it then something *Present*, and not something *Past*. As *Past*, it has no existence but in THE MIND or MEMORY, since had it in fact any other, it could not properly be called *Past*. 'Twas this intimate connection between TIME, and the SOUL, that made some Philosophers doubt, *whether if there was no Soul, there could be any Time*, since Time appears to have its Being in no other region. Πότερον δὲ μὴ ἔσης ψυχῆς εἴη αὖ ὁ χρόνος, ἀπορήσειεν αὖ τις, κ. τ. λ. Natur. Aufcult. L. IV. c. 20. Themistius, who comments the above passage, expresses himself more positively. Εἰ τοίνυν διχῶς λέγεται τότε ἀριθμητὸν καὶ τὸ ἀριθμώμενον, τὸ μὲν τὸ ἀριθμητὸν δηλαδὲ δυνάμει, τὸ δὲ ἐν-εργείᾳ, τὰ ταῦτα δὲ ἔκ αὖ ὑπερ-αίη, μὴ ὅντος τῆ ἀριθμή-
 σοντες

FROM what has been reasoned it ap- C.VII.
 pears, that Knowledge of *the Future*
 comes from Knowledge of *the Past*; as
 does Knowledge of *the Past* from Know-
 ledge of *the Present*, so that their Order
 to us is that of PRESENT, PAST, and
 FUTURE.

OF these Species of Knowledge, that of
 the *Present* is the lowest, not only as *first in*
perception, but as far the more extensive,
 being necessarily common to all *animal Be-*
ings, and reaching even to Zoophytes, as
 far as they possess *Sensation*. Knowledge
 of *the Past* comes next, which is superior
 to the *former*, as being confined to those
 Animals, that have *Memory* as well as
Senses. Knowledge of *the Future* comes
 last,

συντος μήτε δυνάμει μήτε ἐνεργείᾳ, Φανερόν ὡς οὐκ εἶναι ὁ
 χρόνος εἶναι, μὴ ἔσσης ψυχῆς. Them. p. 48. Edit.
 Aldi. Vid. etiam ejusd. Comm. in Lib. de An. p. 94.

C. VII. last, as being derived from the other two,
 and which is for that reason *the most ex-*
 cellent as well as *the most rare*, since Na-
 ture in her superadditions rises from worse
 always to better, and is never found to
 sink from better down to worse*.

Arist. de
 An. II. 3.
 p. 28.


AND now having seen, how we acquire
 the Knowledge of *Time past*, and *Time*
future; which is first in perception, which
 first in dignity; which more common,
 which more rare; let us compare them
 both to the *present Now* or *Instant*, and
 examine what relations they maintain to-
 wards it.

IN the first place there may be *Times*
 both *past* and *future*, in which the *pre-*
sent Now has no existence, as for example
 in *Yesterday*, and *To-morrow*.

AGAIN,

* See below, Note (r) of this Chapter.

AGAIN, the *present Now* may so far be- C.VII.
 long to *Time* of either sort, as to be *the*
End of the past, and *the Beginning* of the
 future; but it cannot be included *within*
 the limits of either. For if it were possible,
 let us suppose C the *present Now* included



within the limits of the *past Time* A D.
 In such case C D, part of the past Time
 A D, will be subsequent to C the *present*
Now, and so of course be *future*. But
 by the Hypothesis it is *past*, and so will be
 both Past and Future at once, which is
 absurd. In the same manner we prove
 that C cannot be included within the li-
 mits of a *future Time*, such as B E.

WHAT then shall we say of such *Times*,
 as *this Day*, *this Month*, *this Year*, *this*

C.VII. Century, all which include within them *the present Now?* They cannot be *past Times* or *future*, from what has been proved; and *present Time has no existence*, as has been proved likewise *. Or shall we allow them to be present, *from the present Now, which exists within them*; so that from the Presence of *that* we call *these* also present, tho' the shortest among them has infinite parts always absent? If so, and in conformity to custom we allow such *Times present*, as present Days, Months, Years, and Centuries, each must of necessity be *a compound of the Past and the Future*, divided from each other by some present Now or Instant, and *jointly called PRESENT*, while that *Now remains within them*. Let us suppose for example the Time XY, which

f . . . X A B C D E Y . . . *g*

let

* Sup. p. 104.

let us call a Day, or a Century ; and let C.VII.
the present *Now* or *Instant* exist at A. }
I say, in as much as A exists within
XY, that therefore XA is Time past,
and AY Time future, and the whole
XA, AY, *Time present*. The same
holds, if we suppose the present Now to
exist at B, or C, or D, or E, or any
where before Y. When the present Now
exists at Y, then is the whole XY *Time*
past, and still more so, when the Now
gets to g, or onwards. In like manner
before the Present Now entered X, as
for example when it was at f, then was
the whole XY *Time future*; 'twas the
same, when the present Now was at
X. When it had past that, then XY
became *Time present*. And thus 'tis that
TIME IS PRESENT, while passing, in its
PRESENT NOW OR INSTANT. 'Tis the
same indeed here, as it is in *Space*. A
Sphere passing over a Plane, and being
for that reason present to it, is only pre-
sent to that Plane *in a single Point at once*,

C.VII. while during the whole progression its
Parts absent are *infinite* (g).

FROM what has been said, we may
perceive that ALL TIME, of every deno-
mination,

(g) PLACE, according to the antients, was either mediate, or immediate. I am (for example) in *Europe*, because I am in *England*; in *England*, because in *Wiltshire*; in *Wiltshire*, because in *Salisbury*; in *Salisbury*, because in *my own house*; in *my own house*, because in *my study*. Thus far **MEDIATE PLACE**. And what is my **IMMEDIATE PLACE**? 'Tis the internal Bound of that containing Body (whatever it be) which co-incides with the external Bound of my own Body. Τὸ περιέχοντος πῶτος, καὶ ὃ περιέχει τὸ περιεχόμενον. Now as this immediate Place is included within the limits of all the former Places, 'tis from this relation that those mediate Places also are called each of them *my Place*, tho' the least among them so far exceed my magnitude. To apply this to **TIME**. The *Present Century* is present in the *present Year*; that, in the *present Month*; that, in the *present Day*; that, in the *present Hour*; that, in the *present Minute*. 'Tis thus by circumscription within circumscription that we arrive at THAT REAL AND INDIVISIBLE INSTANT, which by being itself the very *Essence of the Present*, diffuses **PRESENCE** throughout

nomination, is divisible and extended. But C. VII.
 if so, then whenever we suppose a definite
Time, even though it be a *Time present*, it
 must needs have a *Beginning*, a *Middle*,
 and an *End*. And so much for *TIME*.

Now from the above Doctrine of *TIME*,
 we propose by way of Hypothesis the fol-
 lowing Theorie of *TENSES*.

THE TENSES are used to mark Present,
 Past, and Future Time, either *indefinitely*

I 4

with-

all, even the largest of Times, which are found to in-
 clude it within their respective limits. *Nicephorus Blem-*
mides speaks much to the same purpose. Ένεσως εν
 χρόνος ἐστίν ὁ ἐφ' ἐκότερα παρακείμενος τῷ κυρίως
 ΝΥΝ· χρόνος μερικὸς, ἐκ παρεληλυθότος καὶ μέλλοντος
 συνεχώς, καὶ διὰ τὴν πρὸς τὸ κυρίως ΝΥΝ γεινίασιν,
 ΝΥΝ λεγόμενος καὶ αὐτός. *PRESENT TIME* there-
 fore is that which adjoins to the *REAL NOW* or *INSTANT*
 on either side, being a limited Time made up of Past and
 Future, and from its vicinity to that *REAL NOW* said to
 be *Now* also itself. Ἐπιλ. Φυσικῆς Κεφ. θ'. See also
Arist. Physic. L. IV. c. 6. L. VI. c. 2, 3, &c.

C. VII. without reference to any Beginning, Middle, or End; or else *definitely*, in reference to such distinctions.

IF *indefinitely*, then have we THREE TENSES, an Aorist of the Present, an Aorist of the Past, and an Aorist of the Future. If *definitely*, then have we three Tenses to mark the *Beginnings* of these three Times; three, to denote their *Middles*; and three to denote their *Ends*; in all NINE.

THE three first of these Tenses we call the Inceptive Present, the Inceptive Past, and the Inceptive Future. The three next, the Middle Present, the Middle Past, and the Middle Future. And the three last, the Complotive Present, the Complotive Past, and the Complotive Future,

AND thus 'tis, that the TENSES in their natural Number appear to be TWELVE;
three

three to denote Time absolute, and nine to C.VII. denote it under its respective distinctions.

Aorist of the Present,

Γράφω. *Scribo.* I write.

Aorist of the Past,

Ἐγραψα. *Scripti.* I wrote.

Aorist of the Future.

Γράψω. *Scribam.* I shall write.

Inceptive Present.

Μέλλω γράφειν. *Scripturus sum.* I am going to write.

Middle or extended Present.

Τυγχάνω γράφων. *Scribo* or *Scribens sum,* I am writing.

Completive Present,

Γέγραφα. *Scripti.* I have written.

Inceptive Past.

Ἐμελλον γράφειν. *Scripturus eram.* I was beginning to write.

Middle

C. VII.

Middle or extended Past.

Ἐγραφον or ἐτύχανον γράφω. *Scribebam.*
I was writing.

Completive Past.

Ἐγεγράφειν. *Scripseram.* I had done writing.

Inceptive Future.

Μελλήσω γράφειν. *Scripturus ero.* I shall be beginning to write.

Middle or extended Future.

Ἔσομαι γράφων. *Scribens ero.* I shall be writing.

Completive Future.

Ἔσομαι γεγραφώς. *Scripsero.* I shall have done writing.

It is not to be expected that the above Hypothesis should be justified through all instances in every language. It fares with
Tenses,

Tenses, as with other Affections of Speech; C. VII. be the Language upon the whole ever so perfect, much must be left, in defiance of all Analogy, to the harsh laws of mere Authority and Chance.

It may not however be improper to inquire, what traces may be discovered in favour of this System, either in Languages themselves, or in those authors who have written upon this part of Grammar, or lastly in the nature and reason of things.

IN the first place, as to AORISTS. *Aorists* are usually by Grammarians referred to the *Past*; such are ἦλθον, *I went*; ἔπεσον, *I fell*, &c. We seldom hear of them in the *Future*, and more rarely still in the *Present*. Yet it seems agreeable to reason, that wherever Time is signified without any farther circumscription, than that of Simple present past or future, the Tense is AN AORIST,

THUS

C.VII.



THUS *Milton*,

*Millions of spiritual creatures WALK the
earth*

*Unseen, both when we wake, and when
we sleep.* P. L. IV. 277.

Here the Verb (WALK) means not that they were walking *at that instant only*, when *Adam spoke*, but ἀορίσως indefinitely, take any instant whatever. So when the same Author calls *Hypocrisy*,


—— *the only Evil, that WALKS
Invisible, except to God alone,*

the Verb (WALKS) hath the like *aoristical* or *indefinite application*. The same may be said in general of all Sentences of the *Gnomologic* kind, such as

*Ad pœnitendum PROPERAT, cito qui
judicat.*

*Avarus, nisi cum moritur, nil recte
FACIT, &c.*

ALL

ALL these Tenses are so many AORISTS C. VII.
OF THE PRESENT. 

Gnomologic Sentences after the same manner make likewise AORISTS OF THE FUTURE.

*Tu nihil ADMITTES in te, formidine
pœnæ.* Hor.

So too *Legislative* Sentences, *Thou shalt not kill, Thou shalt not steal, &c.* for this means no one *particular* future Time, but is a prohibition extended *indefinitely* to every part of Time future (*b*).

WE

(*b*) The *Latin* Tongue appears to be more than ordinarily deficient, as to the article of *Aorists*. It has no peculiar Form even for an *Aorist of the Past*, and therefore (as *Priscian* tells us) the *Præteritum* is forced to do the double duty both of *that Aorist*, and of the *perfect Present*, its application in particular instances being to

C.VII. WE pass from *Aorists*, to THE INCEP-
TIVE TENSES.

THESE may be found in part supplied (like many other Tenses) by Verbs auxiliar. ΜΕ'ΛΛΩ γράφειν. *Scripturus sum*. I AM GOING *to write*. But the *Latins* go farther, and have a Species of Verbs, derived from others, which do the duty of these Tenses, and are themselves for that reason called *Inchoatives* or *Inceptives*. Thus from *Caleo*, *I am warm*, comes *Calesco*, *I begin to grow warm*; from *Tumeo*, *I swell*, comes *Tumescō*, *I begin to swell*. These *Inchoative* Verbs are so peculiarly appropriated to the *Beginnings* of Time, that they are defective as to all Tenses, which denote it in its *Completion*, and there-

be gathered from the Context. Thus 'tis that *FECI* means (as the same author informs us) both *πεποίηκα* and *ἔποίησα*, *I have done it*, and *I did it*; *VIDI* both *ἑώρακα* and *εἶδον*, *I have just seen it*, and, *I saw it once*. *Prisc. Gram. L. VIII. p. 814, 838. Edit. Putsch.*

therefore have neither Perfectum, Plus C.VII.
 quam-perfectum, or Perfect Future. There
 is likewise a species of Verbs called in *Greek*
 Ἐφεικὰ, in *Latin Desiderativa*, the *Desi-*
deratives or *Meditatives*, which if they are
 not strictly *Inceptives*, yet both in *Greek*
 and *Latin* have a near affinity with them.
 Such are πολεμῆσείω, *Bellaturio*, *I have a*
desire to make war; βρωσεῖω, *Esurio*, *I*
long to eat (i). And so much for THE
 INCEPTIVE TENSES.

THE two last orders of Tenses which re-
 main, are those we called (k) THE MIDDLE
 TENSES (which express Time as *extended*
 and

(i) As all *Beginnings* have reference to what is *fu-*
ture, hence we see how properly these Verbs are formed,
 the *Greek* ones from a future Verb, the *Latin* from a
 future Participle. From πολεμήσω and βρώσω come
 πολεμῆσείω and βρωσεῖω; from *Bellaturus* and *Esurus*
 come *Bellaturio* and *Esurio*. See *Macrobius*, p. 691.
 Ed. Var. ὃ πάντῃ γέ με νῦν δὴ ΓΕΛΑΣΕΊΟΝΤΑ
 ἐποίησας γελάσαι. *Plato* in *Phædone*.

(k) Care must be taken not to confound these *middle*
 Tenses, with the Tenses of those Verbs, which bear
 the same name among *Grammarians*.

C. VII. and *passing*) and the PERFECT or COMPLETIVE, which exprefs its *Completion* or *End*.

Now for thefe the Authorities are many. They have been acknowledged already in the ingenious Accidence of Mr. *Hoadly*, and explained and confirmed by Dr. *Samuel Clarke*, in his rational Edition of *Homer's Iliad*. Nay, long before either of thefe, we find the fame Scheme in *Scaliger*, and by him (1) afcribed to † *Grocinus*, as its Author. The learned *Gaza* (who

(1) *Ex his percipimus Grocinum acutè admodum Tempora diviſiſſe, ſed minus commodè. Tria enim conſtituit, ut nos, ſed quæ bifariam ſecat, Perfectum & Imperfectum: ſic, Præteritum imperfectum, Amabam: Præteritum perfectum, Amaveram. Rectè ſanè. Et Præſens imperfectum, Amo. Rectè hætenus; continuat enim amorem, neque abſolvit. At Præſens perfectum, Amavi: quis hoc dicat?—De Futuro autem ut non malè ſentit, ita controverſum eſt. Futurum, inquit, imperfectum, Amabo: Perfectum, Amavero. Non malè, inquam: ſignificat enim Amavero, amorem futurum & abſolutum iri: Amabo perfectionem nullam indicat. De Cauſ. Ling. Lat. c. 113.*

† His Name was *William Grocin*, an *Engliſhman*, contemporary with *Erasmus*, and celebrated for his Learning. He went to *Florence* to ſtudy under *Landin*, and was Profeſſor at *Oxford*. *Spec. Lit. Flor.* p. 205.

(who was himself a *Greek*, and one of the ablest restorers of that language in the western world) characterizes the Tenses in nearly the same manner (*m*). What *Apollonius* hints, is exactly consonant (*n*). C.VII.

Priscian

(*m*) THE PRESENT TENSE (as this Author informs us in his excellent Grammar) denotes τὸ ἐνῆς-ἄμενον καὶ ἀτελές, *that which is now instant and incomplete*; THE PERFECTUM, τὸ παρεληλυθὸς ἄρτι, καὶ ἐντελές τῷ ἐνεσῶτος, *that which is now immediately past, and is the Completion of the Present*; THE IMPERFECTUM, τὸ παρατεταμένον καὶ ἀτελές τῷ παρωχημένῳ, *the extended and incomplete part of the Past*; and THE PLUSQUAMPERFECTUM, τὸ παρεληλυθὸς πάλαι, καὶ ἐντελές τῷ παρακειμένῳ, *that which is past long ago, and is the completion of the præteritum*. Gram. L. IV.

(*n*) Ἐντεῦθεν δὲ πειθόμεθα, ὅτι τὸ παρωχημένον συντέλειαν σημαίνει ὁ παρακειμένος, τὴν γε μὴν ἐνεσῶσαν. —Hence we are persuaded that the Perfectum doth not signify the completion of the Past, but PRESENT COMPLETION. *Apollon.* L. III. c. 6. The Reason, which persuaded him to this opinion, was the application and use of the Particle αὖ, of which he was then treating, and which, as it denoted *Potentiality* or *Contingence*, would assort (he says) with any of the passing, extended, and incomplete Tenses, but never with this PERFECTUM, because this implied such a *complete* and *indefeasible existence*, as never to be qualified into the nature of a *Contingent*.

C.VII. *Priscian* too advances the same Doctrine from the *Stoics*, whose authority we esteem greater than all the rest, not only from the more early age when they lived, but from their superior skill in Philosophy, and their peculiar attachment to *Dialectic*, which naturally led them to great accuracy in these *Grammatical Speculations* (o).

BEFORE

(o) By these Philosophers the *vulgar present Tense* was called THE IMPERFECT PRESENT, and the *vulgar Præteritum*, THE PERFECT PRESENT, than which nothing can be more consonant to the system that we favour. But let us hear *Priscian*, from whom we learn these facts. PRÆSENS TEMPUS proprie dicitur, cujus pars jam præteriit, pars futura est. Cum enim Tempus, fluvii more, instabili volvatur cursu, vix punctum habere potest in præsentī, hoc est, in instanti. Maxima igitur pars ejus (sicut dictum est) vel præteriit vel futura est.—Unde STOICI jure HOC TEMPUS PRESENS etiam IMPERFECTUM vocabant (ut dictum est) eo quod prior ejus pars, quæ præteriit, transacta est, deest autem sequens, id est, futura. Ut si in medio versu dicam, scribo versum, priore ejus parte scriptâ, cui adhuc deest extrema pars, præsentī utor verbo, dicendo, scribo versum: sed IMPERFECTUM est, quod deest adhuc versui, quod scribatur.—Ex eodem igitur Præsentī nascitur etiam Perfectum. Si enim ad finem perveniat inceptum, statim utimur PRÆTERITO PERFECTO; continuo enim, scripto ad finem versu, dico, scripsi versum.—And soon after speaking of the *Latin Per-*

BEFORE we conclude, we shall add a C. VII. few miscellaneous observations, which will be more easily intelligible from the Hypothesis here advanced, and serve withal to confirm its truth.

AND first the *Latins* used their *Præteritum Perfectum* in some instances after a very peculiar manner, so as to imply the very reverse of the Verb in its natural signification. Thus, *VIXIT*, signified, IS DEAD; *FUIT*, signified, NOW IS NOT, IS NO MORE. 'Twas in this sense that *Cicero* addressed the People of *Rome*, when he had put to death the leaders in the *Catilinarian* Conspiracy. He appeared in the

K 2 Forum,

Perfectum, he says, — *sciendum tamen, quod Romani PRÆTERITO PERFECTO non solum in re modo completâ utuntur, (in quo vim habet ejus, qui apud Græcos παρὰ-κείμενος vocatur, quem STOICI ΤΕΛΕΙΟΝ ΕΝΕΣΤΩΤΑ nominaverunt) sed etiam pro Ἀορίσ-ε accipitur, &c. Lib. VIII. p. 812, 813, 814.*

C.VII. Forum, and cried out with a loud voice,
 * *VIXERUNT.* So *Virgil*,

— || *FUIMUS Troes, FUIT Ilium &*
ingens

Gloria Dardanidum—— *Æn. II.*

And

* So among the *Romans*, when in a Cause all the Pleaders had spoken, the Cryer used to proclaim, *DIXERUNT*, i. e. *they have done speaking.* *Ascon. Pæd. in Verr. II.*

|| So *Tibullus* speaking of certain Prodigies and evil Omens.

Hæc fuerint olim. Sed tu, jam mitis, Apollo,
Prodigia indomitæ merge sub æquoribus.

Eleg. II. 5. v. 19.

Let these Events HAVE BEEN in days of old;—by Implication therefore—But HENCEFORTH let them be no more.

So *Eneas* in *Virgil* prays to *Phæbus*.

Hæc Trojana tenus fuerit fortuna secuta.

Let Trojan Fortune (that is, adverse, like that of *Troy*, and its Inhabitants,) *HAVE so far FOLLOWED us.* By Implication therefore, *But let it follow us no farther, Here let it end, Hic sit Finis*, as *Servius* well observes in the Place.

In which Instances, by the way, mark not only the Force of the *Tense*, but of the *Mood*, the *PRECATIVE* or *IMPERATIVE*, not in the *Future* but in the *PAST*. See p. 154, 155, 156.

And again,

—*Locus Ardea quondam*

Dictus avis, & nunc magnum manet

Ardea nomen,

* *Sed fortuna* FUIT —, Æn. VII.

THE reason of these Significations is derived from THE COMPLETIVE POWER of the Tense here mentioned. We see that the periods of Nature, and of human affairs are maintained by the reciprocal succession of *Contraries*. 'Tis thus with Calm and Tempest; with Day and Night; with Prosperity and Adversity; with Glory and Ignominy; with Life and Death. Hence then, in the instances above, the *completion* of one contrary is put for the *commencement* of the other, and to say, HATH LIVED, or, HATH BEEN, has the same meaning with, IS DEAD, or, IS NO MORE.

K 3

IT


* *Certus in hospitibus non est amor; errat, ut ipsi:*

Cumque nihil speres firmitus esse, FUIT.

Epist. Ovid. Helen. Paridi. 4. 190.

Sive erimus, seu nos Fata FUISSE volent.

Tibull. III. 5. 32.

C.VII.  IT is remarkable in * *Virgil*, that he frequently joins in the same Sentence this *complete* and *perfect Present* with the *extended* and *passing Present*; which proves that he considered the two, as belonging to the same Species of *Time*, and therefore naturally formed to co-incide with each other.

——*Tibi jam brachia contrahit ardens
Scorpios, & cæli justâ plus parte reliquit.*
G. I.

Terra tremit; fugere feræ— G. I.
*Præsertim si tempestas a vertice sylvis
Incubuit, glomeratque ferens incendia
ventus.* G. II.

——*illa noto citius, volucrique sagittâ,
Ad terram fugit, & portu se condidit
alto.* Æn. V.

IN

* See also *Spenser's Fairy Queen*, B. I. C. 3. St. 19.
C. 3. St. 39. C. 8. St. 9.

*He hath his Shield redeem'd,
And forth his Sword he draws.*

IN the same manner he joins the same C.VII.
 two modifications of *Time in the Past*, that
 is to say, the *complete* and *perfect* Past with
 the *extended* and *passing*.

—Inruerant *Danai*, & *tectum omne*
tenebant. Æn. II.

Tris imbris torti radios, tris nubis aquosæ
Addiderant, rutuli tris ignis, & alitis
austri.

Fulgores nunc terrificos, sonitumque me-
tumque

Miscebant operi, flammisque sequacibus
iras (p). Æn. VIII.

As

(p) The Intention of *Virgil* may be better seen, in rendering one or two of the above passages into *English*.

—*Tibi jam brachia contrahit ardens*
Scorpios, & cœli justâ plus parte reliquit.

For thee the Scorpion IS NOW CONTRACTING *his claws,*
and HATH ALREADY LEFT thee more than a just por-
tion of Heaven. The Poet, from a high strain of poetic
 adulation, supposes the Scorpion so desirous of admitting
Augustus among the heavenly signs, that though he *has*
already made him more than room enough, yet he still


C. VII. As to the IMPERFECTUM, it is sometimes employed to denote what is *usual* and *customary*. Thus *surgebat* and *scribebat* signify not only, *he was rising, he was writing*, but upon occasion they signify, *he USED to rise, he USED to write*. The reason of this is, that whatever is *customary*, must be something which has been *frequently repeated*. But what has been *frequently repeated*, must needs require an *Extension of Time past*, and thus we fall insensibly into the TENSE here mentioned.

AGAIN,

continues to be making him more. Here then we have two Acts, one *perfect*, the other *pending*, and hence the Use of the two different Tenses. Some editions read *relinquit*; but *reliquit* has the authority of the celebrated *Medicean* manuscript.

— *Ille noto citius, volucrique sagittâ,
Ad terram fugit, & portu se condidit alto.*

The ship, quicker than the wind, or a swift arrow, CONTINUES FLYING to land, and is HID within the lofty harbour. We may suppose this Harbour, (like many others) to have been surrounded with high Land. Hence the Vessel, immediately on entering it, was completely hid from those Spectators, who had gone out to see

AGAIN, we are told by *Pliny* (whose C.VII. authority likewise is confirmed by many  Gems and Marbles still extant) that the ancient Painters and Sculptors, when they fixed their names to their works, did it *pendenti titulo, in a suspensive kind of Inscription*, and employed for that purpose the Tense here mentioned. 'Twas Ἀπελλῆς ἐποίει, *Apelles faciebat*, Πολύκλειτος ἐποίει, *Polycletus faciebat*, and never ἐποίησε or *fecit*. By this they imagined that they avoided the shew of arrogance, and had in case of censure an apology (as it were) prepared, since it appeared from the work itself, that *it was once indeed in hand*, but no pretension that *it was ever finished* (q).

IT

see the Ship-race, but yet might *still continue sailing* towards the shore within.

—Inruerant Danai, & tectum omne tenebant.

The Greeks HAD ENTERED, and WERE THEN POSSESSING the whole House; as much as to say, *they had entered, and that was over*, but their Possession continued still.

(q) *Plin. Nat. Hist. L. I.* The first Printers (who were most of them Scholars and Critics) in imitation of

C.VII. IT is remarkable that the very manner, in which the *Latins* derive these Tenses from one another, shews a plain reference to the System here advanced. From *the passing Present* come the passing Past, and Future. *Scribo, Scribebam, Scribam.* From *the perfect Present* come the perfect Past, and Future. *Scripsi, Scripseram, Scripsero.* And so in all instances, even where the Verbs are irregular, as from *Fero* come *Ferebam* and *Feram*; from *Tuli* come *Tuleram* and *Tulero*.

WE shall conclude by observing, that the ORDER of the Tenses, as they stand ranged by the old Grammarians, is not a fortuitous Order, but is consonant to our Perceptions, in the recognition of Time, according to what we have explained already

the antient Artists used the same Tense. *Excudebat H. Stephanus. Excudebat Guil. Morelius. Absolvebat Joan. Benenatus*, which has been followed by Dr. Taylor in his late valuable edition of *Demosthenes*.

ready (r). Hence it is, that the *Present* C.VII. *Tense* stands first; then *the Past Tenses*; and lastly *the Future*.

AND now, having seen what authorities there are for Aorists, or those Tenses, which denote Time *indefinitely*; and what for those Tenses, opposed to Aorists, which mark it *definitely*; (such as the Inceptive, the Middle, and the Compleitive) we here finish the subject of TIME and TENSES, and proceed to consider THE VERB IN OTHER ATTRIBUTES, which 'twill be necessary to deduce from other Principles.

(r) See before p. 109, 110, 111, 112, 113. Scaliger's observation upon this occasion is elegant.—*Ordo autem (Temporum scil.) aliter est, quam natura eorum. Quod enim præteriit, prius est, quam quod est, itaque primo loco debere poni videbatur. Verum, quod primo quoque tempore offertur nobis, id creat primas species in animo: quamobrem Præsens Tempus primum locum occupavit; est enim commune omnibus animalibus. Præteritum autem iis tantum, quæ memoriâ prædita sunt. Futurum verò etiam paucioribus, quippe quibus datum est prudentiæ officium. De Caus. Ling. Lat. c. 113. See also Senecæ Epist. 124. Mutum animal sensu comprehendit præsentia; præteritorum, &c.*

C H A P. VIII.

Concerning Modes.

C.VIII. **W**E have observed already (a) that the Soul's leading Powers are those of *Perception* and those of *Volition*, which words we have taken in their most comprehensive acceptation. We have observed also, that *all Speech or Discourse* is a *publishing* or exhibiting some part of our Soul, either a certain *Perception*, or a certain *Volition*. Hence then, according as we exhibit it either in a *different part*, or after a *different manner*, hence I say the variety of *MODES* or *MOODS* (b).

IF

(a) See Chapter II.

(b) *Gaza* defines a Mode exactly consonant to this doctrine. He says it is — βέλημα, εἰς ἓν πάθημα ψυχῆς, διὰ φωνῆς σημαζόμενον — a *Volition* or *Affection* of the Soul, signified through some Voice, or Sound articulate. *Gram. L. IV.* As therefore this is the nature of Modes, and Modes belong to Verbs, hence 'tis *Apollonius*

nius

IF we simply *declare*, or *indicate* some- C.VIII.
 thing to be, or not to be, (whether a Per-
 ception or Volition, 'tis equally the same)
 this constitutes that Mode called the DE-
 CLARATIVE OR INDICATIVE.

A Perception.

—Nosco *crinis, incanaque menta*
Regis Romani—— Virg. *Æn.* VI.

A Volition.

In nova FERT ANIMUS *mutatas dicere*
formas
Corpora—— Ovid. *Metam.* I.

IF we do not strictly assert, as of some-
 thing absolute and certain, but as of some-
 thing *possible* only, and in the number of
Con-

nus observes—τοῖς ῥήμασιν ἐξαίρετως παράκειται ἡ ψυ-
 χικὴ διάθεσις—the Soul's Disposition is in an eminent de-
 gree attached to Verbs. De Synt. L. III. c. 13. Thus
 too Priscian: *Modi sunt diversæ INCLINATIONES*
ANIMI, quas varia consequitur DECLINATIO VERBI.
 L. VIII. p. 821.

C.VIII. *Contingents*, this makes that Mode, which
 { Grammarians call the POTENTIAL; and
 which becomes on such occasions the leading
 Mode of the Sentence,

Sed tacitus pasci si posset Corvus, HA-

BERET

Plus dapis, &c.

HOR.

YET sometimes 'tis not the leading
 Mode, but only *subjoined* to the Indica-
 tive. In such case, it is mostly used to
 denote the *End*, or *final Cause*; which
 End, as in human Life it is always a Con-
 tingent, and may never perhaps happen
 in despite of all our Foresight, is there-
 fore express'd most naturally by the Mode
 here mentioned. For example,

Ut JUGULENT homines, surgunt de nocte

latrones.

HOR.

*Thieves rise by night, that they may cut
 mens throats.*

HERE

HERE that they *rise*, is *positively asserted* C.VIII. in the *Declarative* or *Indicative* Mode; but as to their *cutting mens throats*, this is only delivered *potentially*, because how truly soever it may be the *End* of their rising, it is still but a *Contingent*, that may never perhaps happen. This Mode, as often as it is in this manner subjoined, is called by Grammarians not the Potential, but THE SUBJUNCTIVE.

BUT it so happens, in the Constitution of human affairs, that it is not always sufficient merely *to declare* ourselves to others. We find it often expedient, from a consciousness of our Inability, to address them after a manner more interesting to ourselves, whether to have *some Perception informed*, or *some Volition gratified*. Hence then new Modes of speaking; if we *interrogate*, 'tis the INTERROGATIVE MODE; if we *require*, 'tis the REQUISITIVE. Even the Requisite itself hath its *subordinate Species*: With respect to inferiors, 'tis an IMPERATIVE MODE; with respect to equals


C.VIII. equals and superiors, 'tis a PRECATIVE or
 OPTATIVE*,

AND thus have we established a variety of Modes; the INDICATIVE or DECLARATIVE, *to assert what we think certain*; the POTENTIAL, *for the Purposes of whatever we think Contingent*; THE INTERROGATIVE, *when we are doubtful, to procure us Information*; and THE REQUISITIVE, *to assist us in the gratification of our Volitions*. The Requisite too appears under two distinct Species, either as 'tis IMPERATIVE to inferiors, or PRECATIVE to superiors (c).

As

* It was the confounding of this Distinction, that gave rise to a Sophism of *Protagoras*. *Homer* (says he) in beginning his *Iliad* with—*Sing, Muse, the Wrath,*—when he thinks to pray, in reality commands. ἔρχεσθαι οἰόμενος, ἐπιτάττει. *Aristot. Poet. c. 19.* The Solution is evident from the Division here established, the Grammatical Form being in both cases the same.

(c) The Species of *Modes* in great measure depend on the Species of *Sentences*. The *Stoics* increased the number of *Sentences* far beyond the *Peripatetics*. Besides those mentioned in Chapter II. Note (b) they had
 many

As therefore all these several Modes **C.VIII.**
 have their foundation in nature, so have 
 certain

many more, as may be seen in *Ammonius de Interpret.* p. 4. and *Diogenes Laertius*, L. VII. 66. The Peripatetics (and it seems too with reason) considered all these additional Sentences as included within those, which they themselves acknowledged, and which they made to be five in number, the Vocative, the Imperative, the Interrogative, the Precative, and the Assertive. There is no mention of a *Potential* Sentence, which may be supposed to co-incide with the Assertive, or Indicative. The Vocative (which the Peripatetics called the εἶδος κλητικόν, but the Stoics more properly προσαγορευτικόν) was nothing more than the Form of Address in point of names, titles, and epithets, with which we apply ourselves one to another. As therefore it seldom included any Verb within it, it could hardly contribute to form a verbal Mode. *Ammonius* and *Boethius*, the one a *Greek* Peripatetic, the other a *Latin*, have illustrated the Species of Sentences from *Homer* and *Virgil*, after the following manner.

Ἄλλὰ τῷ λόγῳ πέντε εἶδῶν, τῷ τε ΚΛΗΤΙΚΟΥ, ὡς τὸ,
 ὦ μάκαρ Ἀτρείδῃ——
 καὶ τῷ ΠΡΟΣΤΑΚΤΙΚΟΥ, ὡς τὸ,
 Βάσκει' ἦθι, ἵππε' ἑταίροι' ἄλκιμα χεῖρα——

C.VIII. certain marks or signs of them been introduced into Languages, that we may be enabled

κ) τῷ ἙΡΩΤΗΜΑΤΙΚΟΥ, ὡς τὸ,

Τίς, πόθεν εἰς ἀνδρῶν;—

κ) τῷ ΕΥΚΤΙΚΟΥ, ὡς τὸ,

Ἄι γὰρ Ζεῦ τε πάτερ—

κ) ἐπὶ τέτοις, τῷ ἈΠΟΦΑΝΤΙΚΟΥ, καθ' ὃν ἀποφαινόμεθα περὶ ὁτουῦν τῶν πραγμάτων, οἷον

—Θεοὶ δέ τε πάντα ἴσασιν—

κ) περὶ παντός, &c. Εἰς τὸ περὶ Ἑρμ. p. 4.

Boethius's Account is as follows. *Perfectarum vero Orationum partes quinque sunt: DEPRECATIVA, ut,*

*Jupiter omnipotens, precibus si flecteris ullis,
Da deinde auxilium, Pater, atque hæc omina firma.*

IMPERATIVA, ut,

Vade age, Nate, voca Zephyros, & labere pennis.

INTERROGATIVA, ut,

Dic mihi, Damæta, cujus pecus?—

VOCATIVA, ut,

O! Pater, O! hominum rerumque æterna potestas.

ENUNTIATIVA, in quâ Veritas vel Falsitas invenitur, ut,
Principio arboribus varia est natura creandis.

Boeth. in Lib. de Interp. p. 291.

In

enable by our discourse to signify them, C.VIII.
 one to another. And hence those various
 MODES or MOODS, of which we find in
 common Grammars so prolix a detail, and
 which are in fact no more than “ so many
 “ *literal* Forms, intended to express these
 “ *natural* Distinctions” (d).

ALL

In *Milton* the same Sentences may be found, as follows. THE PRECATIVE,

—*Universal Lord! be bounteous still*
To give us nought but Good—

THE IMPERATIVE,

Go then, Thou mightiest, in thy Father's might.

THE INTERROGATIVE,

Whence, and what art thou, execrable Shape?


THE VOCATIVE,

—*Adam, earth's bellow'd Mold,*
Of God inspir'd—


THE ASSERTIVE OR ENUNTIATIVE,

The conquer'd also and enslav'd by war
Shall, with their freedom lost, all virtue lose.

(d) The *Greek* Language, which is of all the most
 elegant and complete, expresses these several Modes,

C.VIII.  ALL these MODES have this in common, that they exhibit some way or other the

and all distinctions of Time likewise, by an adequate number of Variations in each particular Verb. These Variations may be found, some at the beginning of the Verb, others at its ending, and consist for the most part either in *multiplying* or *diminishing* the number of Syllables, or else in *lengthening* or *shortening* their respective Quantities, which two methods are called by Grammarians the *Syllabic* and the *Temporal*. The *Latin*, which is but a Species of *Greek* somewhat debased, admits in like manner a large portion of those Variations, which are chiefly to be found at the Ending of its Verbs, and but rarely at their Beginning. Yet in its Deponents and Passives 'tis so far defective, as to be forced to have recourse to the *Auxiliar, sum*. The modern Languages, which have still fewer of those Variations, have been necessitated all of them to assume two Auxiliars at least, that is to say, those which express in each Language the Verbs, *Have*, and *Am*. As to the *English* Tongue, it is so poor in this respect, as to admit no Variation for Modes, and only one for Time, which we apply to express an Aorist of the Past. Thus from *Write* cometh *Wrote*; from *Give*, *Gave*; from *Speak*, *Spake*, &c. Hence to express Time, and Modes, we are compelled to employ no less than seven Auxiliars, viz. *Do*, *Am*, *Have*, *Shall*, *Will*, *May* and *Can*; which we use sometimes singly, as when we say, *I am writing*,

the SOUL and its AFFECTIONS. Their CVIII. Peculiarities and Distinctions are in part,  as follows.

THE REQUISITIVE and INTERROGATIVE MODES are distinguished from *the Indicative and Potential*, that whereas these *last seldom want a Return*, to the two former it is *always necessary*.

If we compare THE REQUISITIVE MODE with THE INTERROGATIVE, we shall find these also distinguished, and that not only in the *Return*, but in other Peculiarities.

L 3

To

ing, I *have* written ; sometimes two together, as, I *have been* writing, I *should have* written ; sometimes no less than three, as I *might have been* lost, he *could have been* preserved. But for these, and all other Speculations, relative to the *Genius* of the *English* Language, we refer the Reader, who wishes for the most authentic information, to that excellent Treatise of the learned Dr. Lowthe, intituled, *A short Introduction to English Grammar*.

C.VIII. *The Return to the Requisite is sometimes made in Words, sometimes in Deeds.*

To the Request of *Dido* to *Eneas*—

——*a primâ dic, hospes, origine nobis
Insidias Danâum*——

the *proper* Return was in *Words*, that is, in an historical Narrative. To the Request of the unfortunate Chief——*date obolum Belisario*——the *proper* Return was in a Deed, that is, in a charitable Relief. But with respect to *the Interrogative*, the Return is necessarily made in *Words* alone, in Words, which are called a *Response* or *Answer*, and which are always actually or by implication some *definitive assertive Sentence*. Take Examples. *Whose Verses are these?*——the Return is a Sentence——*These are Verses of Homer.* *Was Brutus a worthy Man?*——the Return is a Sentence——*Brutus was a worthy Man.*

AND hence (if we may be permitted to digress) we may perceive

the near affinity of this *Interrogative Mode* C.VIII. with the *Indicative*, in which last its Response or Return is mostly made. So near indeed is this Affinity, that in these two Modes alone the Verb retains the same Form (*e*), nor are they otherwise distinguished, than either by the Addition or Absence of some small Particle, or by some minute change in the collocation of the Words, or sometimes only by a change in the Tone, or Accent (*f*).

BUT

(*e*) Ἦγε ἔν προκειμένη ὀριστικὴ ἐγκλισις, τὴν ἐγκειμένην κατάφασιν ἀποβάλλουσα, μεθίσταται τῇ καλεῖσθαι ὀριστικῇ—ἀναπληρωθεῖσα δὲ τῆς καταφάσεως, ὑποσρέφει εἰς τὸ εἶναι ὀριστικῇ. *The Indicative Mode, of which we speak, by laying aside that Assertion, which by its nature it implies, quits the name of Indicative—when it reassumes the Assertion, it returns again to its proper Character.* Apoll. de Synt. L. III. c. 21. *Theodore Gaza* says the same, *Introd. Gram.* L. IV.

(*f*) It may be observed of the INTERROGATIVE, that as often as the *Interrogation* is *simple and definite*, the Response may be made in almost the same Words,

L 4


by

C.VIII. BUT to return to our comparison between the *Interrogative* Mode and the *Requisitive*.

THE

by converting them into a sentence affirmative or negative, according as the Truth is either one or the other. For example—*Are these Verses of Homer?*—Response—*These Verses are of Homer.* *Are those Verses of Virgil?*—Response—*Those are not Verses of Virgil.* And here the Artists of Language, for the sake of brevity and dispatch, have provided two Particles, to represent all such Responses, *Yes*, for all the affirmative; *No*, for all the negative.

But when the *Interrogation* is *complex*, as when we say—*Are these Verses of Homer, or of Virgil?*—much more, when it is *indefinite*, as when we say in general—*Whose are these Verses?*—we cannot then respond after the manner above mentioned. The Reason is, that no Interrogation can be answered by a simple *Yes*, or a simple *No*, except only those, which are themselves so simple, as of two possible Answers to admit only one. Now the least complex Interrogation will admit of four Answers, two affirmative, two negative, if not perhaps of more. The reason is, a complex Interrogation cannot consist of less than two simple ones; each of which may be separately affirmed and separately denied. For
instance

THE INTERROGATIVE (in the lan- C.VIII.
guage of Grammarians) has all *Persons* 
of

instance—*Are these Verses Homer's, or Virgil's?* (1.)
They are Homer's—(2.) *They are not Homer's*—(3.)
They are Virgil's—(4.) *They are not Virgil's*—we may
add, (5.) *They are of neither*. The indefinite Interro-
gations go still farther; for these may be answered by
infinite affirmatives, and infinite negatives. For in-
stance—*Whose are these Verses?* We may answer affir-
matively—*They are Virgil's, They are Horace's, They*
are Ovid's, &c.—or negatively—*They are not Virgil's,*
They are not Horace's, They are not Ovid's, and so on,
either way to infinity. How then should we learn from
a single *Yes*, or a single *No*, which particular is meant
among infinite Possibles? These therefore are Interro-
gations which must be always answered by a *Sentence*.
Yet even here Custom hath consulted for Brevity, by
returning for Answer only the *single essential characteristic*
Word, and retrenching by an Ellipsis all the rest, which
rest the Interrogator is left to supply from himself.
Thus when we are asked—*How many right angles equal*
the angles of a triangle?—we answer in the short mo-
nosyllable, *Two*—whereas, without the Ellipsis, the
answer would have been—*Two right angles equal the*
angles of a triangle.

The

C.VIII. of both *Numbers*. The REQUISITIVE or IMPERATIVE has no *first Person* of the *singular*, and that from this plain reason, that 'tis equally absurd in *Modes* for a person to *request* or *give commands* to *himself*, as it is in *Pronouns*, for the speaker to become *the subject of his own address* *.

AGAIN, we may *interrogate* as to *all Times*, both *Present*, *Past*, and *Future*. *Who was Founder of Rome?* *Who is King of China?* *Who will discover the Longitude?*—But *Intreating* and *Commanding* (which are the *Essence* of the *Re-*

The Antients distinguished these two Species of Interrogation by different names. The simple they called Ἑρώτημα, *Interrogatio*; the complex, πύσμα, *Percontatio*. Ammonius calls the first of these Ἑρώτησις διαλεκτική; the other, Ἑρώτησις πυσματική. See *Am. in Lib. de Interpr.* p. 160. *Diog. Laert.* VII. 66. *Quintil. Inst.* IX. 2.

* Sup. p. 74, 75.

Requisitive Mode) have a necessary re- C.VIII.
spect to the *Future* (g) only. For indeed what

(g) *Apollonius's Account of the Future*, implied in all Imperatives, is worth observing. Ἐπὶ γὰρ μὴ γινόμενοις ἢ μὴ γεγενομένοις ἡ ΠΡΟΣΤΑΞΙΣ· τὰ δὲ μὴ γινόμενα ἢ μὴ γεγενομένα, ἐπιτηδεϊότητα δὲ ἔχοντα εἰς τὸ ἴσσεσθαι, ΜΕΛΛΟΝΤΟΣ ἔστι. A COMMAND has respect to those things which either are not doing, or have not yet been done. But those things, which being not now doing, or having not yet been done, have a natural aptitude to exist hereafter, may be properly said to appertain to THE FUTURE. De Syntaxi, L. I. c. 36. Soon before this he says—Ἀπαντα τὰ πρὸς ἀκρίκῳ ἐκκειμένην ἔχει τὴν τῷ μέλλοντος διάθεσιν—χεδὸν γὰρ ἐν ἴσῳ ἔστι τὸ, Ὁ ΤΥΡΑΝΝΟΚΤΟΝΗΣΑΣ ΤΙΜΑΣΘΩ, τῷ, ΤΙΜΗΘΗΣΕΤΑΙ, κατὰ τὴν χρόνον ἔννοϊαν· τῇ ἐκκλίσει διηλλαχὸς, καθὸ τὸ μὲν πρὸς ἀκρίκον, τὸ δὲ ὀριστικόν. All IMPERATIVES have a disposition within them, which respects THE FUTURE—with regard therefore to TIME, 'tis the same thing to say, LET HIM, THAT KILLS A TYRANT, BE HONoured, or, HE, THAT KILLS ONE, SHALL BE HONoured; the difference being only in the Mode, in as much as one is IMPERATIVE, the other INDICATIVE or DECLARATIVE. Apoll. de Syntaxi, L. I. c. 35. Priscian seems to allow Imperatives a share of *Present Time*, as well as *Future*. But if we attend, we shall find his *Present* to be

C.VIII. what have they to do with the present or the past, the natures of which are immutable and necessary?

'Tis

be nothing else than an immediate Future, as opposed to a more distant one. *Imperativus vero Præsens & Futurum [Tempus] naturali quâdam necessitate videtur posse accipere. Ea etenim imperamus, quæ vel in præsentis statim volumus fieri sine aliquâ dilatione, vel in futuro. Lib. VIII. p. 806.*

'Tis true the *Greeks* in their Imperatives admit certain Tenses of the Past, such as those of the *Perfektum*, and of the two *Aorists*. But then these Tenses, when so applied, either totally lose their temporary Character, or else are used to insinuate such a Speed of execution, that the deed should be (as it were) done, in the very instant when commanded. The same difference seems to subsist between our *English* Imperative, BE GONE, and those others of, Go, or BE GOING. The first (if we please) may be stiled the *Imperative of the Perfektum*, as calling in the very instant for the completion of our Commands; the others may be stiled *Imperatives of the Future*, as allowing a reasonable time to begin first, and finish afterward.

'Tis thus *Apollonius*, in the Chapter first cited, distinguishes between σκαπλέτω τὰς ἀμπέλεις, Go to digging the Vines, and σκαψάτω τὰς ἀμπέλεις, Get the Vines dug.

'TIS from this connection of *Futurity* C.VIII. with *Commands*, that the *Future Indicative* is sometimes used for the *Imperative*, and that to say to any one, YOU SHALL DO THIS, has often the same Force with the *Imperative*, DO THIS. So in the Decalogue — THOU SHALT NOT KILL — THOU SHALT NOT BEAR FALSE WITNESS

dig. The first is spoken (as he calls it) εἰς παράτασιν, by way of *Extension*, or allowance of Time for the work; the second, εἰς συντελείωσιν, with a view to immediate Completion. And in another place, explaining the difference between the same Tenses, Σκάπτει and Σκάψον, he says of the last, ὃ μόνον τὸ μὴ γενόμενον προστάσει, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ γινόμενον ἐν παρατάσει ἀπαγορεύει, that it not only commands something, which has not been yet done, but forbids also that, which is now doing in an *Extension*, that is to say, in a slow and lengthened progress. Hence, if a man has been a long while writing, and we are willing to hasten him, 'twould be wrong to say in Greek, ΓΡΑΨΕ, WRITE (for that he is now, and has been long doing) but ΓΡΑΨΟΝ, GET YOUR WRITING DONE; MAKE NO DELAYS. See *Apoll. L. III. c. 24.* See also *Macrobius de Diff. Verb. Græc. & Lat. p. 680. Edit. Varior. Latini non æstimaverunt, &c.*

C.VIII. WITNESS — which denote (we know) the strictest and most authoritative Commands.

As to the POTENTIAL MODE, it is distinguished from all the rest, by its *subordinate* or *subjunctive* Nature. It is also farther distinguished from the *Requisitive* and *Interrogative*, by implying a kind of feeble and weak *Affertion*, and so becoming in some degree susceptible of Truth and Falshood. Thus, if it be said potentially, *This may be*, or, *This might have been*, we may remark without absurdity, *'Tis true*, or *'Tis false*. But if it be said, *Do this*, meaning, *Fly to Heaven*, or, *Can this be done?* meaning, *to square the Circle*, we cannot say in either case, *'tis true* or *'tis false*, though the Command and the Question are about things impossible. Yet still the *Potential* does not aspire to the Indicative, because it implies but a *dubious* and *conjectural* Assertion,

Affertion, whereas that of the Indicative C.VIII.
is absolute, and without reserve.

THIS therefore (the INDICATIVE I mean) is the Mode, which, as in all Grammars 'tis the first in order, so is truly first both in Dignity and Use. 'Tis this, which publishes our sublimest Perceptions; which exhibits the Soul in her purest Energies, superior to the Imperfection of Desires and Wants; which includes the whole of *Time*, and its minutest Distinctions; which, in its various *Past* Tenses, is employed by History, to preserve to us the Remembrance of former Events; in its *Futures* is used by Prophecy, or (in default of this) by wise Foresight, to instruct and forewarn us, as to that which is coming; but above all in its *Present* Tense serves Philosophy and the Sciences, by just Demonstrations to establish *necessary Truth*; THAT TRUTH, which from its nature *only exists*


C.VIII. *ists in the Present*; which knows no distinctions either of Past or of Future, but is every where and always invariably one (*b*).

THROUGH

(*b*) See the quotation, Note (*c*), Chapter the Sixth. *Cum enim dicimus, DEUS EST, non eum dicimus nunc esse, sed, &c.*

Boethius, author of the sentiment there quoted, was by birth a *Roman* of the first quality; by religion, a Christian; and by philosophy, a Platonic and Peripatetic; which two Sects, as they sprang from the same Source, were in the latter ages of antiquity commonly adopted by the same Persons, such as *Themistius*, *Porphry*, *Iamblichus*, *Ammonius*, and others. There were no Sects of Philosophy, that lay greater Stress on the distinction between things existing *in Time* and *not in Time*, than the two above-mentioned. The Doctrine of the Peripatetics on this Subject (since 'tis these that *Boethius* here follows) may be partly understood from the following Sketch.

“ THE THINGS, THAT EXIST IN TIME, are
 “ *those whose Existence Time can measure.* But if their
 “ Existence may be measured by Time, then there
 “ may be assumed a Time greater than the Existence
 “ of any one of them, as there may be assumed a
 “ number greater than the greatest multitude, that is
 “ capable

THROUGH all the above Modes, with C.VIII.
 their respective Tenses, the Verb being 
 con-


“ capable of being numbred. And hence 'tis that
 “ *things temporary* have their Existence, as it were li-
 “ mited by Time; that they are confined within it, as
 “ within some bound; and that in some degree or other
 “ they *all submit to its power*, according to those com-
 “ mon Phrases, that *Time is a destroyer*; that *things*
 “ *decay through Time*; that *men forget in Time*, and *lose*
 “ *their abilities*, and seldom that they improve, or grow
 “ young, or beautiful. The truth indeed is, *Time al-*
 “ *ways attends Motion*. Now the natural effect of Mo-
 “ tion is *to put something, which now is, out of that*
 “ *state, in which it now is*, and so far therefore to de-
 “ stroy that State.

“ The reverse of all this holds with THINGS THAT
 “ EXIST ETERNALLY. These exist *not in Time*, be-
 “ cause Time is so far from being able to measure their
 “ Existence, that *no Time can be assumed, which their*
 “ *Existence doth not surpass*. To which we may add,
 “ that they *feel none of its effects*, being no way ob-
 “ noxious either to damage or dissolution.

“ To instance in examples of either kind of Being.
 “ There are such things at this instant, as *Stonehenge*
 “ and the *Pyramids*. 'Tis likewise true at this instant,
 “ that the *Diameter of the Square is incommensurable*
 “ *with its side*. What then shall we say? Was there

M

“ ever

C.VIII. considered as denoting an ATTRIBUTE,  has always reference to some Person, or SUBSTANCE. Thus if we say, *Went*, or, *Go*, or *Whither goeth*, or, *Might have gone*, we must add a Person or Substance, to make the Sentence complete. Cicero *went*; Cæsar *might have gone*; *whither goeth the Wind*? *Go! Thou Traitor!* But there is a Mode or Form, under which Verbs sometimes appear, where they have no reference at all to Persons or Substances. For example—*To eat is pleasant* ;
but

“ ever a Time, when it was *not incommensurable*, as
 “ ’tis certain there was a Time, when there was no
 “ Stonehenge, or Pyramids? or is it *daily growing less*
 “ *incommensurable*, as we are assured of Decays in both
 “ those massy Structures?” From these unchangeable
 Truths, we may pass to their Place, or Region; to the
 unceasing Intellection of the universal Mind, ever perfect,
 ever full, knowing no remissions, languors, &c. See *Nat.*
Ausc L. IV. c. 19. *Metaph.* L. XIV. c. 6, 7, 8, 9,
 10. Edit. Du Val. and Vol. I. p. 262. Note VII.
 The following Passage may deserve Attention.

Τοῦ γὰρ Νοῦ ὁ μὲν νοεῖν πέφυκεν, καὶ μὴ νοῶν· ὁ δὲ καὶ πέφυκε,
 καὶ νοεῖ. ἀλλὰ καὶ οὗτος οὐκ ἔστι τέλειος, ἀν μὴ προσθῇς αὐτῷ τὸ καὶ
 νοεῖν αἰεὶ, καὶ πάντα νοεῖν, καὶ μὴ ἀλλοτε ἄλλα. ὥς ἐστιν αἰὶντελής α-
 τος ὁ νοῶν εἰς αἰὶν, καὶ πάντα, καὶ ἅμα. Max. Tyr. *Diff.* XVII.
 p. 201. Ed. Lond.

but to fast is wholesome. Here the Verbs, *To eat*, and, *To fast*, stand alone by themselves, nor is it requisite or even practicable to prefix a Person or Substance. Hence the *Latin* and modern Grammarians have called Verbs under this Mode, from this their indefinite nature, INFINITIVES. *Sanctius* has given them the name of *Impersonals*; and the *Greeks* that of Ἀπαρέμφοτα. from the same reason of their *not discovering* either Person or Number.

THESE INFINITIVES go farther. They not only lay aside the character of *Attributives*, but they also assume that of *Substantives*, and as such themselves become distinguished with their several *Attributes*. Thus in the instance above, *Pleasant* is the Attribute, attending the Infinitive, *To Eat*; *Wholesome* the attribute attending the Infinitive, *To Fast*. Examples in *Greek* and *Latin* of like kind are innumerable.

Dulce & decorum est pro patria MORI.

SCIRE tuum nihil est—

C.VIII. *Ὁυ κατθανεῖν γὰρ δεινόν, ἀλλ' αἰσχροῦς
θανεῖν (i).*

THE *Stoics* in their grammatical inquiries had this Infinitive in such esteem, that
they

(i) 'Tis from the INFINITIVE thus participating the nature of a Noun or Substantive, that the best Grammarians have called it sometimes Ὀνομα ῥηματικόν, A VERBAL NOUN; sometimes Ὀνομα ῥήματος, THE VERB'S NOUN. The Reason of this Appellation is in *Greek* more evident, from its taking the prepositive Article before it in all cases; τὸ γράφειν, τῷ γράφειν, τῇ γράφειν. The same construction is not unknown in *English*.

Thus *Spencer*,

*For not to have been dipt in Lethe lake,
Could save the Son of Thetis FROM to DIE—*

ἀπὸ τῷ θανεῖν. In like manner we say, *He did it, to be rich*, where we must supply by an Ellipsis the Preposition, FOR. *He did it, for to be rich*, the same as if we had said, *He did it for gain*—ἐνεκα τῷ πλουτεῖν, ἐνεκα τῷ κέρδους—in *French*, *pour s'enrichir*. Even when we speak such Sentences, as the following, *I choose TO PHILOSOPHIZE, rather than TO BE RICH*, τὸ φιλοσοφεῖν βέλομαι, ἢ περ τὸ πλουτεῖν, the Infinitives are in nature as much Accusatives, as if we were to say, *I choose PHILOSOPHY rather than RICHES*, τὴν
φιλο-

they held this alone to be the genuine C.VIII. PHMA or VERB, a name, which they denied to all the other Modes. Their reasoning was, they considered the true verbal character to be contained *simple* and *unmixed* in the *Infinitive only*. Thus the Infinitives, Περιπαλεῖν, *Ambulare*, *To walk*, mean *simply* that Energy, and *nothing more*. The other Modes, besides expressing this Energy, *superadd* certain *Affections*, which respect Persons and Circumstances. Thus *Ambulo* and *Ambula* mean not simply *To walk*, but mean, *I walk*, and, *Walk Thou*.

M 3

And

Φιλοσοφίαν βέλομαι, ἥπερ τὸν πλεῖστον. Thus too *Priscian*, speaking of *Infinitives*—CURRERE enim est CURSUS; & SCRIBERE, SCRIPTURA; & LEGERE, LECTIO. Itaque frequenter & Nominibus adjunguntur, & aliis casualibus, more Nominum; ut *Persius*,

Sed pulcrum est digito monstrari, & dici, hic est.

And soon after—Cum enim dico, BONUM EST LEGERE, nihil aliud significo, nisi, BONA EST LECTIO. L. XVIII. p. 1130. See also *Apoll.* L. I. c. 8. *Gaza Gram.* L. IV. Τὸ δὲ ἀπαρέμφατον, ὀνομά ἐστι ῥήματος κ. τ. λ.

C.VIII. And hence they are all of them resolvable into *the Infinitive, as their Prototype*, together with *some Sentence or Word, expressive of their proper Character*, *Ambulo, I walk*; that is, *Indico me ambulare, I declare myself to walk. Ambula, Walk Thou*; that is, *Impero te ambulare, I command thee to walk*; and so with the Modes of every other Species. Take away therefore the *Affertion*, the *Command*, or whatever else gives a *Character* to any one of these Modes, and there remains nothing more than THE MERE INFINITIVE, which (as *Priscian* says) *significat ipsam rem, quam continet Verbum (k)*.

THE

(k) See *Apollon. L. III. 13. Καθόλου πάντων παρηγμένον από τινος κ. τ. λ.* See also *Gaza*, in the note before. *Igitur a Constructione quoque Vim rei Verborum (id est, Nominis, quod significat ipsam rem) habere INFINITIVUM possumus dignoscere; res autem in Personas distributa facit alios verbi motus.*—*Itaque omnes modi in hunc, id est, Infinitivum, transumuntur sive resolvuntur. Prisc. L. XVIII. p. 1131.* From these Principles *Apollonius* calls the Infinitive *ῥῆμα γενικώτατον*, and *Priscian*, *Verbum generale*.

THE Application of this Infinitive is C.VIII. somewhat singular. It *naturally coalesces* with all those Verbs, that denote any *Tendence, Desire, or Volition of the Soul*, but not readily with others. Thus 'tis Sense as well as Syntax, to say βέλομαι ζῆν, *Cupio vivere, I desire to live*; but not to say ἔσθίω ζῆν, *Edo vivere*, or even in *English, I eat to live*, unless by an Ellipsis, instead of, *I eat for to live*; as we say ἐνεκα τῆ ζῆν, or *pour vivre*. The Reason is, that though *different Actions* may unite in the *same Subject*, and therefore be coupled together (as when we say, *He walked and discoursed*) yet the *Actions* notwithstanding remain separate and distinct. But 'tis not so with respect to *Volitions, and Actions*. Here the Coalescence is often so intimate, that *the Volition* is unintelligible, till *the Action* be exprest. *Cupio, Volo, Desidero—I desire, I am willing, I want—What?—The sentences, we see, are defective and imperfect.*

C.VIII. We must help them then by *Infinitives*, which express the proper Actions to which they tend. *Cupio legere, Volo discere, Desidero videre, I desire to read, I am willing to live, I want to see.* Thus is the whole rendered complete, as well in Sentiment, as in Syntax (1).

AND so much for MODES, and their several SPECIES. Were we to attempt to denominate them according to their most eminent Characters, it may be done in the following manner. As every necessary Truth, and every demonstrative Syllogism (which last is no more than a Combination of such Truths) must always be expressed under positive Assertions, and as positive

(1) *Priscian* calls these Verbs, which naturally precede Infinitives, *Verba Voluntativa*; they are called in Greek Προαινετικά. See L. XVIII. 1129. but more particularly see *Apollonius*, L. III. c. 13. where this whole doctrine is explained with great Accuracy. See also *Macrobius de Diff. Verb. Gr. & Lat.* p. 685. Ed. Var.

—*Nec omne ἀπαρέμφατον cuicunque Verbo, &c.*


sitive Assertions only belong to the *Indi-* C.VIII.
cative, we may denominate it for that rea-
 son the MODE OF SCIENCE (*m*). Again,
 as the *Potential* is only conversant about
Contingents, of which we cannot say with
 certainty that they will happen or not, we
 may call this Mode, THE MODE OF CON-
 JECTURE. Again, as those that are ig-
 norant and would be informed, must ask
 of those that already know, this being the
 natural way of becoming *Proficients*; hence
 we may call the *Interrogative*, THE MODE
 OF PROFICIENCY.

Inter cuncta leges, & PERCONTABERE
doctos,

Quâ ratione queas traducere leniter ævum,
Quid purè tranqillet, &c. Hor.

Farther still, as the highest and most ex-
 cellent use of the *Requisitive* Mode is le-
 gislative

(*m*) *Ob nobilitatem prævit INDICATIVUS, solus Mo-*
du aptus Scientiis, solus Pater Veritatis. Scal. de Caus.
 L. Lat. c. 116.

C.VIII.  gislative Command, we may stile it for this reason THE MODE OF LEGISLATURE. *Ad Divos adeunto castè*, says *Cicero* in the character of a *Roman* law-giver; *Be it therefore enacted*, say the *Laws of England*; and in the same *Mode* speak the *Laws* of every other nation. 'Tis also in this *Mode* that the Geometrician, with the authority of a Legislator, orders lines to be bisected, and circles described, as preparatives to that Science, which he is about to establish.

THERE are other *supposed* Affections of Verbs, such as *Number* and *Person*. But these surely cannot be called a part of their Essence, nor indeed are they the Essence of any other Attribute, being in fact the Properties, not of Attributes, but of Substances. The most that can be said, is, that Verbs in the more elegant Languages are provided with certain Terminations, which respect the *Number* and *Person* of every *Substantive*, that we may

know with more precision. in a complex C.VIII.
 Sentence, each particular Substance, with
 its attendant verbal Attributes. The same
 may be said of *Sex*, with respect to Ad-
 jectives. They have Terminations which
 vary, as they respect Beings male or fe-
 male, tho' *Substances* past dispute are alone
 susceptible of sex (*n*). We therefore pass
 over these matters, and all of like kind,

as

(*n*) 'Tis somewhat extraordinary, that so acute and
 rational a Grammarian as *Sanctius*, should justly deny
Genders, or the distinction of Sex to *Adjectives*, and yet
 make *Persons* appertain, not to *Substantives*, but to *Verbs*.
 His commentator *Perizonius* is much more consistent,
 who says—*At vero si rem rectè consideres, ipsis Nominibus*
& Pronominibus vel maximè, imò unicè inest ipsa Perso-
na; & Verba se habent in Personarum ratione ad Nomina
planè sicuti Adjectiva in ratione Generum ad Substantiva,
quibus solis autor (*Sanctius* scil. L. I. c. 7.) *& rectè Ge-*
nus adscribit, exclusis Adjectivis. *Sanct. Minerv. L. I.*
c. 12. There is indeed an exact Analogy between the
 Accidents of *Sex* and *Person*. There are but two *Sexes*,
 that is to say, the Male and the Female; and but two
Persons (or Characters essential to discourse) that is to
 say, the Speaker, and the Party address'd. The third
 Sex and third Person are improperly so called, being in
 fact but Negations of the other two.

C.VIII. as being rather among the Elegancies, than
the Essentials of Language, which Essentials are the Subject of our present Inquiry. The principal of these now remaining is THE DIFFERENCE OF VERBS, AS TO THEIR SEVERAL SPECIES, which we endeavour to explain in the following manner.

C H A P.


C H A P. IX.

*Concerning the Species of Verbs, and their
other remaining Properties.*

ALL Verbs, that are strictly so called, Ch.IX.
denote (a) Energies. Now as all *Energies* are *Attributes*, they have reference of course to certain *energizing Substances*. Thus 'tis impossible there should be such Energies, as *To love, to fly, to wound, &c.* if there were not such Beings as *Men, Birds, Swords, &c.* Farther, every Energy doth not only require an Energizer, but is necessarily conversant about some *Subject*. For example, if we say, *Brutus loves*—we must needs supply—*loves Cato, Cassius,*

(a) We use this word ENERGY, rather than *Motion*, from its more comprehensive meaning; it being a sort of Genus, which includes within it both *Motion* and its *Privation*. See before, p. 94, 95.

Ch.IX. *Cassius, Portia, or some one. The Sword wounds*—i. e. wounds *Hector, Sarpedon, Priam, or some one.* And thus is it, that every Energy is necessarily situate between two Substantives, an Energizer which is *active*, and a Subject which is *passive*. Hence then, if the Energizer lead the Sentence, the Energy follows its Character, and becomes what we call A VERB ACTIVE.—Thus we say *Brutus amat, Brutus loves.* On the contrary, if the passive Subject be principal, it follows the Character of this too, and then becomes what we call A VERB PASSIVE.—Thus we say, *Portia amatur, Portia is loved.* 'Tis in like manner that the *same Road* between the Summit and Foot of the same Mountain, with respect to the Summit is *Ascent*, with respect to the Foot is *Descent*. Since then every Energy respects an Energizer or a passive Subject; hence the Reason why every Verb, whether active or passive, has in Language a necessary Reference

ference to some *Noun* for its *Nominative* Ch. IX.
Case (b). 

BUT to proceed still farther from what has been already observed. *Brutus* loved *Portia*.—Here *Brutus* is the Energizer; loved, the Energy, and *Portia*, the Subject. But it might have been, *Brutus* loved *Cato*, or *Cassius*, or the *Roman Republic*; for the Energy is referable to Subjects infinite. Now among these infinite Subjects, when that happens to occur, which is the Energizer also, as when we say *Brutus* loved *himself*, slew *himself*, &c. in such Case *the Energy* hath to the same Being *a double Relation*, both Active and Passive. And this 'tis which gave rise
among

(b) The doctrine of Impersonal Verbs has been justly rejected by the best Grammarians, both antient and modern. See *Sanct. Min.* L. I. c. 12. L. III. c. 1. L. IV. c. 3. *Priscian.* L. XVIII. p. 1134. *Apoll.* L. III. sub fin. In all which places they will see a proper Nominative supplied to all Verbs of this supposed Character.

Ch. IX. among the *Greeks* to that Species of Verbs, called VERBS MIDDLE (*c*), and such was their true and original Use, however in many instances they may have since happened to deviate. In other Languages the Verb still retains its active Form, and the passive Subject (*se* or *himself*) is expressed like other Accusatives.

AGAIN, in some Verbs it happens that the Energy *always keeps within* the Energizer, and *never passes out* to any foreign extraneous Subject. Thus when we say, *Cæsar walketh, Cæsar sitteth*, 'tis impossible

(*c*) Τα γὰρ καλούμενα μεσότητος χήματα συνέμπλω-
 σιν ἀνεδέξατο ἐνεργητικῆς καὶ παθητικῆς διαθέσεως. *The*
Verbs, called Verbs middle, admit a Coincidence of the ac-
tive and passive Character. Apollon. L. III. c. 7. He
 that would see this whole Doctrine concerning the
 power of THE MIDDLE VERB explained and confirmed
 with great Ingenuity and Learning, may consult a small
 Treatise of that able Critic. *Kuster*, entitled, *De vero*
Ufu Verborum Mediorum. A neat edition of this scarce
 piece has been lately published.

ble *the Energy should pass out* (as in the Ch. IX.
 case of those Verbs called by the Gram-
 marians VERBS TRANSITIVE) because
 both the *Energizer* and the *Passive Sub-*
ject are united in *the same Person*. For
 what is the Cause of this walking or sit-
 ting? — 'Tis the *Will* and *Vital Powers*
 belonging to *Cæsar*. And what is the
 Subject, made so to move or to sit? —
 'Tis the *Body* and *Limbs* belonging also
 to the same *Cæsar*. 'Tis this then forms
 that Species of Verbs, which Gramma-
 rians have thought fit to call VERBS NEU-
 TER, as if indeed they were void both of
Action and *Passion*, when perhaps (like Verbs
 middle) they may be rather said *to imply*
both. Not however to dispute about names,
 as these Neuters *in their Energizer* always
 discover *their passive Subject* (c), which
 other

(c) This Character of Neuters the *Greeks* very hap-
 pily express by the Terms, *ἑαυτοπάθεια* and *ἑδιοπάθεια*,
 which *Priscian* renders, *quæ ex se in seipsâ fit intrinsecus*
Passio. L. VIII. 790. *Consentii Ars apud Putsch.* p.
 2051.

Ch.IX. other Verbs cannot, their passive Subjects being infinite; hence the reason why 'tis as superfluous in these Neuters to have the Subject exprest, as in other Verbs it is necessary, and cannot be omitted. And thus 'tis that we are taught in common Grammars

It may be here observed, that even those Verbs, called *Actives*, can upon occasion lay aside their transitive Character; that is to say, can drop their subsequent Accusative, and *assume the Form of Neuters*, so as to stand by themselves. This happens, when the Discourse respects the mere *Energy* or *Affection* only, and has no regard to the Subject, be it this thing or that. Thus we say, *ὅδε οὐδὲν ἀναγινώσκειν ἔστος*, *This Man knows not how to read*, speaking only of the Energy, in which we suppose him deficient. Had the Discourse been upon the Subjects of reading, we must have added them. *ὅδε οὐδὲν ἀναγινώσκειν τὰ Ὀμήρου*, *He knows not how to read Homer*, or *Virgil*, or *Cicero*, &c.

Thus *Horace*,

*Qui CUPIT aut METUIT, juvat illum sic domus
aut res,*

Ut lippum pictæ tabulæ —

He that DESIRES or FEARS (not this thing in particular nor that, but in general he within whose breast these

mars that *Verbs Active* require an Accu- Ch. IX.
sative, while *Neuters* require none. }

OF the above Species of Verbs, the *Middle* cannot be called necessary, because most Languages have done without it. THE SPECIES OF VERBS therefore remaining are the ACTIVE, the PASSIVE and the NEUTER, and those seem essential to all Languages whatever (*d*).


N 2

THERE

these affections prevail) *has the same joy in a House or Estate, as the Man with bad Eyes has in fine Pictures.* So *Cæsar* in his celebrated *Laconic* Epistle of, VENI, VIDI, VICI, where two Actives we see follow one Neuter in the same detached Form, as that Neuter itself. The Glory it seems was *in the rapid Sequel of the Events.* Conquest came as quick, as he could come himself, and look about him. *Whom* he saw, and *whom* he conquered, was not the thing, of which he boasted. See *Apoll.* L. III. c. 31. p. 279.

(*d*) The STORCS, in their logical view of Verbs, as making a part in Propositions, considered them under the four following Sorts,

When

Ch.IX.  THERE remains a Remark or two farther, and then we quit the Subject of Verbs. 'Tis true in general that the greater Part of them denote Attributes of *Energy*

When a *Verb*, co-inciding with the *Nominative* of some *Noun*, made without further help a perfect assertive Sentence, as Σωκράτης περιπατεῖ, *Socrates walketh*; then as the Verb in such case implied the Power of a perfect Predicate, they called it for that reason Κατηγορημα, a *Predicable*; or else, from its readiness συνελαιν, to co-incide with its *Noun* in completing the Sentence, they called it Σύμβημα, a *Co-incider*.

When a *Verb* was able with a *Noun* to form a perfect assertive Sentence, yet could not associate with such *Noun*, but under some *oblique Case*, as Σωκράτης μεταμέλει, *Socratem pœnitet*: Such a Verb, from its near approach to just Co-incidence, and Predication, they called Παρασύμβημα or Παρακατηγορημα.

When a Verb, though regularly co-inciding with a *Noun* in its *Nominative*, still required, to complete the Sentiment, some other *Noun* under an *oblique Case*, as Πλάτων φιλεῖ Δίωνα, *Plato loveth Dio*, (where without *Dio* or some other, the Verb *Loveth* would rest indefinite:)

Energy and Motion. But there are some Ch.IX.
 which appear to denote nothing more,
 than a *mere simple Adjective*, joined to an
 Assertion, Thus ἰσάζει in *Greek*, and
Equalleth in *English*, mean nothing more
 N 3 than

nite :) Such Verb, from this Defect they called ἥττον
 ἢ σύμμετρον, or ἡ κατηγόρημα, *something less than a*
Co-incider, or less than a Predicable.

Lastly, when a Verb required *two Nouns in oblique*
Cases, to render the Sentiment complete; as when we
 say Σωκράτει Ἀλκιβιάδους μέλει, *Tædet me Vitæ*, or the
 like : Such Verb they called ἥττον, or ἔλαττον ἢ παρα-
 σύμμετρον, or ἡ παρακατηγόρημα, *something less than an*
imperfect Co-incider, or an imperfect Predicable.

These were the *Apellations* which they gave to Verbs,
 when employed along with Nouns to the forming of
 Propositions. As to the Name of ΠΡῆΜΑ, or VERB,
 they denied it to them all, giving it only to the *Infini-*
tive, as we have shewn already. See page 164. See
 also *Ammon. in Lib. de Interpret.* p. 37. *Apollon. de*
Syntaxi L. I. c. 8. L. III. c. 31. p. 279. c. 32. p.
 295. *Theod. Gaz. Gram.* L. IV.

From the above Doctrine it appears, that all *Verbs*
Neuter are Συμμετάλλα ; *Verbs Active*, ἥττονα ἢ συμ-
 μέταλλα.

Ch. IX. than ἴσος ἐστί, *is equal*. So *Albeo* in *Latin* is no more than *albus sum*.

—*Campique ingentes ossibus albeo*. Virg.


THE same may be said of *Tumeo*. *Mons tumet*, i. e. *tumidus est*, *is tumid*. To express the Energy in these instances, we must have recourse to the Inceptives.

Fluctus uti primo cœpit cum ALBESCERE Vento. Virg.

————— *Freta ponti Incipiunt agitata TUMESCERE*. Virg.

THERE are Verbs also to be found, which are formed out of Nouns. So that as in *Abstract Nouns* (such as *Whiteness* from *White*, *Goodness* from *Good*) as also in the *Infinitive Modes* of Verbs, the *Attributive* is converted into a *Substantive*; here the *Substantive* on the contrary is converted into an *Attributive*. Such are Κυνίῳ from κύων, *to act the part of a Dog*, or be a *Cynic*;

nic; Φιλιππίζεν from Φίλιππος, to *Philippize*, or *favour Philip*; *Syllaturire* from *Sylla*, to *meditate acting the same part as Sylla did*. Thus too the wise and virtuous Emperour, by way of counsel to himself—ὄρα μὴ ἀποκαισαρωθῆς, *beware thou beest not BECÆSAR'D*; as though he said, *Beware, that by being Emperor, thou dost not dwindle into A MERE CÆSAR (e)*. In like manner one of our own witty Poets,

Ch.IX.


STERNHOLD *himself* he OUT-STER-
HOLDED.

And long before him the facetious *Fuller*, speaking of one *Morgan*, a sanguinary Bishop in the Reign of *Queen Mary*, says of him, *that he OUT-BONNER'D even BONNER himself*. *.

AND so much for that Species of ATTRIBUTES, called VERBS IN THE STRICTEST SENSE.

(e) *Marc. Antonin. L. VI. §. 30.*

* *Church Hist. B. VIII. p. 21.*

CHAP. X.

*Concerning those other Attributives,
Participles and Adjectives.*

Ch. X. **T**HE Nature of Verbs being understood, that of PARTICIPLES is no way difficult. Every complete Verb is expressive of an *Attribute*; of *Time*; and of an *Affertion*. Now if we take away the *Affertion*, and thus destroy the *Verb*, there will remain the *Attribute* and the *Time*, which make the Essence of a PARTICIPLE. Thus take away the *Affertion* from the Verb, Γράφει, *Writeth*, and there remains the Participle, Γράφων, *Writing*, which (without the *Affertion*) denotes the same *Attribute*, and the same *Time*. After the same manner, by withdrawing the *Affertion*, we discover Γράψας in Ἐγραψε, Γράψων in Γράψει, for we chuse to refer to the *Greek*, as being of all languages the

the most complete, as well in this respect, Ch. X.
as in others. }

AND so much for PARTICIPLES (a).

THE

(a) The *Latins* are defective in this Article of Participles. Their Active Verbs, ending in *or*, (commonly called Deponents) have Active Participles of all Times (such as *Loquens*, *Locutus*, *Locuturus*) but none of the Passive. Their Actives ending in *O*, have Participles of the Present and Future (such as *Scribens*, and *Scripturus*) but none of the Past. On the contrary, their Passives have Participles of the Past (such as *Scriptus*) but none of the Present or Future, unless we admit such as *Scribendus* and *Docendus* for Futures, which Grammarians controvert. The want of these Participles they supply by a Periphrasis—for *γράφας* they say, *cum scripsisset*—for *γραφόμενος*, *dum scribitur*, &c. In *English* we have sometimes recourse to the same Periphrasis; and sometimes we avail ourselves of the same Auxiliars, which form our Modes and Tenses.

The *English* Grammar lays down a good Rule with respect to its Participles of the Past, that they all terminate in D, T, or N. This Analogy is perhaps liable to as few Exceptions, as any. Considering therefore how little Analogy of any kind we have in our
Lan-

Ch. X. THE Nature of *Verbs* and *Participles* being understood, that of **ADJECTIVES** becomes easy. A *Verb* implies (as we have said) both an *Attribute*, and *Time*, [and an *Affertion*; a *Participle* only implies an *Attribute*, and *Time*; and an **ADJECTIVE** only implies an *Attribute*; that is to say, in other Words, an **ADJECTIVE** has no *Affertion*, and only denotes such an *Attribute*, as hath not its *Essence* either in *Motion* or its *Privation*. Thus in general the *Attributes* of *Quantity*, *Quality*, and *Relation* (such as *many* and *few*, *great* and *little*,

Language, it seems wrong to annihilate the few *Traces*, that may be found. It would be well therefore, if all *Writers*, who endeavour to be accurate, would be careful to avoid a *Corruption*, at present so prevalent, of saying, *it was wrote*, for, *it was written*; *he was drove*, for, *he was driven*; *I have went*, for, *I have gone*, &c. in all which instances a *Verb* is absurdly used to supply the proper *Participle*, without any necessity from the want of such *Word*.

little, black and white, good and bad, double, treble, quadruple, &c.) are all denoted by ADJECTIVES. Ch. X.


It must indeed be confessed, that sometimes even those Attributes, which are wholly foreign to the Idea of *Motion*, assume an Assertion, and appear as Verbs. Of such we gave instances before, in *al-beo, tumeo, ἰσάζω*, and others. These however, compared to the rest of Verbs, are but few in number, and may be called, if thought proper, *Verbal Adjectives*. 'Tis in like manner, that Participles insensibly pass too into Adjectives. Thus *Doctus* in *Latin*, and *Learned* in *English* lose their power, as *Participles*, and mean a Person possessed of an habitual Quality. Thus *Vir eloquens* means not a man now speaking, but a man, who possesses the habit of speaking, whether he speak or no. So when we say in *English*, he is a *Thinking Man*, an *Understanding Man*, we mean not a person, whose mind is in actual Energy,

Ch. X. *Energy*, but whose *mind* is enriched with a larger portion of those powers. 'Tis indeed no wonder, as all *Attributives* are homogeneous, that at times the several *Species* should appear to interfere, and the Difference between them be scarcely perceptible. Even in *natural Species*, which are congenial and of kin, the specific Difference is not always to be discerned, and in appearance at least they seem to run into each other.

WE have shewn already (*b*) in the Instances of *Φιλιππίζειν*, *Syllaturire*, *Ἀποκαισαρωθῆναι*, and others, how *Substantives* may be transformed into *Verbal Attributives*. We shall now shew, how they may be converted into *Adjectives*. When we say the Party of *Pompey*, the *Stile* of *Cicero*, the *Philosophy* of *Socrates*,
in

(*b*) Sup. p. 182, 183.


in these cases the Party, the Stile, and the Ch. X. Philosophy spoken of, receive a Stamp and Character from the Persons, whom they respect. Those Persons therefore perform the part of Attributes, that is, stamp and characterize their respective Subjects. Hence then *they actually pass into Attributes*, and assume, as such, the Form of *Adjectives*. And thus 'tis we say, the *Pompeian* Party, the *Ciceronian* Stile, and the *Socratic* Philosophy. 'Tis in like manner for a Trumpet of *Brass*, we say a *Brazen* Trumpet; for a Crown of *Gold*, a *Golden* Crown, &c. Even *Pronominal* Substantives admit the like mutation. Thus instead of saying, the Book of *Me*, of *Thee*, and of *Him*, we say *My* Book, *Thy* Book, and *His* Book; instead of saying the Country of *Us*, of *You*, and of *Them*, we say, *Our* Country, *Your* Country, and *Their* Country; which Words may be called so many *Pronominal Adjectives*.

Ch. X.  IT has been observed already, and must needs be obvious to all, that Adjectives, as marking Attributes, can have no Sex (*c*). And yet their having Terminations conformable to the Sex, Number, and Case of their Substantive, seems to have led Grammarians into that strange Absurdity of ranging them with Nouns, and separating them from Verbs, tho' with respect to these they are perfectly homogeneous; with respect to the others, quite contrary. They are homogeneous with respect to Verbs, as both sorts denote *Attributes*; they are heterogeneous with respect to Nouns, as *never properly denoting Substances*. But of this we have spoken before (*d*).

THE

(*c*) Sup. p. 171.

(*d*) Sup. C. VI. Note (*a*). See also C. III. p. 28, &c.

THE Attributives hitherto treated, that **Ch. X.** is to say, VERBS, PARTICIPLES, and  ADJECTIVES, may be called ATTRIBUTIVES OF THE FIRST ORDER. The reason of this Name will be better understood, when we have more fully discussed ATTRIBUTIVES OF THE SECOND ORDER, to which we now proceed in the following Chapter.

C H A P.

CHAP. XI.

Concerning Attributives of the Second Order.

Ch. XI. **A**S the Attributives hitherto mentioned denote *the Attributes of Substances*, so there is an inferior Class of them, which denote *the Attributes only of Attributes*.

To explain by examples in either kind —when we say, *Cicero and Pliny were both of them eloquent; Statius and Virgil both of them wrote*; in these instances the Attributives, *Eloquent*, and *Wrote*, are immediately referable to the Substantives, *Cicero, Virgil, &c.* As therefore denoting THE ATTRIBUTES OF SUBSTANCES, we call them ATTRIBUTIVES OF THE FIRST ORDER. But when we say, *Pliny was moderately eloquent, but Cicero exceedingly eloquent; Statius wrote indifferently, but Virgil wrote admirably*;
in

in these instances, the *Attributives*, *Mo-* Ch.XI.
derately, *Exceedingly*, *Indifferently*, *Ad-*
mirably, are not referable to *Substantives*,
 but to *other Attributives*, that is, to the
 words, *Eloquent*, and *Wrote*. As there-
 fore denoting *Attributes of Attributes*, we
 call them **ATTRIBUTIVES OF THE SE-**
COND ORDER.

GRAMMARIANS have given them the
 Name of *Ἐπιρρήματα*, **ADVERBIA**, **AD-**
VERBS. And indeed if we take the word
ῥῆμα, or, *Verb*, in its most *comprehensive*
Signification, as including not only *Verbs*
properly so called, but also *Participles* and
Adjectives [an usage, which may be justi-
 fied by the best authorities (a)] we shall
 find

(a) Thus *Aristotle* in his *Treatise de Interpretatione*,
 instances *ἄνθρωπος* as a *Noun*, and *λεῖκος* as a *Verb*.
 So *Ammonius* — κατὰ τὸ τοῦ σημαζομένου, τό μὲν
 ΚΑΛΟΣ καὶ ΔΙΚΑΙΟΣ καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα — ῥΗΜΑΤΑ
 λέγεσθαι καὶ ἐκ ὀΝΟΜΑΤΑ. According to this *Signi-*
fication (that is of denoting the *Attributes of Substance*,
 () and

Ch. XI. find the name, *Επίρρημα*, or ADVERB, to be a very just appellation, as denoting A PART OF SPEECH, THE NATURAL APPENDAGE OF VERBS. So great is this dependence in grammatical Syntax, that an *Adverb* can no more subsist without its *Verb*, than a *Verb* can subsist without its *Substantive*. 'Tis the same here, as in certain natural Subjects. Every Colour for its existence as much requires a Superficies, as the Superficies for its existence requires a solid Body (*b*).

AMONG

and the Predicate in Propositions) *the words*, FAIR, JUST, and the like, are called VERBS, and not NOUNS. *Am. in libr. de Interp.* p. 37. b. *Arist. de Interp.* L. I. c. 1. See also of this Treatise, c. 6. Note (*a*). p. 87.

In the same manner the *Stoics* talked of the Participle. *Nam PARTICIPIUM connumerantes Verbis, PARTICIPIALE VERBUM vocabant vel CASUALE. Priscian.* L. I. p. 574.

(*b*) This notion of *ranging the Adverb under the same Genus with the Verb* (by calling them both *Attributives*) and of *explaining it to be the Verb's Epithet or Adjective* (by

AMONG the Attributes of Substance are Ch.XI. reckoned Quantities, and Qualities. Thus we say, *a white Garment, a high Mountain*. Now some of these Quantities and Qualities are capable of Intension, and Remission. Thus we say, *a Garment EXCEEDINGLY white; a Mountain TOLERABLY*
 O 2 *high,*

(by calling it the Attributive of an Attributive) is conformable to the best authorities. *Theodore Gaza* defines an ADVERB, as follows—μέρος λόγου ἀπλῶτον, κατὰ ῥήματος λεγόμενον, ἢ ἐπιλεγόμενον ῥήματι, καὶ οἷον ἐπίθετον ῥήματος. *A Part of Speech devoid of Cases, predicated of a Verb, or subjoined to it, and being as it were the Verb's Adjective.* L. IV. (where by the way we may observe, how properly the Adverb is made an *Aptote*, since its Principal sometimes *has cases*, as in *Valdè Sapiens*; sometimes *has none*, as in *Valdè amat*). *Priscian's* definition of an Adverb is as follows—ADVERBIUM est pars orationis indeclinabilis, cujus significatio Verbis adjicitur. Hoc enim perficit Adverbium Verbis additum, quod adjectiva nomina appellativis nominibus adjuncta; ut prudens homo; prudenter egit; felix Vir; feliciter vivit. L. XV. p. 1003. And before, speaking of the *Stoics*, he says—Etiam ADVERBIA Nominibus vel VERBIS CONNUMERABANT, & quasi ADJECTIVA VERBORUM nominabant. L. I. p. 574. See also *Apoll. de Synt.* L. I. c. 3. *sub fin.*

Ch. XI. *high*, or MODERATELY *high*. 'Tis plain therefore that Intension and Remission are among the Attributes of such Attributes. Hence then one copious Source of secondary Attributives, or Adverbs, to denote these two, that is, *Intension*, and *Remission*. The *Greeks* have their θαυμασῶς, μάλιστα, πάντως, ἥκιστα; the *Latins* their *valdè*, *vehementer*, *maximè*, *satis*, *mediocriter*; the *English* their *greatly*, *vastly*, *extremely*, *sufficiently*, *moderately*, *tolerably*, *indifferently*, &c.

FARTHER than this, where there are different Intensions of the same Attribute, they may be *compared* together. Thus if the Garment A be EXCEEDINGLY *White*, and the Garment B be MODERATELY *White*, we may say, *the Garment A is MORE white than the Garment B*.

IN these instances the Adverb MORE not only denotes Intension, but *relative Intension*. Nay we stop not here. We
not

not only denote Intension *merely relative*, Ch.XI, *but relative Intension, than which there is none greater.* Thus we not only say *the Mountain A is MORE high than the Mountain B*, but that 'tis *the MOST high of all Mountains.* Even *Verbs, properly so called*, as they admit *simple* Intensions, so they admit also these *comparative* ones. Thus in the following Example — *Fame he LOVETH MORE than Riches, but Virtue of all things he LOVETH MOST*—the Words *MORE* and *MOST* denote the different *comparative Intensions* of the Verbal Attributive, *Loveth*.

AND hence the rise of COMPARISON, and of its different *Degrees*; which cannot well be more, than the two Species above mentioned, one to denote *Simple Excess*, and one to denote *Superlative*. Were we indeed to introduce *more* degrees than these, we ought perhaps to introduce *infinite*, which is absurd. For why stop at a limited Number, when in all subjects,

Ch.XI. susceptible of Intension, the intermediate Excesses are in a manner infinite? There are infinite Degrees of *more* White, between the *first Simple White*, and the *Superlative, Whitest*; the same may be said of *more* Great, *more* Strong, *more* Minute, &c. The Doctrine of Grammarians about *three* such Degrees, which they call the Positive, the Comparative and the Superlative, must needs be absurd; both because in their Positive there is† no Comparison at all, and because their *Superlative* is a Comparative, as much as their *Comparative* it self. Examples to evince this may be found every where. *Socrates was the MOST WISE of all the Athenians—Homer was the MOST SUBLIME of all Poets.—*

—*Cadit et Ripheus, JUSTISSIMUS UNUS
Qui fuit in Teucris—* Virg.

IT

† Qui (scil. Gradus Positivus) quoniam perfectus est, a quibusdam in numero Graduum non computatur. Con-
sentii Ars apud Putsch. p. 2022.

It must be confessed these Comparatives, Ch. XI. as well the *simple*, as the *superlative*, seem sometimes to part with their *relative* Nature, and only retain their *intensive*. Thus in the Degree, denoting *simple* Excess,

Tristior, *et lacrumis oculos suffusa nittentes.* Virg.

Rusticior paulo est— Hor.

IN the *Superlative* this is more usual. *Vir doctissimus, Vir fortissimus, a most learned Man, a most brave Man*,—that is to say, not the *bravest* and *most learned* Man, that ever existed, but a Man possessing those Qualities in an *eminent Degree*.

THE Authors of Language have contrived a method to retrench these Comparative Adverbs, by expressing their force in the Primary Attributive. Thus instead of *More fair*, they say FAIRER; instead of *Most fair*, FAIREST; and the same holds

Ch. XI. true both in the *Greek* and *Latin*. This Practice however has reached no farther than to *Adjectives*, or at least to *Participles*, *sharing the nature of Adjectives*. Verbs perhaps were thought too much diversified already, to admit more Variations without perplexity.

As there are some *Attributives*, which admit of Comparison, so there are others, which admit of none. Such for example are those, which denote *that Quality of Bodies arising from their Figure*; as when we say, a *Circular Table*, a *Quadrangular Court*, a *Conical Piece of Metal*, &c. The reason is, that a million of things, participating the same Figure, participate it *equally*, if they participate it at all. To say therefore that while A and B are both quadrangular, A is *more* or *less* quadrangular than B, is absurd. The same holds true in all *Attributives*, denoting *definite Quantities*, whether *continuous* or *discrete*, whether *absolute* or *relative*. Thus the *two-foot Rule*

A cannot be *more a two-foot Rule*, than any Ch.XI.
 other of the same length. *Twenty Lions* }
 cannot be *more twenty*, than *twenty Flies*.
 If A and B be both *triple*, or *quadruple* to
 C, they cannot be *more triple*, or *more qua-*
druple, one than the other. The reason of
 all this is, there can be *no Comparison* with-
 out *Intension and Remission*; there can be
 no *Intension and Remission* in things *al-*
ways definite; and such are the *Attribu-*
tives, which we have last mentioned.

IN the same reasoning we see the cause,
 why *no Substantive is susceptible of these*
Comparative Degrees. *A Mountain* cannot
 be said *MORE TO BE*, or *TO EXIST*, than
a Mole-hill, but the *More and Less* must be
 sought for in their *Quantities*. In like
 manner, when we refer many *Individuals*
 to one *Species*, the *Lion A* cannot be
 called *more a Lion*, than the *Lion B*, but
 if more any thing, he is *more fierce*, *more*
speedy, or exceeding in some such *Attribute*.
 So again, in referring many *Species* to one
 Genus,

Ch. XI. Genus, a Crocodile is not more an Animal, than a Lizard; nor a Tiger, more than a Cat, but if any thing, they are *more bulky, more strong, &c.* the Excess, as before, being derived from their Attributes. So true is that saying of the acute *Stagirite*—that SUBSTANCE is not susceptible of MORE and LESS (c). But this by way of digression, to return to the subject of Adverbs.

OF the Adverbs, or secondary Attributives already mentioned, these denoting Intension or Remission may be called Adverbs of *Quantity continuous*; *Once, Twice, Thrice*, are Adverbs of *Quantity discrete*; *More and Most, Less and Least*, to which may be added *Equally, Proportionally, &c.* are

(c) ἂν αὖ ἐπιδέχοιτο ἡ ὑσία τὸ μᾶλλον ἢ τὸ ἥττω.
Categor. c. 5. See also *Sanctius*, L. I. c. 11. L. II. c. 10, 11. where the Subject of Comparatives is treated in a very masterly and philosophical manner. See also *Priscian*, p. 598. *Derivantur igitur Comparativa a Nominibus Adjectivis, &c.*

are Adverbs of *Relation*. There are others Ch. XI.
of *Quality*, as when we say, *HONESTLY*
industrious, *PRUDENTLY brave*, *they fought*
BRAVELY, *he painted FINELY*, a *Portico*
form'd CIRCULARLY, a *Plain cut TRI-*
ANGULARLY, &c.

AND here 'tis worth while to observe,
how the same thing, participating the
same Essence, assumes different grammatical
Forms from its different relations.
For example, suppose it should be asked,
how differ *Honest*, *Honestly*, and *Honesty*.
The Answer is, they are *in Essence* the
same, but they differ, in as much as *Honest*
is the *Attributive of a Substantive*;
Honestly, of a *Verb*; and *Honesty*, being
divested of these its attributive Relations,
assumes *the Power of a Substantive*, so as
to stand by itself.

THE Adverbs, hitherto mentioned, are
common to *Verbs of every Species*; but
there


Ch. XI. there are some, which are peculiar to *Verbs properly so called*, that is to say, to such as denote *Motion* or *Energy*, with their *Privations*. All MOTION and REST imply TIME and PLACE, as a kind of necessary *Coincidents*. Hence then, if we would express the *Place* or *Time* of either, we must needs have recourse to the proper Adverbs; of *Place*, as when we say, *he stood THERE*; *he went HENCE*; *he travelled FAR*, &c. of *Time*, as when we say, *he stood THEN*; *he went AFTERWARD*; *he travelled FORMERLY*, &c. Should it be asked — why *Adverbs of Time*, when Verbs have *Tenses*? The Answer is, tho' Tenses may be sufficient to denote the greater Distinctions of Time, yet to denote them all by Tenses would be a perplexity without end. What a variety of Forms, to denote *Yesterday*, *To-day*, *To-morrow*, *Formerly*, *Lately*, *Just now*, *Now*, *Immediately*, *Presently*, *Soon*, *Hereafter*, &c.? 'Twas this then that made the

the *Temporal* Adverbs necessary, over and above the *Tenses*. Ch. XI.

To the Adverbs just mentioned may be added those, which denote the *Intensions and Remissions peculiar to Motion*, such as *speedily, hastily, swiftly, slowly, &c.* as also *Adverbs of Place, made out of Prepositions*, such as ἀνω and κάτω from ἀνὰ and κατὰ, in *English upward and downward, from up and down*. In some instances the *Preposition* suffers no change, but becomes an *Adverb* by nothing more than its *Application*, as when we say, CIRCA equitat, *he rides ABOUT*; PROPE cecidit, *he was NEAR falling*; Verum ne POST conferas culpam in me, *But do not AFTER lay the blame on me (d)*.

THERE

(d) *Sosip. Charisii Inst. Gram. p. 170. Terent. Eun. Act. II. Sc. 3.*

Ch.XI.  THERE are likewise *Adverbs of Interrogation*, such as *Where, Whence, Whither, How*; of which there is this remarkable, that when they lose their *Interrogative* power, they assume that of a *Relative*, so as even to represent the *Relative* or *Subjunctive Pronoun*. Thus Ovid,

Et Seges est, UBI Troja fuit—
translated in our old *English Ballad*,

And Corn doth grow, WHERE Troy town
stood.

That is to say, *Seges est in eo loco, IN QUO, &c. Corn groweth in that place, IN WHICH, &c.* the power of the *Relative*, being implied in the *Adverb*. Thus Terence,

Hujusmodi mihi res semper comminiscere,
UBI me excarnufices— Heaut.IV. 6.

where UBI relates to *res*, and stands for *quibus rebus*.

'Tis

'Tis in like manner that the *Relative* Ch.XI.
Pronoun upon occasion becomes an *Inter-*
rogative, at least in *Latin* and *English*.
 Thus *Horace*,

QUEM Virum aut Heroa lyrâ, vel acri
 Tibiâ sumes celebrare, Clio?

So *Milton*,

Who first seduc'd them to that foul re-
 volt?

THE reason of all this is as follows.
 The *Pronoun* and *Adverbs* here mentioned
 are all alike, in their original character,
 RELATIVES. Even when they become
 Interrogatives, they lose not this character,
 but are still Relatives, as much as ever.
 The difference is, that *without* an Interro-
 gation, they have reference to a Subject,
 which is *antecedent*, *definite* and *known*;
 with an Interrogation, to a Subject which
 is *subsequent*, *indefinite*, and *unknown*, and
 which

Ch. XI. which 'tis expected that *the Answer* should
 { express and ascertain,

WHO *first seduc'd them?*——

The very Question itself supposes a Seducer, to which, tho' *unknown*, the Pronoun, WHO, has a *reference*.

Tb' infernal Serpent——

Here in the *Answer* we have *the Subject*, which was *indefinite*, *ascertained*; so that the WHO in the *Interrogation* is (we see) as much a *Relative*, as if it had been said originally, without any *Interrogation* at all, 'Twas *the Infernal SERPENT*, WHO *first seduced them*.

AND thus is it that *Interrogatives* and *Relatives* mutually pass into each other.

AND so much for ADVERBS, peculiar to Verbs properly so called. We have already spoken of those, which are common to all *Attributives*. We have likewise at-

tempted to explain *their general Nature*, Ch. XI. which we have found to consist in being *the Attributes of Attributes*. There remains only to add, that ADVERBS may be derived from almost every Part of Speech: from PREPOSITIONS, as when from *After* we derive *Afterwards*—from PARTICIPLES, and through these from *Verbs*, as when from *Know* we derive *Knowing*, and thence *Knowingly*; from *Scio*, *Sciens*, and thence *Scienter*—from ADJECTIVES, as when from *Virtuous* and *Vicious*, we derive *Virtuously* and *Viciously*—from SUBSTANTIVES, as when from Πίθηξ, *an Ape*, we derive Πιθήκειον βλέπειν, *to look APISHLY*; from Λέων, *a Lion*, Λεονῶδῶς, *Leoninely*—nay even from PROPER NAMES, as when from *Socrates* and *Demosthenes*, we derive *Socratically* and *Demosthenically*. 'Twas *Socratically* reasoned, we say; 'twas *Demosthenically* spoken*. Of the same sort
P are


* Aristotle has Κυκλοπικῶς *Cyclopically*, from Κύκλωψ *a Cyclops*. Eth. Nic. X. 9.

Ch.XI. are many others, cited by the old Gram-
 marians, such as *Catiliniter* from *Catilina*,
Sisenniter from *Sisenna*, *Tullianè* from *Tul-*
lius, &c. (e).

NOR are they thus extensive in *Deriva-*
tion, but in *Signification* also. *Theodore*
Gaza in his Grammar informs us (f),
 that ADVERBS may be found in every
 one of the Predicaments, and that the
 readiest way to reduce their Infinitude,
 was to refer them by classes to those ten
 universal Genera. The *Stoics* too called
 the ADVERB by the name of Πανδέκτης,
 and that from a view to the same *multi-*
form Nature. *Omnia in se capit quasi col-*
lata per satiram, concessã sibi rerum variã
potestate. 'Tis thus that *Sofipater* explains
 the

(e) See *Prisc.* L. XV. p. 1022. *Sof. Charif.* 161.
 Edit. *Putschii*.

(f) — διὸ δὴ καὶ ἄμεινον ἴσως δέκα καὶ τῶν ἐπιρρήμα-
 των γένη θέσθαι ἐκεῖνα, ὁσίαν, ποιόν, ποσόν, πρὸς τι,
 κ. τ. λ. *Gram. Introd.* L. II.

the Word (*g*), from whose authority Ch.XI. we know it to be *Stoical*. But of this  enough.

AND now having finished those PRINCIPAL PARTS of Speech, the SUBSTANTIVE and the ATTRIBUTIVE, which are SIGNIFICANT WHEN ALONE, we proceed to those AUXILIARY PARTS, which are ONLY SIGNIFICANT, WHEN ASSOCIATED. But as these make the Subject of a Book by themselves, we here conclude the first Book of this Treatise.

(*g*) *Soft. Char.* p. 175. Edit. *Putschii*.


HERMES

OR A PHILOSOPHICAL INQUIRY
CONCERNING UNIVERSAL GRAMMAR

BOOK. II.

CHAP. I.

Concerning Definitives.

WHAT remains of our Work, Ch. I. is a matter of less difficulty,  it being the same here, as in some Historical Picture; when the principal Figures are once formed, 'tis an easy labour to design the rest.

Ch. I. DEFINITIVES, the Subject of the present Chapter, are commonly called by Grammarians, ARTICLES, ARTICULI, Ἀρθρα. They are of two kinds, either those *properly and strictly so called*, or else the *Pronominal Articles*, such as *This, That, Any, &c.*

WE shall first treat of those *Articles more strictly so denominated*, the reason and use of which may be explained, as follows.

THE visible and individual Substances of Nature are infinitely more numerous, than for each to admit of a particular Name. To supply this defect, when any Individual occurs, which either wants a proper Name, or whose proper Name is not known, we ascertain it, as well as we can, by referring it to its Species; or, if the Species be unknown, then at least

least to some Genus. For example—a Ch. I.
 certain Object occurs, with a head and
 limbs, and appearing to possess the pow-
 ers of Self-motion and Sensation. If we
 know it not as an Individual, we refer
 it to its proper Species, and call it *Dog*,
 or *Horse*, or *Lion*, or the like. If none
 of these Names fit, we go to the Genus,
 and call it, *Animal*.

BUT this is not enough, The Thing,
 at which we are looking, is neither a Spe-
 cies, nor a Genus. What is it then? An
 Individual.—Of what kind? *Known*, or
unknown? Seen now *for the first time*,
 or *seen before*, and now remembred? —
 'Tis here we shall discover the use of the
 two Articles (A) and (THE). (A) re-
 spects our *primary* Perception, and de-
 notes Individuals as *unknown*; (THE)
 respects our *secondary* Perception, and
 denotes Individuals as *known*. To ex-
 plain by an example—I see an object pass

Ch. I. by, which I never saw till then. What
 do I say?—*There goes A Beggar, with A
 long Beard.* The Man departs, and re-
 turns a week after. What do I say then?
 —*There goes THE Beggar with THE long
 Beard.* The Article only is changed, the
 rest remains un-altered.

YET mark the force of this apparently
 minute Change. The Individual, *once
 vague*, is now recognized *as something
 known*, and that merely by the efficacy of
 this latter Article, which tacitly insinuates
 a kind of *previous* acquaintance, by refer-
 ring the present Perception to a like Per-
 ception already past (a).

THE Truth is, the Articles (A) and
 (THE) are both of them *definitives*, as
 they circumscribe the latitude of Genera
 and Species, by reducing them for the
 most

(a) See B. I. c. 5. p. 63, 64.

most part to denote Individuals. The difference however between them is this; the Article (A) leaves the Individual itself *unascertained*, whereas the Article (THE) *ascertains the Individual also*, and is for that reason the more accurate Definitive of the two.

'Tis perhaps owing to the imperfect manner, in which the Article (A) defines, that the *Greeks* have no Article correspondent to it, but supply its place, by a negation of their Article, 'Ο. 'Ο ἄνθρωπος ἔπεσεν, THE man fell — ἄνθρωπος ἔπεσεν, A Man fell, without any thing prefixed, but only the Article withdrawn (b). Even in *English*, where the Article

(b) Τὰ γὰρ ἀοριστῶς ὥστε νοήμενα, ἢ τῷ ἀόριστῳ παρὰθεσις ὑπὸ ὀρισμὸν τῷ προσώπῳ ἄγει. *Those things, which are at times understood indefinitely, the addition of the Article makes to be definite as to their Person.* Apoll. L. IV. c. I. See of the same author, L. I. c. 6, 36.

Ch. I. Article (A) cannot be used, as in plurals, its force is express'd by the same Negation. *Those are THE Men*, means those are Individuals, of which we possess some previous Knowledge. *Those are Men*, the Article apart, means no more than that they are so many vague and uncertain Individuals, just as the Phrase, *A Man*, in the singular, implies one of the same number.

BUT

ποιεῖ (τὸ Ἄρθρον sc.) δ' ἀναπόλησιν προεγνωσμένον τῷ ἐν τῇ συντάξει· οἷον εἰ μὲν λέγοι τις, ΑΝΘΡΩΠΟΣ ΗΚΕ, ἀδηλον τίνα ἀνθρώπου λέγει· εἰ δὲ Ο ΑΝΘΡΩΠΟΣ, δῆλον, προεγνωσμένον γὰρ τίνα ἀνθρώπου λέγει. Τῷτο δὲ αὐτὸ βέλονται καὶ οἱ φάσκοντες τ' ἄρθρον σημαντικὸν πρώτης γνώσεως καὶ δευτέρας. *The Article causes a Review within the Mind of something known before in the texture of the Discourse. Thus if any one says Ἀνθρωπὸς ἦκε, MAN CAME (which is the same, as when we say in English A man came) it is not evident, of whom he speaks. But if he says ὁ ἀνθρωπὸς ἦκε, THE MAN CAME, then 'tis evident; for he speaks of some Person known before. And this is what those mean, who say that the Article is expressive of the First and Second Knowledge together. Theod. Gazæ, L. IV.*

BUT tho' the *Greeks* have no Article Ch. I.
 correspondent to the Article (A,) yet no-
 thing can be nearer related, than their 'Ο,
 to the Article, THE. 'Ο βασιλεῦς, THE
King; ΤΟ δῶρον, THE *Gift*, &c. Nor
 is this only to be proved by parallel ex-
 amples, but by the Attributes of the
Greek Article, as they are described by
Apollonius, one of the earliest and most
 acute of the old Graminarians, now re-
 maining.

Ἔστιν ἓν καθὼς καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις ἀπεφηνάμεθα,
 ἴδιον ἄρθρων ἢ ἀναφορὰ, ἥ ἐστὶ προκατειλεγ-
 μένως προσώπε παραστατική.—Now the pecu-
 liar Attribute of the Article, as we have
 shewn elsewhere, is that Reference, which
 implies some certain Person already men-
 tioned. Again—Οὐ γὰρ δήγε τὰ ὀνόματα
 ἐξ αὐτῶν ἀναφορὰν παρίσθουσιν, εἰ μὴ συμπα-
 ραλάξουσιν τὸ ἄρθρον, ἔξ ἑξαίρετός ἐστιν ἡ ἀναφο-
 ρά. For Nouns of themselves imply not
 Re-

Ch. I. *Reference, unless they take to them the Article, whose peculiar Character is Reference.*

Again—Τὸ ἄρθρον προῦφεσῶσαν γνώσιν δηλοῖ.
—*The Article indicates a pre-established acquaintance (c).*

HIS reasoning upon *Proper Names* is worth remarking. *Proper Names* (he tells us) often fall into *Homonymie*, that is, different Persons often go by the same Name. To solve this ambiguity, we have recourse to *Adjectives* or *Epithets*. For example—there were two *Grecian* Chiefs, who bore the name of *Ajax*. 'Twas not therefore without reason, that *Menestheus* uses *Epithets*, when his intent was to distinguish the one of them from the other.

Ἀλλὰ

(c) *Apoll. de Synt. L. I. c. 6, 7.* His account of *REFERENCE* is as follows—Ἰδιώμα ἀναφορᾶς προκατειλεγμένον προσώπων δευτέρᾳ γνώσιν. *The peculiar character of Reference is the second or repeated Knowledge of some Person already mentioned. L. II. c. 3.*

Ἄλλὰ περ οἷοι Τελαμώνι ἄλκιμοι Ch. I.
 Αἴας. Hom. }

If both Ajaxes (says he) cannot be spared,

——at least alone

Let mighty Telamonian Ajax come.

Apollonius proceeds —— Even Epithets themselves are diffused thro' various Subjects, in as much as the same Adjective may be referred to many Substantives.

IN order therefore to render both Parts of Speech equally definite, that is to say the Adjective as well as the Substantive, the Adjective itself assumes *an Article* before it, that it may indicate *a Reference to some single Person only*, μοναδικὴ ἀναφορὰ, according to the Author's own Phrase. And thus 'tis we say, Τρύφων ὁ Γραμματικός, *Trypho the Grammarian*; Ἀπολλόδωρος ὁ Κυρηναῖος, *Apollodorus the Cyrenean*, &c. The Author's Conclusion of this

Ch. I. this Section is worth remarking. Δεόν-
 τως ἄρα καὶ κατὰ τὸ τοιῦτον ἡ πρόσθεσις ἐστὶ
 τῷ ἄρθρῳ, συνιδιάζουσα τὸ ἐπιθετικὸν τῷ κυρίῳ
 ὀνόματι — 'Tis with reason therefore that
 the Article is here also added, as it brings
 the Adjective to an Individuality, as pre-
 cise, as the proper Name (d).

WE may carry this reasoning farther,
 and shew, how by help of the *Article*
 even *common Appellatives* come to have
 the force of *proper Names*, and that un-
 assisted by epithets of any kind. Among
 the *Athenians* Πλοῖον meant *Ship*; Ἐνδεκα,
Eleven; and Ἀνθρωπῶν, *Man*. Yet add
 but the Article, and Τὸ Πλοῖον, *THE SHIP*,
 meant *that particular Ship, which they sent*
annually to Delos; Οἱ Ἐνδεκα, *THE ELEVEN*,
 meant, *certain Officers of Justice*; and Ὁ
 Ἀνθρωπῶν, *THE MAN*, meant *their public*
Executioner. So in *English*, *City*, is a
 Name

(d) See *Apoll.* L. I. c. 12. where by mistake *Mene-*
laus is put for *Mencs/theus*.

Name common to many places; and Ch. I.
Speaker, a Name common to many Men. }
 Yet if we prefix the Article, THE CITY
 means our Metropolis; and THE SPEAK-
 ER, a *high Officer* in the *British* Parlia-
 ment.

AND thus 'tis by an easy transition, that
 the Article, from denoting *Reference*, comes
 to denote *Eminence* also; that is to say,
 from implying an *ordinary* pre-acquain-
 tance, to presume a kind of *general and*
universal Notoriety. Thus among the
Greeks Ὁ Ποιητὴς, THE POET, meant *Ho-*
mer (e); and Ὁ Σταγειρίτης, THE STAGI-
 RITE, meant *Aristotle*; not that there were
 not

(e) There are so few exceptions to this Observation,
 that we may fairly admit it to be generally true. Yet
Aristotle twice denotes *Euripides* by the Phrase ὁ ποιητής,
 once at the end of the seventh Book of his *Nicomachean*
Ethics, and again in his *Physics*, L. II. 2. *Plato* also
 in his tenth Book of *Laws* (p. 901. *Edit. Serr.*) denotes
Hesiod after the same manner.

Ch. I. not many Poets, beside *Homer*; and many Stagirites, beside *Aristotle*; but none equally illustrious for their Poetry and Philosophy.

'Tis on a like principle that *Aristotle* tells us, 'tis by no means the same thing to assert—*εἶναι τὴν ἡδονὴν ἀγαθόν*, or, *Τὸ ἀγαθόν*—that, *Pleasure is A GOOD*, or, *THE GOOD*. The first only makes it a *common Object of Desire*, upon a level with many others, which daily raise our wishes; the last supposes it *that supreme and sovereign Good*, the ultimate Scope of all our Actions and Endeavours (f).

BUT to pursue our Subject. It has been said already that the Article has no meaning, but when associated to some other word.—To what words then may it be associated?—To such as require *defining*,
for

(f) *Analyt. Prior. L. I. c. 40.*

for it is by nature a *Definitive*.—And Ch. I.
what Words are these?—Not those which
 already are *as definite, as may be*. Nor
 yet those, which, *being indefinite, cannot*
properly be made otherwise. It remains
 then they must be *those, which though in-*
definite, are yet capable, through the Article,
of becoming definite.

UPON these Principles we see the reason,
 why 'tis absurd to say, Ο ΕΓΩ, THE I, or
 Ο ΣΥ, THE THOU, because nothing can
 make those Pronouns more *definite*, than
 they are (g). The same may be asserted
 of

(g) *Apollonius* makes it part of the Pronoun's Defi-
 nition, to refuse co-alescence with the Article. Ἐκείνο
 ἔν' Αἰτωνυμία, τὸ μετὰ δείξεως ἢ ἀναφορᾶς ἀνασχε-
 ζόμενον, ᾧ ἔσθ' ἐν τῷ ἄρθρῳ. *That therefore is a Pro-*
noun, which with Indication or Reference is put for a
Noun, and WITH WHICH THE ARTICLE DOETH
NOT ASSOCIATE. L. II. c. 5. So *Gaza*, speaking
 of Pronouns—Πάντη δὲ—ἐν ἐπιδέχοντα ἄρθρον. L. IV.
Priscian says the same. *Jure igitur apud Græcos prima*
 Q at

Ch. I. of Proper Names, and though the *Greeks* say ὁ Σωκράτης, ἡ Ξάνθη, and the like, yet the Article is a mere Pleonasm, unless perhaps it serve to distinguish Sexes. By the same rule we cannot say in *Greek* ΟΙ ΑΜΦΟΤΕΡΟΙ, or in *English*, THE BOTH, because these Words in their own nature are each of them perfectly defined, so that to define them farther would be quite superfluous. Thus if it be said, *I have read BOTH Poets*, this plainly indicates a definite pair, of whom some mention has been made already; Δυὸς ἐγνωσμένα, a known Duad, as Apollonius expresses himself, (b) when he speaks of this Subject. On the contrary, if it be said, *I have read Two Poets*, this may mean any Pair out of

et secunda persona pronominum, quæ sine dubio demonstrativæ sunt, articulis adjungi non possunt; nec tertia, quando demonstrativa est. L. XII. p. 938.—In the beginning of the same Book, he gives the true reason of this. *Supra omnes alias partes orationis FINIT PERSONAS PRONOMEN.*

(b) *Apollon.* L. I. c. 16.

of all that ever existed. And hence this Ch. I.
 Numeral, being in this Sense *indefinite* (as
 indeed are all others, as well as itself) is
 forced *to assume the Article*, whenever it
 would become *definite**. And thus 'tis,
 THE TWO in *English*, and ΟΙ ΔΥΟ in
Greek, mean nearly the same thing, as
 BOTH or ΑΜΦΟΤΕΡΟΙ. Hence also it
 is, that as TWO, when taken alone, has
 reference to some *primary* and *indefinite*
 Perception, while the Article, THE, has
 reference to some *secondary* and *definite* †;
 hence I say the Reason, why 'tis bad *Greek*
 to say ΔΥΟ ΟΙ ΑΝΘΡΩΠΟΙ, and bad
English, to say TWO THE MEN. Such
 Syntax is in fact a *Blending of Incompati-*
 Q 2 bles,

* This explains *Servius* on the XIIth *Æneid*. v. 511.
 where he tells us that *Duorum* is put for *Amborum*. In
English or *Greek* the Article would have done the busi-
 ness, for *the Two*, or τοῖν δύοιν are equivalent to *Both*
 or ἀμφοτέρων, but not so *Duorum*, because the *Latins*
 have no Articles to prefix.

† Sup. p. 215, 216.

Ch. I. *bles*, that is to say of a *defined Substantive* with an *undefined Attributive*. On the contrary to say in *Greek* ΑΜΦΟΤΕΡΟΙ ΟΙ ΑΝΘΡΩΠΟΙ, or in *English*, BOTH THE MEN, is good and allowable, because the Substantive cannot possibly be less apt, by being defined, to coalesce with an Attributive, which is defined as well as itself. So likewise, 'tis correct to say, ΟΙ ΔΥΟ ΑΝΘΡΩΠΟΙ, THE TWO MEN, because here the Article, being placed in the beginning, *extends it's Power* as well through Substantive as Attributive, and equally contributes to *define* them both.

As some of the words above admit of no Article, *because they are by Nature as definite as may be*, so there are others, which admit it not, *because they are not to be defined at all*. Of this sort are all INTERROGATIVES. If we question about *Substances*, we cannot say Ο ΤΙΣ ΟΥΤΟΣ, THE WHO IS THIS; but ΤΙΣ ΟΥ-

ΟΥΤΟΣ, WHO IS THIS? (i). The same Ch. I.
 as to *Qualities* and both kinds of *Quantity*.
 We say without an Article ΠΟΙΟΣ, ΠΟ-
 ΣΟΙ, ΠΗΛΙΚΟΣ, in *English*, WHAT
 SORT OF, HOW MANY, HOW GREAT.
 The Reason is, that the Articles Ο, and
 ΤΗΕ respect Beings *already known*; Inter-
 rogatives respect Beings, *about which we*
are ignorant; for as to what we know,
 Interrogation is superfluous.

IN a word *the natural Associators with*
Articles are all those *common Appellatives*,
 which denote the several Genera and Spe-
 cies of Beings. 'Tis these, which, by as-
 suming a different *Article*, serve either to ex-
 plain an Individual upon its first being per-
 ceived, or else to indicate, upon its return,
 a Recognition, or repeated Knowledge (k).

Q3

WE

(i) *Apollonius* calls ΤΙΣ, ἐναντιώτατον τῶν ἀρθρῶν,
 a Part of Speech, *most contrary, most averse to Articles*.
 L. IV. c. 1.

(k) What is here said respects *the two Articles*, which
 we have in *English*. In *Greek*, the Article does no more,
 than imply a *Recognition*. See before p. 216, 217, 218.

Ch. I. WE shall here subjoin a few Instances
 of the peculiar Power of ARTICLES.

EVERY Proposition consists of a *Subject*, and a *Predicate*. In *English* these are distinguished by their Position, the Subject standing *first*, the Predicate *last*. *Happiness is Pleasure*—Here, *Happiness* is the *Subject*; *Pleasure*, the *Predicate*. If we change their order, and say, *Pleasure is Happiness*; then *Pleasure* becomes the *Subject*, and *Happiness* the *Predicate*. In *Greek* these are distinguished not by any Order or Position, but by help of the *Article*, which the Subject always assumes, and the Predicate in most instances (some few excepted) rejects. *Happiness is Pleasure*—ἡδονὴ ἡ εὐδαιμονία—*Pleasure is Happiness*—ἡ ἡδονὴ εὐδαιμονία—*Fine things are difficult*—χαλεπὰ τὰ καλὰ—*Difficult things are fine*—τὰ χαλεπὰ καλὰ.

IN

IN *Greek* 'tis worth attending, how in Ch. I. the same Sentence, the same *Article*, by being prefixed to a different Word, quite changes the whole meaning. For example—Ὁ Πτολεμαῖος γυμνασιάρχης εἰτιμήθη —*Ptolemy, having presided over the Games, was publickly honoured.* The Participle γυμνασιάρχης has here no other force, than to denote to us *the Time, when* Ptolemy was honoured, *viz.* after having presided over the Games. But if, instead of the Substantive, we join the Participle to the *Article*, and say, Ὁ γυμνασιάρχης Πτολεμαῖος εἰτιμήθη, our meaning is then—*The Ptolemy, who presided over the Games, was honoured.* The Participle in this case, being joined to the *Article*, tends tacitly to indicate not one *Ptolemy* but many, of which number a particular one participated of honour (1).

Q 4

IN

(1) *Apollon. L. I. c. 33, 34.*

Ch. I. IN *English* likewise it deserves remark-
 ing, how the Sense is changed by chang-
 ing of the *Articles*, tho' we leave every
 other Word of the sentence untouched.—
And Nathan said unto David, THOU ART
THE MAN *. In that single, THE, that
 diminutive Particle, all the force and effi-
 cacy of the Reason is contained. By that
 alone are the Premises applied, and so
 firmly fixed, as never to be shaken. 'Tis
 possible this Assertion may appear at first
 somewhat strange; but let him, who doubts
 it, only change the *Article*, and then see
 what will become of the Prophet and his
 reasoning.—*And Nathan said unto David,*
THOU ART A MAN. Might not the King
 well have, demanded upon so impertinent
 a position,

*Non dices hodie, quorsum hæc tam putida
 tendant ?*

BUT

* ΣΤ ΕΙ Ο ΑΝΗΡ. Βασιλ. Β'. κεΦ. ιβ'.

Ch. I.

BUT enough of such Speculations. The only remark, which we shall make on them, is this; that “ minute Change in “ PRINCIPLES leads to mighty Change in “ EFFECTS; so that well are PRINCIPLES “ intitled to our regard, however *in appearance* they may be trivial and low.”

THE ARTICLES already mentioned are those *strictly* so called; but besides these there are the PRONOMINAL ARTICLES, such as *This, That, Any, Other, Some, All, No, or None, &c.* Of these we have spoken already in our Chapter of Pronouns (*m*),
where

(*m*) See B. I. c. 5. p. 72, 73. It seems to have been some view of words, like that here given, which induced Quintilian to say of the *Latin Tongue*—*Noster sermo Articulos non desiderat; ideoque in alias partes orationis sparguntur.* Inst. Orat. L. I. c. 4. So Scaliger. *His declaratis, satis constat Græcorum Articulos non neglectos a nobis, sed eorum usum superfluum. Nam ubi aliquid præscribendum est, quod Græci per articulum efficiunt (ἐλεξεν ὁ δῶλος) expletur a Latinis per IS aut ILLE; IS,*
aut

Ch. I. where we have shewn, when they may be taken as Pronouns, and when as Articles. Yet in truth it must be confessed, if the Essence of an Article be *to define and ascertain*, they are much more properly Articles, than any thing else, and as such should be considered in Universal Grammar. Thus when we say, *THIS Picture I approve, but THAT I dislike*, what do we perform by the help of these Definitives, but bring down the common Appellative to denote two Individuals, the one as *the more near*, the other as *the more distant*? So when we say, *SOME men are virtuous, but ALL men are mortal*, what is the natural Effect of this ALL and SOME, but to define that *Universality*, and *Particularity*, which would remain indefinite, were we to take them

aut, Ille servus dixit, de quo servo antea facta mentio sit, aut qui alio quo pacto notus sit. Additur enim Articulus ad rei memoriam renovandam, cujus antea non nescii sumus, aut ad præscribendam intellectionem, quæ latius patere queat; veluti cum dicimus, C. Cæsar, Is qui postea dictator fuit. Nam alii fuere C. Cæsares. Sic Græcè Καὶσαρ ὁ ἀντιχράτωρ. De Caus. Ling. Lat. c. 131.

them away? The same is evident in such Ch. I.
 Sentences, as—*SOME substances have sensation*; *OTHERS want it*—*Choose ANY way of*
acting, and SOME men will find fault, &c.
 For here *SOME*, *OTHER*, and *ANY*, serve
 all of them to *define* different Parts of a
 given Whole; *SOME*, to denote a *definite*
Part; *ANY*, to denote an *indefinite*; and
OTHER, to denote the *remaining* Part,
 when a Part has been assumed already.
 Sometimes this last Word denotes a *large*
indefinite Portion, set in opposition to some
single, definite, and remaining Part, which
 receives from such Opposition no small de-
 gree of heightening. Thus *Virgil*,

Excudent ALII spirantia mollius æra ;
(Credo equidem) vivos ducent de marmore
vultus ;

Orabunt causas melius, cœlique meatus
Describent radio, et surgentia sidera
dicent :

TU regere imperio populos, ROMANE,
memento, &c. *Æn. VI.*

NOTHING

Ch. I. **NOTHING** can be stronger or more sublime, than this Antithesis; *one Act* set as equal to *many other Acts taken together*, and the Roman *singly* (for it is *Tu Romane*, not *Vos Romani*) to *all other Men*; and yet this performed by so trivial a cause, as the just opposition of **ALII** to **TU**.

BUT here we conclude, and proceed to treat of **CONNECTIVES**.

CHAP.

C H A P. II.

*Concerning Connectives, and first those
called Conjunctions.*

CONNECTIVES are the subject of what Ch. II.
{
 follows; which, according as they
 connect either *Sentences* or *Words*, are cal-
 led by the different Names of CONJUNC-
 TIONS, or PREPOSITIONS. Of these Names,
 that of the *Preposition* is taken from a *mere*
accident, as it commonly stands in connec-
 tion before the Part, which it connects.
 The name of the *Conjunction*, as is evident,
 has reference to its *essential character*.

OF these two we shall consider the CON-
 JUNCTION first, because it connects, not
 Words, but *Sentences*. This is conform-
 able to the Analysis, with which we be-
 gan this inquiry *, and which led us, by
 parity


* Sup. p. 11, 12.

Ch. II. parity of reason, to consider *Sentences themselves* before *Words*. Now the Definition of a CONJUNCTION is as follows—a *Part of Speech, void of Signification itself, but so formed as to help Signification, by making TWO or more significant Sentences to be ONE significant Sentence (a).*

THIS

(a) Grammarians have usually considered the Conjunction as connecting rather *single Parts of Speech*, than *whole Sentences*, and that too with the addition of like with like, Tense with Tense, Number with Number, Case with Case, &c. This *Sanctius* justly explodes. *Conjunctio neque casus, neque alias partes orationis (ut imperiti docent) conjungit, ipsæ enim partes inter se conjunguntur—sed conjunctio Orationes inter se conjungit.* *Miner.* L. III. c. 14. He then establishes his doctrine by a variety of examples. He had already said as much, L. I. c. 18. and in this he appears to have followed *Scaliger*, who had asserted the same before him. *Conjunctionis autem notionem veteres paullo inconsultius prodidere; neque enim, quod aiunt, partes alias conjungit (ipsæ enim partes per se inter se conjunguntur)—sed Conjunctio est, quæ conjungit Orationes plures.* *De Caus. Ling. Lat.* c. 165.

This

THIS therefore being the general Idea of Ch. II.
 CONJUNCTIONS, we deduce their Species 
 in

This Doctrine of theirs is confirmed by *Apollonius*, who in the several places, where he mentions the Conjunction, always considers it in Syntax as connecting Sentences, and not Words, though in his works now extant he has not given us its Definition. See L. I. c. 2. p. 14. L. II. c. 12. p. 124. L. III. c. 15. p. 234.

But we have stronger authority than this to support *Scaliger* and *Sanctius*, and that is *Aristotle's* Definition, as the Passage has been corrected by the best Critics and Manuscripts. A Conjunction, according to him, is *Φωνὴ ἄσημος, ἐκ πλείονων μὲν Φωνῶν μιᾶς, σημαστικῶν δέ, ποιεῖν πεφυκῆα μίαν Φωνὴν σημαστικὴν*. An articulate Sound, devoid of Signification, which is so formed as to make ONE significant articulate Sound out of several articulate Sounds, which are each of them significant. Poet. c. 20. In this view of things, the one significant articulate Sound, formed by the Conjunction, is not the Union of two or more Syllables in one simple Word, nor even of two or more Words in one simple Sentence, but of two or more simple Sentences in one complex Sentence, which is considered as ONE, from that Concatenation of Meaning effected by the Conjunctions. For example, let us take the Sentence, which follows. *If Men are by nature social, 'tis their Interest to be just, though it were*

Ch. II. in the following manner. CONJUNCTIONS,
 while they *connect sentences*, either *connect*
also

were not so ordained by the Laws of their Country. Here are three Sentences. (1.) *Men are by nature social.* (2.) *'Tis Man's Interest to be just.* (3.) *'Tis not ordained by the Laws of every Country that Men should be just.* The first two of these Sentences are made *One* by the Conjunction, *IF*; these, *One* with the third Sentence, by the Conjunction, *THO'*; and the three, thus united, make that *Φωνὴ μία σημαστικὴ*, *that one significant articulate Sound*, of which *Aristotle* speaks, and which is the result of the conjunctive Power.

This explains a passage in his *Rhetoric*, where he mentions the same Subject. 'Ο γὰρ σύνδεσμος ἐν ποιεῖ τὰ πολλά· ὥς-ε εἰὰν ἐξαιρεθῇ, δῆλον ὅτι τετραυτίον ἔσται τὸ ἐν πολλά. *The Conjunction makes many, ONE; so that if it be taken away, 'tis then evident on the contrary that one will be MANY.* Rhet. III. c. 12. His instance of a Sentence, divested of its Conjunctions, and thus made *many* out of *one*, is, *ἦλθον, ἀπήντησα, ἐδέόμην*, *veni, occurri, rogavi*, where by the way the three Sentences, resulting from this Dissolution, (for *ἦλθον*, *ἀπήντησα*, and *ἐδέόμην*, are each of them, when unconnected, so many perfect Sentences) prove that these are the proper Subjects of the *Conjunction's* connective faculty.

Ammonius's

also their meanings, or not. For exam- Ch. II.
ple: let us take these two Sentences—

Rome was enslaved—Cæsar was ambitious
—and connect them together by the Con-
junction, BECAUSE. *Rome was enslaved,*
BECAUSE *Cæsar was ambitious.* Here the
Meanings, as well as the Sentences, appear
to be connected. But if I say,—*Manners*
must be reformed, OR Liberty will be lost—
here the Conjunction, OR, though it join
the

Ammonius's account of the use of this Part of Speech
is elegant. Διὸ καὶ τῶν λόγων ὁ μὲν ὑπάρχειν μίαν ση-
μαίνων, ὁ κυρίως εἷς, ἀνάλογον αὐτῇ τῷ μηδέπω τετ-
μημένῳ ξύλῳ, καὶ διὰ τῆς ἐν λεγομένῳ· ὁ δὲ πλείονας
ὑπάρχεις δηλῶν, ἕνα (lege διὰ) τινὰ δὲ σύνδεσμον ἡνωσ-
θαί πως δοκῶν, ἀναλογεῖ τῇ νηὶ τῇ ἐκ πολλῶν συγκει-
μένη ξύλων, ὑπὸ δὲ τῶν γόμφων φαινομένην ἔχουσαν τὴν
ἑνωσιν. *Of Sentences that, which denotes one Existence*
simply, and which is strictly ONE, may be considered as
analogous to a piece of Timber not yet sever'd, and called
on this account One. That, which denotes several Exist-
ences, and which appears to be made ONE by some Conjun-
ctive Particle, is analogous to a Ship made up of many pieces
of Timber, and which by means of the nails has an apparent
Unity. Am. in Lib. de Interpret. p. 54, 6.

Ch. II. *the Sentences*, yet as to their respective *Meanings*, is a perfect *Disjunctive*. And thus it appears, that though all Conjunctions *conjoin Sentences*, yet with respect to the *Sense*, some are CONJUNCTIVE, and some DISJUNCTIVE; and hence (b) 'tis that we derive their different Species.

THE *Conjunctions*, which *conjoin both Sentences and their Meanings*, are either COPULATIVES, or CONTINUATIVES. The principal Copulative in *English* is, AND. The Continuatives are, IF, BECAUSE, THEREFORE, THAT, &c. The Difference between these is this — *The Copulative* does no more than barely couple Sentences, and is therefore applicable to all Subjects, whose Natures are not incompatible. *Continuatives*, on the contrary, by a more intimate connection, consolidate

I Sen-

(b) Thus Scaliger. *Aut ergo Sensum conjungunt, ac Verba; aut Verba tantum conjungunt, Sensum vero disjungunt.* De C. L. Lat. c. 167.

Sentences into *one continuous Whole*, and Ch. II. are therefore applicable only to Subjects, which have an *essential Co-incidence*.

To explain by Examples—'Tis no way improper to say, *Lyfippus was a Statuary*, AND *Priscian was a Grammarian*—*The Sun shineth*, AND *the Sky is clear*—because these are things that may co-exist, and yet imply no absurdity. But it would be absurd to say, *Lyfippus was a Statuary*, BECAUSE *Priscian was a Grammarian*; tho' not to say, *the Sun shineth*, BECAUSE *the Sky is clear*. The Reason is, with respect to the first, *the Co-incidence* is merely *accidental*; with respect to the last, tis *essential*, and founded in nature. And so much for the Distinction between *Copulatives* and *Continuatives* (c).

As

(c) *Copulativa est, quæ copulat tam Verba, quam Sensum*. Thus *Priscian*, p. 1026. But *Scaliger* is more explicit—*si Sensum conjungunt (conjunctiones sc.) aut necessariò,*

Ch. II. As to *Continuatives*, they are either **SUPPOSITIVE**, such as, *IF*; or **POSITIVE**, such as, *BECAUSE, THEREFORE, As, &c.* Take Examples of each—you will live happily, *IF* you live honestly—you live happily, *BECAUSE* you live honestly. The Difference between these *Continuatives* is this—The *Suppositives* denote *Connection*, but assert not actual *Existence*; the *Positives* imply *both the one and the other* (d).

FARTHER

cessariò, aut non necessariò: Et, si non necessario, tum sunt Copulativæ, &c. De C. Ling. Lat. c. 167. Priscian's own account of *Continuatives* is as follows. *Continuativæ sunt, quæ continuationem Et consequentiam rerum significant*—ibid. Scaliger's account is—*causam aut præstituunt, aut subdunt.* Ibid. c. 168. The Greek name for the *Copulative* was Σύνδεσμος συμπλεκτικός; for the *Continuative*, συναντικός; the Etymologies of which words justly distinguish their respective characters.

(d) The old Greek Grammarians confined the name Συναντικοί, and the Latins that of *Continuativæ* to those

Con-

FARTHER than this, the Positives above Ch. II. mentioned are either CAUSAL, such as, BECAUSE, SINCE, AS, &c. or COLLECTIVE, such as, THEREFORE, WHEREFORE, THEN, &c. The Difference between these is this—the *Causals* subjoin *Causes to Effects*—*The Sun is in Eclipse,*

BE-

Conjunctions, which we have called *Suppositive* or *Conditional*, while the Positive they called *παρασυναπτικοί*, or *Subcontinuativæ*. They agree however in describing their proper Characters. The first according to *Gaza* are, οἱ ὑπαρξιν μὲν ἔ, ἀκολουθίαν δὲ τινα καὶ τάξιν δηλῶντες—L. IV. *Priscian* says, they signify to us, *qualis est ordinatio & natura rerum, cum dubitatione aliquâ essentialis rerum*—p. 1027. And *Scaliger* says, they conjoin *sine subsistentiâ necessariâ; potest enim subsistere & non subsistere; utrumque enim admittunt*. Ibid. c. 168. On the contrary of the Positive, or *παρασυναπτικοί* (to use his own name) *Gaza* tells us, ὅτι καὶ ὑπαρξιν μετὰ τάξεως σημαίνουσιν ἑτοίγῃ—And *Priscian* says, *causam continuationis ostendunt consequentem cum essentia rerum*—And *Scaliger*, *non ex hypothesi, sed ex eo, quod subsistit, conjungunt*. Ibid.

Ch. II. BECAUSE *the Moon intervenes*—*The Collectives* subjoin *Effects to Causes*—*The Moon intervenes*, THEREFORE *the Sun is in Eclipse*. Now we use *Causals* in those instances, where, the Effect being conspicuous, we seek its Cause; and *Collectives*, in *Demonstrations*, and *Science properly so called*, where the Cause being known

It may seem at first somewhat strange, why the *Positive* Conjunctions should have been considered as Subordinate to the *Suppositive*, which by their antient Names appears to have been the fact. Is it, that the Positive are confined to what *actually is*; the Suppositive extend to *Possibles*, nay even as far as to *Impossible*s? Thus 'tis false to affirm, *As it is Day, it is Light*, unless it actually *be Day*. But we may at midnight affirm, *If it be Day, it is Light*, because the, *IF*, extends to Possibles also. Nay we may affirm, by its help (if we please) even *Impossible*s. We may say, *If the Sun be cubical, then is the Sun angular*; *If the Sky fall, then shall we catch Larks*. Thus too Scaliger upon the same occasion—*amplitudinem Continuativæ percipi ex eo, quod etiam impossibile aliquando præsupponit*. De C. L. Lat. C. 168. In this sense then the Continuative, Suppositive or Conditional Conjunction is (as it were) superior to the Positive, as being of greater latitude in its application.

known first, by its help we discern consequences (e). Ch. II.

ALL these *Continuatives* are resolvable into *Copulatives*. Instead of, *BECAUSE it is Day, it is light*, we may say, *It is Day, AND it is Light*. Instead of, *IF it be Day, it is Light*, we may say, *'Tis at the same time necessary to be Day, AND to be Light*, and so in other Instances. The Reason is, that the Power of the *Copulative* extends to all Connections, as well to the *essential*, as to the *casual* or *fortuitous*. Hence therefore the *Continuative* may be resolved into a *Copulative* and *something more*, that is to say, into a *Copulative* implying an *essential* Co-incidence (f) in the Subjects conjoined.

R 4 As

(e) The *Latins* called the *Causals*, *Causales* or *Causativæ*; the *Collectives*, *Collectivæ* or *Illativæ*: The *Greeks* called the former *Αἰτιολογικοί*, and the latter *Συλλογιστικοί*.

(f) *Resolvuntur autem in Copulativas omnes hæ, propterea quod Causa cum Effectu Suapte naturâ conjuncta est.*
Scal. de C. L. Lat. c. 169.

Ch. II. As to *Causal* Conjunctions (of which we have spoken already) there is no one of the four Species of Causes, which they are not capable of denoting: for example, THE MATERIAL CAUSE—*The Trumpet sounds, BECAUSE 'tis made of Metal*—THE FORMAL—*The Trumpet sounds, BECAUSE 'tis long and hollow*—THE EFFICIENT—*The Trumpet sounds, BECAUSE an Artist blows it*—THE FINAL—*The Trumpet sounds, THAT it may raise our courage*, Where 'tis worth observing, that the three first Causes are exprest by the strong affirmation of the *Indicative Mode*, because if the Effect actually be, these must of necessity be also. But the last Cause has a different Mode, namely, the *Contingent* or *Potential*. The Reason is, that the Final Cause, tho' it may be *first in Speculation*, is always *last in Event*. That is to say, however it may be the End, which set the Artist first to work, it may still be an End beyond his Power to obtain, and

which

which like other Contingents, may either Ch. II.
happen, or not (g.) Hence also it is con-
nected by Conjunctions of a peculiar kind,
such as, THAT, ἵνα, UT, &c.

THE Sum is, that ALL CONJUNCTIONS,
which connect both Sentences and their Mean-
ings, are either COPULATIVE, or CONTI-
NUATIVE; the Continuatives are either
Conditional, or *Positive*; and the Positives
are either *Causal* or *Collective*.

AND now we come to the DISJUNC-
TIVE CONJUNCTIONS, a Species of Words
which bear this contradictory Name, be-
cause, while they *disjoin the Sense,* they
conjoin the Sentences (h).

WITH

(g) See B. I. c. 8. p. 142. See also Vol. I. Note
VIII. p. 271. For the four Causes see Vol. I. Note
XVII. p. 280.

(h) Ὅτι δὲ διαζευκτικοὶ τὰ διαζευγμένα συντιθέασιν,
καὶ ἢ πρᾶγμα ἀπὸ πράγματος, ἢ πρόσωπον ἀπὸ προ-
σώπου διαζευγνύσιν, τὴν φράσιν ἐπισυνδύσιν. *Gazæ*
Gram.

Ch. II. WITH respect to these we may observe, that as there is a Principle of UNION diffused throughout all things, by which THIS WHOLE is kept together, and preserved from Diffipation ; so there is a Principle of DIVERSITY diffused in like manner, the Source of Distinction, of Number, and of Order (i).

Now

Gram. L. IV. *Disjunctivæ sunt, quæ, quamvis distinctiones conjungant, sensum tamen disjunctum habent.* Prisc. L. XVI. p. 1029. And hence it is, that a Sentence, connected by Disjunctives, has a near resemblance to a *simple negative Truth*. For though this as to its Intellection be *disjunctive* (its end being to disjoin the Subject from the Predicate) yet as it combines Terms together into one Proposition, 'tis as truly *synthetical*, as any Truth, that is *affirmative*. See Chap. I. Note (b). p. 3.

(i) The DIVERSITY, which adorns Nature, may be said to heighten by degrees, and as it passes to different Subjects, to become more and more intense. Some things only differ, when considered as *Individuals*, but if we recur to their *Species*, immediately lose all Distinction: such for instance are *Socrates* and *Plato*. Others differ as to *Species*, but as to *Genus* are the same: such

are

Now 'tis to express in some degree the *Ch. II.*
Modifications of this Diversity, that DIS-
 JUNCTIVE CONJUNCTIONS seem first to
 have been invented.

OF these DISJUNCTIVES, some are
 SIMPLE, some ADVERSATIVE—*Simple*,
 as when we say, EITHER *it is Day*, OR *it*
is

are *Man* and *Lion*. There are others again, which *dis-*
fer as to Genus, and co-incide only in those *transcenden-*
tal Comprehensions of *Ens*, *Being*, *Existence*, and the
 like: such are *Quantities* and *Qualities*, as for example
an Ounce, and the *Colour, White*. Lastly ALL BEING
 whatever differs, as *Being*, from *Non-being*.

Farther, in all things different, however moderate
 their Diversity, there is an appearance of OPPOSITION
 with respect to each other, in as much as each thing *is*
it self, and *not any* of the rest. But yet in all Subjects
 this Opposition is not *the same*. In RELATIVES, such
 as Greater and Less, Double and Half, Father and Son,
 Cause and Effect, in *these* 'tis more striking, than in or-
 dinary Subjects, because *these* always shew it, by *neces-*
sarily inferring each other. In CONTRARIES, such as
 Black and White, Even and Odd, Good and Bad,
 Virtuous

Ch. II. *is Night—Adversative*, as when we say, *It is not Day, BUT it is Night*. The Difference between these is, that the simple do no more, than *merely disjoin*; the *Adversative* disjoin, with an *Opposition concomitant*. Add to this, that the Adversative are *definite*; the Simple, *indefinite*. Thus when we say, *The Number Three is not* an

Virtuous and Vicious, in these the Opposition goes still farther, because these not only *differ*, but are even *destructive of each other*. But the most potent Opposition is that of *Ἀντίφασις*, or CONTRADICTION, when we oppose *Proposition to Proposition*, *Truth to Falshood*, asserting of any Subject, *either it is, or is not*. This indeed is an *Opposition*, which extends it self to all things, for every thing conceivable must needs have its *Negative*, though multitudes by nature have neither *Relatives*, nor *Contraries*.

Besides these Modes of DIVERSITY, there are others that deserve notice; such for instance, as the Diversity between the *Name* of a thing, and *its Definition*; between the *various Names*, which belong to the *same thing*, and the *various things*, which are denoted by the *same Name*; all which *Diversities* upon occasion become a Part of our Discourse. And so much, in short, for the Subject of DIVERSITY.

an even Number, BUT an odd, we not only Ch. II.
disjoin two opposite Attributes, but we de-
finitely affirm one, and deny the other.
But when we say, The Number of the Stars
is EITHER even OR odd, though we assert
one Attribute to be, and the other not to
be, yet the Alternative notwithstanding is
left indefinite. And so much for simple
Disjunctives (k).

As

(k) The simple Disjunctive η , or *Vel*, is mostly used indefinitely, so as to leave an Alternative. But when it is used definitely, so as to leave no Alternative, 'tis then a perfect Disjunctive of the Subsequent from the Previous, and has the same force with κ , ϵ , or, *Et non*. 'Tis thus Gaza explains that Verse of Homer.

Βέλομαι ἐγὼ λαὸν σόου ἔμμεναι, ἢ ἀπολέσθαι.

Ιλ. Α.

That is to say, *I desire the people should be saved, AND NOT be destroyed*, the Conjunction η being ἀναιρετικός, or *sublative*. It must however be confessed, that this Verse is otherwise explained by an Ellipsis, either of μάλλον, or αὐτίς, concerning which see the Commentators.

Ch. II. As to *Adversative Disjunctives*, it has been said already that they imply OPPOSITION. Now there can be no Opposition of the *same Attribute*, in the *same Subject*, as when we say, *Nireus was beautiful*; but the Opposition must be either of the *same Attribute* in *different Subjects*, as when we say, *Brutus was a Patriot*, BUT *Cæsar was not*—or of *different Attributes* in the *same Subject*, as when we say, *Gorgias was a Sophist*, BUT *not a Philosopher*—or of *different Attributes* in *different Subjects*, as when we say, *Plato was a Philosopher*, BUT *Hippias was a Sophist*.

THE *Conjunctions* used for all these purposes may be called ABSOLUTE ADVERSATIVES.

BUT there are *other Adversatives*, besides these; as when we say, *Nireus was more beautiful*, THAN *Achilles*—*Virgil was*

AS great a Poet, AS Cicero was an Orator. Ch. II.

The Character of these latter is, that they go farther than the former, by marking not only *Opposition*, but that *Equality* or *Excess*, which arises among Subjects from their being *compared*. And hence 'tis they may be called ADVERSATIVES OF COMPARISON.

BESIDES the Adversatives here mentioned, there are two other Species, of which the most eminent are UNLESS and ALTHO'. Forexample—*Troy will be taken, UNLESS the Palladium be preserved—Troy will be taken, ALTHO' Hector defend it.* The Nature of these *Adversatives* may be thus explained. As every *Event* is naturally allied to its *Cause*, so by parity of reason 'tis opposed to its *Preventive*. And as every Cause is either adequate (1) or in-adequate (in-adequate,

(1) This Distinction has reference to common Opinion, and the form of Language, consonant thereto. In strict metaphysical truth, No Cause, that is not adequate, is any Cause at all.

Ch. II. quate, when it endeavours, without being
 effectual) so in like manner is every *Preven-*
tive. Now *adequate Preventives* are exprest
 by such Adversatives, as *UNLESS*—*Troy will*
be taken, UNLESS the Palladium be preserved;
that is, This alone is sufficient to prevent
it. The *In-adequate* are exprest by such
 Adversatives, as *ALTHO'*—*Troy will be*
taken, ALTHO' Hector defend it; that is,
Hector's Defence will prove in-effectual.

THE Names given by the old Gram-
 marians to denote these last Adversatives,
 appear not sufficiently to express their Na-
 tures (*m*). They may be better perhaps
 called *ADVERSATIVES ADEQUATE*, and
IN-ADEQUATE.

AND thus it is that all *DISJUNCTIVES*,
 that is *CONJUNCTIONS*, *which conjoin Sen-*
tences,

(*m*) They called them for the most part, without
 sufficient Distinction of their Species, *Adversativa*, or
Εναντιωματικοί.

tences, but not their Meanings, are either Ch. II.
SIMPLE OR ADVERSATIVE; and that all
ADVERSATIVES are either *Absolute* or *Comparative*; or else *Adequate* or *In-adequate*.


WE shall finish this Chapter with a few miscellany Observations.

IN the first place it may be observed, through all the Species of Disjunctives, that the *same* Disjunctive appears to have *greater* or *less* force, according as the Subjects, which it disjoins, are more or less disjoined by Nature. For example, if we say, *Every Number is even, OR odd—Every Proposition is true, OR false*—nothing seems to disjoin *more strongly* than the *Disjunctive*, because no things are in Nature more *incompatible* than the Subjects. But if we say, *That Object is a Triangle, OR Figure contained under three right lines*—the (OR) in this case hardly seems to disjoin, or indeed to do more, than *distinctly* to express the Thing, first by its
S Name,

Ch. II. *Name*, and then by its *Definition*. So if we say, *That Figure is a Sphere, OR a Globe, OR a Ball*—the Disjunctive in this case, tends no farther to disjoin, than as it distinguishes the *several Names*, which belong to the *same Thing* (n).

AGAIN—the Words, *When* and *Where*, and all others of the same nature, such as, *Whence, Whither, Whenever, Wherever, &c.* may be properly called ADVERBIAL CONJUNCTIONS, because they participate the nature both of Adverbs and Conjunctions—*of Conjunctions*, as they conjoin Sentences ;

(n) The *Latins* had a peculiar Particle for this occasion, which they called *Subdisjunctiva*, a *Subdisjunctive* ; and that was *SIVE*. *Alexander sive Paris ; Mars sive Mavors*. The Greek *ἢ* seems to answer the same end. Of these Particles, *Scaliger* thus speaks—*Et sane nomen Subdisjunctivarum recte acceptum est, neque enim tam planè disjungit, quam Disjunctivæ. Nam Disjunctivæ sunt in Contrariis—Subdisjunctivæ autem etiam in non Contrariis, sed Diversis tantum ; ut, Alexander sive Paris.* De C. L. Lat. c. 170.

ces; of *Adverbs*, as they denote the At- Ch. II.
tributes either of *Time*, or of *Place*. 

AGAIN—these *Adverbial Conjunctions*, and perhaps *most of the Prepositions* (contrary to the Character of *accessory Words*, which have strictly no Signification, but when associated with other words) have a kind of *obscure* Signification, when taken alone, by denoting those Attributes of Time and Place. And hence 'tis, that they appear in Grammar, like *Zoophites* in Nature; a *kind of (o) middle Beings*, of amphibious character, which, by sharing the Attributes of the higher and the lower, conduce to link the Whole together (*p*).

AND

(o) Πολλαχοῦ γὰρ ἡ φύσις δῆλη γίνεται κατὰ μικρὸν μεταβάλλουσα, ὥστε ἀμφισβητεῖσθαι ἐπὶ τῶν, πότερον ζῶον ἢ φυτὸν. *Themist.* p. 74. Ed. Ald. See also *Arist.* de Animal. Part. p. 93. l. 10. Ed. Syll.

(p) 'Tis somewhat surprizing that the politest and most elegant of the *Attic Writers*, and *Plato* above all

Ch. II. AND so much for CONJUNCTIONS, their
 { Genus, and their Species.

the rest, should have their Works filled with Particles of all kinds, and with Conjunctions in particular; while in the modern polite Works, as well of ourselves as of our neighbours, scarce such a Word as a Particle, or Conjunction is to be found. Is it, that where there is *Connection in the Meaning*, there must be *Words had to connect*; but that where the Connection is little or none, such Connectives are of little use? That Houses of Cards, without cement, may well answer their end, but not those Houses, where one would chuse to dwell? Is this the Cause? or have we attained an Elegance, to the Antients unknown?

Venimus ad summam fortunæ, &c.

C H A P.

C H A P. III.

*Concerning those Connectives, called
Prepositions.*

PREPOSITIONS by their name express Ch. III.
their *Place*, but not their *Character*.
Their Definition will distinguish them
from the former Connectives. A PRE-
POSITION is a *Part of Speech*, devoid itself
of Signification, but so formed as to unite
two Words that are significant, and that re-
fuse to co-alesce or unite, of themselves (a).
This

(a) The Stoic Name for a Preposition was Προθε-
τικὸς Σύνδεσμος, *Præpositiva Conjunctio*, *A Prepositive
Conjunction*. Ὡς μὲν ἔν κ' κατὰ τὰς ἄλλας παραθέ-
σεις αἱ προθέσεις συνδεσμικῆς συνιᾶξεως γίνονται παρεμ-
φαικταί, λέλεκται ἡμῖν· ἐξ ὧν κ' ἀφορμὴ ἔσται περὶ
τοῖς Στωικοῖς τῷ καλεῖσθαι αὐτὰς Προθετικὸς Σύνδεσμος.
*Now in what manner even in other applications (besides
the present) Prepositions give proof of their Conjunctive
Syntax, we have mentioned already; whence too the Stoics*

Ch.III. This connective Power, (which relates to *Words* only, and not *Sentences*) will be better understood from the following Speculations.

SOME things co-alesce and unite of *themselves*; others refuse to do so *without help*, and as it were compulsion. Thus in Works of Art, the Mortar and the Stone co-alesce of themselves; but the Wainscot and the Wall not without Nails and Pins. In Nature this is more conspicuous. For example; all Quantities, and Qualities co-alesce immediately with their Substances. Thus'tis we say, *a fierce Lion, a vast Mountain*; and from *this Natural Concord of Subject and Accident*, arises *the Grammatical Concord of Substantive and Adjective*. In
like

took occasion to call them PREPOSITIVE CONJUNCTIONS. *Apollon. L. IV. c. 5. p. 313.* Yet is this in fact rather a descriptive *Sketch*, than a complete *Definition*, since there are other Conjunctions, which are Prepositive as well as these. See *Gaz. L. IV. de Præposit. Prisc. L. XIV. p. 983.*

like manner Actions co-alesce with their Agents, and Passions with their Patients. Ch.III.
 Thus 'tis we say, *Alexander conquers; Darius is conquered.* Nay, as every Energy is a kind of Medium between its Agent and Patient, the whole three, *Agent, Energy, and Patient*, co-alesce with the same facility; as when we say, *Alexander conquers Darius.* And hence, that is from *these Modes of natural Co-alescence*, arises *the Grammatical Regimen of the Verb by its Nominative, and of the Accusative by its Verb.* Farther than this, Attributives themselves may be most of them characterized; as when we say of such Attributives as *ran, beautiful, learned*, he *ran swiftly*, she was *very beautiful*, he was *moderately learned*, &c. And hence the *Co-alescence of the Adverb with Verbs, Participles, and Adjectives.*

THE general Conclusion appears to be this. "THOSE PARTS OF SPEECH UNITE
 " OF THEMSELVES IN GRAMMAR, WHOSE
 " ORIGINAL ARCHETYPES UNITE OF

Ch.III. “THEMSELVES IN NATURE.” To which
 we may add, as following from what has
 been said, that *the great Objects of Natural
 Union are SUBSTANCE and ATTRIBUTE.*
 Now tho’ *Substances* naturally co-incide
 with their *Attributes*, yet they absolutely
 refuse doing so, *one with another (b).* And
 hence those known Maxims in Physics,
 that *Body is impenetrable*; that *two Bodies*
cannot possess the same place; that *the same*
Attribute cannot belong to different Sub-
stances, &c.

FROM these Principles it follows, that
 when we form a Sentence, the *Substantive*
 without difficulty co-incides with the *Verb*,
 from the natural Co-incidence of *Substance*
 and *Energy*—THE SUN WARMETH. So
 likewise the *Energy* with the *Subje&ct*, on
 which

(b) *Causa, propter quam duo Substantiva non ponuntur
 sine copulâ, e Philosophiâ petenda est: neque enim duo sub-*
stantialiter unum esse potest, sicut Substantia et Accidens;
itaque non dicas, CÆSAR CATO PUGNAT, Scal. de
Caus. Ling. Lat. c. 177.

which it operates — WARMETH THE Ch.III.
 EARTH. So likewise both *Substance* and *Energy* with their proper *Attributes*. —
 THE SPLENDID SUN, — GENIALLY WARM-
 ETH — THE FERTILE EARTH. But sup-
 pose we were desirous to add other Sub-
 stantives, as for instance, AIR, or BEAMS.
 How would these co-incide, or under what
 Character could they be introduced? Not
 as *Nominatives* or *Accusatives*, for both
 those places are already filled; the Nomi-
 native by the Substance, SUN; the Accu-
 sative by the Substance, EARTH. Not as
Attributes to these last, or to any other
 thing; for *Attributes by nature they nei-*
ther are, nor can be made. Here then we
 perceive the Rise and Use of PREPOSI-
 TIONS. By these we connect those Sub-
 stantives to Sentences, which at the time
 are unable to co-alesce *of themselves*. Let
 us assume for instance a pair of these Con-
 nectives, THRO' and, WITH, and mark
 their Effect upon the Substances here men-
 tioned. *The splendid Sun* WITH *his Beams*
genially

Ch.III. *genially warmeth THRO' the Air the fertile Earth.* The Sentence, as before, remains *intire and one*; the *Substantives* required are both *introduced*; and not a Word, which was there before, is detruded from its proper place.

It must here be observed that most, if not all Prepositions seem originally formed to denote the *Relations of PLACE* (c). The reason is, this is that grand *Relation*, which *Bodies* or *natural Substances* maintain at all times one to another, whether they are contiguous or remote, whether in motion, or at rest.

It may be said indeed that *in the Continuity of Place* they form this UNIVERSE
or

(c) *Omne corpus aut movetur aut quiescit: quare opus fuit aliquâ notâ, quæ TO' ΠΟΥ' significaret, sive esset inter duo extrema, inter quæ motus fit, sive esset in altero extremorum, in quibus fit quies. Hinc eliciemus Præpositionis essentialem definitionem. Scal. de Caus. Ling. Lat. c. 152.*

OR VISIBLE WHOLE, and are made as much ONE by that general Comprehension, as is consistent with their several Natures, and specific Distinctions. Thus 'tis we have Prepositions to denote the *contiguous Relation* of Body, as when we say, *Caius walked WITH a Staff; the Statue stood UPON a Pedestal; the River ran OVER a Sand;* others for the *detached Relation*, as when we say, *He is going TO Italy; the Sun is risen ABOVE the Hills; these Figs came FROM Turkey.* So as to *Motion* and *Rest*, only with this difference, that *here* the Preposition varies its character with the Verb. Thus if we say, *that Lamp hangs FROM the Ceiling*, the Preposition, *FROM*, assumes a Character of *Quiescence*. But if we say, *that Lamp is falling FROM the Ceiling*, the Preposition in such case assumes a Character of *Motion*. So in *Milton*,

—*To support uneasy Steps*

OVER the burning Marle—Par. L. I.

Here *OVER* denotes *Motion*.

Again

Ch.III. Again—

—*He—with looks of cordial Love*
Hung OVER her enamour'd—Par. L.IV.

Here OVER denotes *Rest*.


BUT though the original use of Prepositions was to denote *the Relations of Place*, they could not be confined to this Office only. They by degrees extended themselves to Subjects *incorporeal*, and came to denote Relations, as well *intellectual*, as *local*. Thus, because in Place he, who is *above*, has commonly the advantage over him, who is *below*, hence we transfer OVER and UNDER to *Dominion and Obedience*; of a King we say, *he ruled OVER his People*; of a common Soldier, *he served UNDER such a General*. So too we say, *with Thought; without Attention; thinking over a Subject; under Anxiety; from Fear; out of Love; through Jealousy, &c.* All which instances, with many others of like kind,

kind, shew that the *first Words* of Men, Ch.III.
 like their *first Ideas*, had an immediate re-
 ference to *sensible Objects*, and that in after
 days, when they began to discern with
 their *Intellect*, they took those Words,
 which they found *already* made, and
 transferred them by metaphor to *intellec-*
tual Conceptions. There is indeed no
 Method to express new Ideas, but either
 this of *Metaphor*, or that of *Coining new*
Words, both which have been practised
 by Philosophers and wise Men, accord-
 ing to the nature, and exigence of the oc-
 casion (d).

IN

(d) Among the Words new coined we may ascribe
 to *Anaxagoras*, Ὁμοιομέρεια; to *Plato*, Ποιότης; to
Cicero, Qualitas; to *Aristotle*, Ἐντελέχεια; to the
Stoics, Ὅστις, κεράτις, and many others.—Among
 the Words transferred by Metaphor from *common* to
special Meanings, to the *Platonics* we may ascribe Ἴδεα;
 to the *Pythagoreans* and *Peripatetics*, Κατηγορία, and
 Κατηγορεῖν; to the *Stoics*, Κατάληψις, ὑπόληψις, κα-
 θήκον; to the *Pyrrhonists*, Ἐξέστι, ἐνδέχεται, ἐπιέχω,
 &c.

And

Ch.III.  IN the foregoing use of Prepositions, we have seen how they are applied *κατὰ παράθεσιν*, by way of *Juxta-position*, that is to say, where they are prefixt to a Word, with-

And here I cannot but observe, that he who pretends to discuss the Sentiments of any one of these Philosophers, or even to cite and translate him (except in trite and obvious Sentences) without accurately knowing the *Greek* Tongue in general; the nice differences of many Words apparently synonymous; the peculiar Style of the Author whom he presumes to handle; the new coined Words, and new Significations given to old Words, used by such Author, and his Sect; the whole Philosophy of such Sect, together with the Connections and Dependencies of its several Parts, whether Logical, Ethical, or Physical; — He, I say, that, without this previous preparation, attempts what I have said, will shoot in the dark; will be liable to perpetual blunders; will explain, and praise, and censure merely by chance; and though he may possibly to Fools appear as a wise Man, will certainly among the Wise ever pass for a Fool. Such a Man's Intellect comprehends antient Philosophy, as his Eye comprehends a distant Prospect. He may see perhaps enough, to know Mountains from Plains, and Seas from Woods; but for an accurate discernment of particulars, and their character, this without farther helps 'tis impossible he should attain.

without becoming a Part of it. But they Ch.III.
 may be used also *κατὰ σύνθεσιν*, by way of
Composition, that is, they may be prefixt to
 a Word, so as to become a real Part of
 it (e). Thus in *Greek* we have *Ἐπίστασθαι*,
 in *Latin*, *Intelligere*, in *English*, to *Under-*
stand. So also, to *foretel*, to *overact*, to
undervalue, to *outgo*, &c. and in *Greek* and
Latin, other Instances innumerable. In
 this case the Prepositions commonly trans-
 fuse something of their own Meaning into
 the Word, with which they are compound-
 ed; and this imparted Meaning in most
 instances will be found ultimately resolv-
 able into some of the Relations of PLACE,
 (f) as used either in its *proper* or *metapho-*
rical acceptation.

LASTLY,

(e) See *Gaz. Gram. L. IV. Cap. de Præpositione*.

(f) For example, let us suppose some given Space.
 E & Ex signify *out of* that Space; PER, *through* it,
 from beginning to end; IN, *within* it; SUB, *under* it.

Hence

Ch.III. LASTLY, there are times, when Prepositions totally lose their connective Nature, being

Hence then E and PER in composition augment; *Enormis*, something not simply big, but big in excess; something got out of the rule, and beyond the measure; *Dico*, to speak; *Edico*, to speak out; whence *Edictum* an *Edict*, something so effectually spoken, as all are supposed to hear, and all to obey. So *Terence*,

Dico, Edico vobis—Eun. V. 5. 20.

which (as *Donatus* tells us in his Comment) is an *Ἀυξήσις*. *Fari*, to speak; *Effari*, to speak out—hence *Effatum*, an *Axiom*, or self-evident Proposition, something addressed as it were to all men, and calling for universal Assent. *Cic. Acad. II. 29. Per magnus, Perutilis*, great throughout, useful through every part.

On the contrary, IN and SUB diminish and lessen. *Injustus, Iniquus*, unjust, inequitable, that lies within Justice and Equity, that reaches not so far, that falls short of them; *Subniger*, blackish; *Subrubicundus*, reddish; tending to black, and tending to red, but yet under the standard, and below perfection.

Emo originally signified to take away; hence it came to signify to buy, because he, who buys, takes away his purchase. INTER, *Between*, implies Discontinuance,

being converted into Adverbs, and used in Ch.III.
Syntax accordingly. Thus *Homer*,

—Γέλασσε δὲ πᾶσα περὶ χθών.

—*And Earth smil'd all around.*

ΙΛ. T. 362.

But of this we have spoken in a preceding Chapter (g). One thing we must however observe, before we finish this Chapter, which is, that whatever we may be told of CASES in modern Languages, there are in fact no such things ; but their force and power is express'd by two Methods,

ance, for in things continuous there can nothing lie between. From these two comes, *Interimo*, 'to kill, that is to say, to take a Man away in the midst of Life, by making a Discontinuance of his vital Energy. So also *Perimo*, to kill a Man, that is to say, to take him away thoroughly ; for indeed what more thorough taking away can well be supposed ? The Greek Verb, 'Αναίρειν, and the English Verb, *To take off*, seem both to carry the same allusion. And thus 'tis that Prepositions become Parts of other Words.

(g) See before p. 205.

T

Ch. III. thods, either by *Situation*, or by *Prepositions*; *the Nominative and Accusative Cases* by *Situation*; *the rest*, by *Prepositions*. But this we shall make the Subject of a Chapter by itself, concluding here our Inquiry concerning *Prepositions*.

C H A P.

C H A P. IV.

Concerning Cases.

AS CASES, or at least their various Powers, depend on the knowledge partly of *Nouns*, partly of *Verbs*, and partly of *Prepositions*; they have been reserved, till those Parts of Speech had been examined and discussed, and are for that reason made the Subject of so late a Chapter, as the present. Ch. IV.

THERE are no CASES in the modern Languages, except a few among the *primitive Pronouns*, such as I, and ME; JE, and MOY; and the *English Genitive*, formed by the addition of s, as when from *Lion*, we form *Lion's*; from *Ship*, *Ship's*. From this defect however we may be enabled to discover in some instances *what a Case is*, the *Periphrasis*, which sup-

Ch.IV. plies its place, being *the Case* (as it were) *unfolded*. Thus *Equi* is analized into *Du Cheval*, *Of the Horse*; *Equo* into *Au Cheval*, *To the Horse*. And hence we see that the GENITIVE and DATIVE CASES imply the joint Power of a *Noun* and a *Preposition*, the Genitive's Preposition being *A*, *De*, or *Ex*, the Dative's Preposition being *Ad*, or *Versus*.


WE have not this assistance as to the ACCUSATIVE, which in modern Languages (a few instances excepted) is only known from its position, that is to say, by being subsequent to its Verb, in the collocation of the words.

THE VOCATIVE we pass over from its little use, being not only unknown to the modern Languages, but often in the ancient being supplied by the *Nominative*.

THE ABLATIVE likewise was used by the *Romans* only; a Case they seem to have adopted

adopted *to associate with their Prepositions*, Ch.IV. as they had deprived their *Genitive* and *Dative* of that privilege; a Case certainly not necessary, because the *Greeks* do as well without it, and because with the *Romans* themselves 'tis frequently undistinguished.

THERE remains the NOMINATIVE, which whether it were a Case or no, was much disputed by the Antients. The *Peripatetics* held it to be no *Case*, and likened the Noun, in this its *primary* and *original Form*, to a perpendicular Line, such for example, as the line A B.



The Variations from the Nominative, they considered as if A B were to fall from its perpendicular, as for example, to A C, or A D. Hence then they only called these Variations, ΠΤΩΣΕΙΣ, CASUS, CASES, or

Ch.IV. FALLINGS. The *Stoics* on the contrary, and the Grammarians with them, made the *Nominative* a CASE also. Words they considered (as it were) *to fall from the Mind, or discursive Faculty*. Now when a Noun fell thence *in its primary Form*, they then called it ΠΤΩΣΙΣ ΟΡΘΗ, CASUS RECTUS, AN ERECT, or UPRIGHT CASE OF FALLING, such as A B, and by this name they distinguished the *Nominative*. When *it fell from the Mind under any of its variations*, as for example in the form of a *Genitive*, a *Dative*, or the like, such variations they called ΠΤΩΣΕΙΣ ΠΛΑΓΙΑΙ, CASUS OBLIQUI, OBLIQUE CASES, or SIDE-LONG FALLINGS (such as A C, or A D) in opposition to the other (that is A B) which was erect and perpendicular (a). Hence too Grammarians called the Method of enumerating the various Cases of a Noun, ΚΑΙΣΙΣ, DECLINATIO, a DECLENSION,

it

(a) See *Ammon*. in *Libr. de Interpr.* p. 35.

it being a sort of *progressive Descent from* Ch.IV.
the Noun's upright Form thro' its various
declining Forms, that is, a Descent from
 AB, to AC, AD, &c.

OF these CASES we shall treat but of
 four, that is to say, the NOMINATIVE,
 the ACCUSATIVE, the GENITIVE, and
 the DATIVE.

IT has been said already in the pre-
 ceding Chapter, that the great Objects of
 natural Union are SUBSTANCE and AT-
 TRIBUTE. Now from this *Natural Con-*
cord arises the *Logical Concord* of SUBJECT
 and PREDICATE, and the *Grammatical*
Concord of SUBSTANTIVE and ATTRIBU-
 TIVE (b). These CONCORDS in SPEECH
 produce PROPOSITIONS and SENTENCES,
 as that previous CONCORD in NATURE
 produces NATURAL BEINGS. This being

T 4 admitted,

(b) See before, p. 264.

Ch.IV. admitted, we proceed by observing, that when a Sentence is regular and orderly, *Nature's Substance*, the *Logician's Subject*, and the *Grammarian's Substantive* are all denoted by that Case, which we call the **NOMINATIVE**. For example, *CÆSAR pugnāt*, *Æs fingitur*, *DOMUS ædificatur*. We may remark too by the way, that *the Character of this Nominative* may be learnt from its *Attributive*. The Action implied in *pugnāt*, shews its Nominative *CÆSAR* to be an Active efficient Cause; the Passion implied in *fingitur*, shews its Nominative *Æs* to be a Passive Subject, as does the Passion in *ædificatur* prove *DOMUS* to be an Effect.

As therefore every Attributive would as far as possible conform itself to its Substantive, so for this reason, when it has Cases, it imitates its Substantive, and appears as a *Nominative* also. So we find it in such instances as—*CICERO est ELOQUENS*; *VITIUM est TURPE*; *HOMO est*
 4 ANIMAL,

ANIMAL, &c. When it has no Cases, Ch.IV.
 (as happens with Verbs) it is forced to
 content itself with such assimilations as it
 has, those of Number and Person * ; as
 when we say, CICERO LOQUITUR ; NOS
 LOQUIMUR ; HOMINES LOQUUNTUR.

FROM what has been said, we may
 make the following observations—that as
 there can be *no Sentence without a Sub-*
stantive, so that Substantive, if the Sen-
 tence be *regular*, is always denoted by a
Nominative—that on this occasion *all the*
Attributives, that have Cases, appear as
Nominatives also—that there may be a re-
 gular and perfect Sentence *without any of*
the other Cases, but that *without one Nomi-*
native at least, this is utterly impossible.
 Hence therefore we form its Character and
 Description—THE NOMINATIVE *is that*
Case, without which there can be no regu-
lar

* What sort of Number and Person Verbs have, see
 before, p. 170, 171.

Ch.IV. *lar (c) and perfect Sentence.* We are now
 { to search after another Case.

WHEN the *Attributive* in any Sentence is some *Verb denoting Action*, we may be assured the *principal Substantive* is some *active efficient Cause*. So we may call *Achilles* and *Lysippus* in such Sentences as *Achilles vulneravit, Lysippus fecit*. But though this be evident and clearly understood, the Mind is still *in suspense*, and finds its conception *incomplete*. ACTION, it well knows, not only requires some *Agent*, but it must have a *Subject* also to work on, and it must produce some *Effect*. 'Tis then to denote one of these (that is, the *Subject* or the *Effect*) that the Authors of Language

(c) We have added *regular* as well as *perfect*, because there may be *irregular Sentences*, which may be *perfect without a Nominative*. Of this kind are all Sentences, made out of those Verbs, called by the Stoics Παρασυνεάματα or Παρακατηγορήματα, such as Σωκράτης μετόμελει, *Socratem pœnitet*, &c. See before, p. 180.

guage have destined THE ACCUSATIVE. *Achilles vulneravit HECTOREM*—here the Accusative denotes the Subject. *Lyfippus fecit STATUAS*—here the Accusative denotes the Effect. By these additional Explanations the Mind becomes satisfied, and the Sentences acquire a Perfection, which before they wanted. In whatever other manner, whether figuratively, or with Prepositions, this Case may have been used, its first destination seems to have been that here mentioned, and hence therefore we shall form its Character and Description—THE ACCUSATIVE is that Case, which to an efficient Nominative and a Verb of Action subjoins either the Effect or the passive Subject. We have still left the Genitive and the Dative, which we investigate, as follows.


IT has been said in the preceding Chapter (*d*), that when the Places of the Nominative

(*d*) See before, p. 265.

Ch.IV. *minative* and the *Accusative* are filled by proper Substantives, other Substantives are annexed by the help of *Prepositions*. Now, though this be so far true in the modern Languages, that (a very few instances excepted) they know no other method ; yet is not the rule of equal latitude with respect to the *Latin* or *Greek*, and that from reasons which we are about to offer.

AMONG the various Relations of Substantives denoted by *Prepositions*, there appear to be two principal ones ; and these are, the *Term* or *Point*, which something commences FROM, and the *Term* or *Point*, which something tends TO. These Relations the *Greeks* and *Latins* thought of so great importance, as to distinguish them, when they occurred, by *peculiar Terminations of their own*, which express their force, *without the help of a Preposition*. Now 'tis here we behold the Rise of the antient Genitive, and Dative, the GENITIVE being formed to express all Relations

com-

commencing FROM *itself*; THE DATIVE, Ch.IV. *all Relations tending TO itself*. Of this  there can be no stronger proof, than the Analysis of these Cases in the modern Languages, which we have mentioned already (e).

'TIS on these principles that they say in Greek—Δεομαί ΣΟΥ, δίδωμί ΣΟΙ, OF *thee I ask, To thee I give*. The reason is, in requests the person requested is one whom something is expected *from*; in donations, the person presented, is one whom something passes *to*. So again—(f) Πεποιήται λίθῃ, 'tis *made of Stone*. Stone was the passive Subject, and thus it appears in the *Genitive*, as being the *Term from, or out of which*. Even in *Latin*, where the Syntax is more formal and strict, we read—

Implentur

(e) See before, p. 275, 276.

(f) Χρυσού πεποιημένος, καὶ ἐλέφαντος, *made of Gold and Ivory*. So says Pausanias of the Olympian Jupiter, L. V. p. 400. See also *Hom. Iliad.* Σ. 574.

Ch.IV. *Implentur veteris Bacchi, pinguisque fe-*
rinae. Virg.

The old Wine and Venison were the funds or stores, *of* or *from* which they were filled. Upon the same principles, Πίνω τῆ ὕδατος, is a Phrase in Greek; and, *Je bois de l'eau*, a Phrase in French, as much as to say, *I take some or a certain part, FROM OR OUT OF a certain whole.*

WHEN we meet in Language such Genitives as *the Son of a Father; the Father of a Son; the Picture of a Painter; the Painter of a Picture, &c.* these are all RELATIVES, and therefore each of them reciprocally a *Term or Point* to the other, FROM OR OUT OF which it derives its *Essence*, or at least its *Intellection* (g).

THE

(g) All Relatives are said to reciprocate, or mutually infer each other, and therefore they are often expressed by this Case, that is to say, the Genitive. Thus *Aristotle*, Πάντα δὲ τὰ πρὸς τι πρὸς ἀντιθέσει λέγεται, οἷον

THE *Dative*, as it implies *Tendency to*, Ch.IV. is employed among its other uses to denote the FINAL CAUSE, that being the Cause *to which* all Events, not fortuitous, may be said to tend. 'Tis thus used in the following instances, among innumerable others.

———TIBI *suaveis dædala tellus*
Submittit flores——— Lucret.

———TIBI *brachia contrahit ardens*
Scorpios——— Virg. G. I.

———TIBI *serviat ultima Thule.*
Ibid.

AND so much for CASES, their Origin and Use ; a Sort of Forms, or Terminations,

οἷον ὁ δὲ λῶ δεσπότης δὲ λῶ, καὶ ὁ δεσπότης δὲ λῶ δεσπότης λέγεται εἶναι, καὶ τὸ διπλάσιον ἡμίσεος διπλάσιον, καὶ τὸ ἡμισυ διπλασίον ἡμισυ. *Omnia vero, quæ sunt ad aliquid, referuntur ad ea, quæ recipiuntur. Ut servus dicitur domini servus; et dominus, servi dominus; necnon duplum, dimidii duplum; et dimidium, dupli dimidium. Categor. C. VII.*

Ch.IV. tions, which we could not well pass over, from their great importance (*b*) both in the *Greek* and *Latin* Tongues; but which however, not being among the Essentials of Language, and therefore not to be found in many particular Languages, can be hardly said to fall within the limits of our Inquiry.

(*b*) *Annon et illud observatione dignum (licet nobis modernis spiritus nonnihil redundat) antiquas Linguas, plenas declinationum, casuum, conjugationum, et similium fuisse; modernas, his ferè destitutas, plurima per præpositiones et verba auxiliaria segnitè expedire? Sanè facile quis conjiciat (utcunque nobis ipsi placeamus) ingenia priorum seculorum nostris fuisse multo acutiora et subtiliora. Bacon. de Augm. Scient. VI. 1.*

CHAP. V.

*Concerning Interjections—Recapitulation—
Conclusion.*

BESIDES the Parts of Speech before Ch. V. mentioned, there remains THE INTERJECTION. Of this Kind among the Greeks are ὦ, εὖ, αἰ, &c. among the Latins, *Ab! Heu! Hei! &c.* among the English, *Ab! Alas! Fie! &c.* These the Greeks have ranged among their *Adverbs*; improperly, if we consider the Adverbial Nature, which always co-incides with some Verb, as its Principal, and to which it always serves in the character of an Attributive. Now INTERJECTIONS co-incide with no Part of Speech, but are either uttered alone, or else thrown into a Sentence; without altering its Form, either in Syntax or Signification. The Latins seem therefore to have done better in † separating

† *Vid. Servium in Æneid XII. v. 486.*

Ch. V. rating them by themselves, and giving
 them a name by way of distinction from
 the rest.

SHOULD it be ask'd, if not Adverbs, what then are they? It may be answered, not so properly Parts of Speech, as adventitious Sounds; certain VOICES OF NATURE, rather than Voices of *Art*, expressing those Passions and natural Emotions, which spontaneously arise in the human Soul, upon the View or Narrative of interesting Events (*a*).

“ AND

(*a*) INTERJECTIONES a Græcis ad Adverbia referuntur, atque eos sequitur etiam Boethius. Et recte quidem de iis, quando casum regunt. Sed quando orationi solum inferuntur, ut nota affectus, velut suspirii aut mentis, vix videntur ad classem aliquam pertinere, ut quæ NATURALES sint NOTÆ; non, aliarum vocum instar, ex instituto significent. Voss. de Anal. L. I. c. 1. INTERJECTIO est Vox affectum mentis significans, ac citra verbi opem sententiam complens. Ibid. c. 3. Restat classum extrema, INTERJECTIO. Hujus appellatis non
 5
 fini-

“ AND thus we have found that ALL Ch. V.
 “ WORDS ARE EITHER SIGNIFICANT BY
 “ THEMSELVES, OR ONLY SIGNIFICANT,
 U 2 “ WHEN

similiter se habet ac Conjunctionis. Nam cum hæc dicatur Conjunctio, quia conjungat; Interjectio tamen, non quia interjacet, sed quia interjicitur, nomen accepit. Nec tamen de ὁσῖα ejus est, ut interjiciatur; cum per se compleat sententiam, nec raro ab eâ incipiat oratio. Ibid. L. IV. c. 28. INTERJECTIONEM non esse partem Orationis sic ostendo: Quod naturale est, idem est apud omnes: Sed gemitus & signa lætitiæ idem sunt apud omnes: Sunt igitur naturales. Si vero naturales, non sunt partes Orationis. Nam eæ partes, secundum Aristotelem, ex instituto, non naturâ, debent constare. Interjectionem Græci Adverbiis adnumerant; sed falso. Nam neque, &c. Sanct. Miner. L. I. c. 2. INTERJECTIONEM Græci inter Adverbia ponunt, quoniam hæc quoque vel adjungitur verbis, vel verba ei subaudiuntur. Ut si dicam—Papæ! quid video?—vel per se—Papæ!—etiamsi non addatur, Miror; habet in se ipsius verbi significationem. Quæ res maxime fecit Romanarum artium Scriptores separatim hanc partem ab Adverbiis accipere; quia videtur affectum habere in sese Verbi, et plenam motûs animi significationem, etiamsi non addatur Verbum, demonstrare. Interjectio tamen non solum illa, quæ dicunt Græci σκετασµόν, significat; sed etiam voces, quæ cujuscunque passionis animi pulsû per exclamationem interjiciuntur. Prisc. L. XV.

Ch. V. “ WHEN ASSOCIATED—*that those signi-*
 “ *ficant by themselves, denote either SUB-*
 “ *STANCES or ATTRIBUTES, and are cal-*
 “ *led for that reason SUBSTANTIVES and*
 “ *ATTRIBUTIVES—that the Substantives*
 “ *are either NOUNS or PRONOUNS—that*
 “ *the ATTRIBUTIVES are either PRIMARY*
 “ *or SECONDARY—that the Primary At-*
 “ *tributives are either VERBS, PARTICI-*
 “ *PLES, or ADJECTIVES; the Secondary,*
 “ *ADVERBS—Again, that the Parts of*
 “ *Speech, only significant when associated, are*
 “ *either DEFINITIVES or CONNECTIVES*
 “ *—that the Definitives are either ARTI-*
 “ *CULAR, or PRONOMINAL—and that*
 “ *the Connectives are either PREPOSITIONS*
 “ *or CONJUNCTIONS.”*

AND thus have we resolved LANGUAGE,
 AS A WHOLE INTO ITS CONSTITUENT
 PARTS, which was the first thing, that we
 proposed, in the course of this Inquiry (b).

BUT

(b) See before, p. 7.

BUT now as we conclude, methinks I Ch. V.
 hear some Objector, demanding with an
 air of pleasantry, and ridicule—" *Is there*
" no speaking then without all this trouble?
" Do we not talk every one of us, as well
" unlearned, as learned; as well poor Pea-
" sants, as profound Philosophers?" We
 may answer by interrogating on our part
 —Do not those same poor Peasants use
 the Levar and the Wedge, and many
 other Instruments, with much habitual
 readiness? And yet have they any con-
 ception of those Geometrical Principles,
 from which those Machines derive their
 Efficacy and Force? And is the Ignorance
 of these Peasants, a reason for others to
 remain ignorant; or to render the Subject
 a less becoming Inquiry? Think of Ani-
 mals, and Vegetables, that occur every
 day—of Time, of Place, and of Motion
 —of Light, of Colours, and of Gravita-
 tion—of our very Senses and Intellect,
 by which we perceive every thing else—

Ch. V. THAT they are, we all know, and are perfectly satisfied—WHAT they are, is a Subject of much obscurity and doubt. Were we to reject this last Question, because we are certain of the first, we should banish all Philosophy at once out of the world (c).

BUT a graver Objector now accosts us,
*“What (says he) is the UTILITY?
 “Whence the Profit, where the Gain?”*
 Every Science whatever (we may answer) has its Use. Arithmetic is excellent

(c) Ἄλλ' ἔστι πολλὰ τῶν ὄντων, ἃ τὴν μὲν ὑπαρξὴν ἔχει γνωριμωτάτην, ἀγνωστοτάτην δὲ τὴν οὐσίαν· ὥσπερ ἢ τε κίνησις, καὶ ὁ τόπος, ἔτι δὲ μᾶλλον ὁ χρόνος. Ἐκάστῃ γὰρ τούτων τὸ μὲν εἶναι γνώριμον καὶ ἀναμφίλεκτον· τίς δὲ ποτὲ ἐστὶν αὐτῶν ἡ οὐσία, τῶν χαλεπωτάτων ἐραθύναι. Ἔστι δὲ δὴ τὶ τῶν τοιούτων καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ· τὸ μὲν γὰρ εἶναι τι τὴν ψυχὴν, γνωριμώτατον καὶ φανερώτατον· τί δὲ ποτὲ ἐστὶν, οὐκ ῥάδιον καταμαθεῖν. Ἀλεξ. αὐδ. Ἀφροδ. Περὶ ψυχῆς, Β. p. 142.

lent for gauging of Liquors ; Geometry, Ch. V. for measuring of Estates ; Astronomy, for making of Almanacks ; and Grammar perhaps, for drawing of Bonds and Conveyances.

THUS much to the *Sordid*—If the *Liberal* ask for something better than this, we may answer and assure them from the best authorities, that every Exercise of the Mind upon Theorems of Science, like generous and manly Exercise of the Body, tends to call forth and strengthen Nature's original Vigour. Be the Subject itself immediately lucrative or not, the Nerves of Reason are braced by the mere Employ, and we become abler Actors in the Drama of Life, whether our Part be of the busier, or of the sedater kind.

Ch. V. *PERHAPS too there is a Pleasure even in Science itself, distinct from any End, to which it may be farther conducive. Are not Health and Strength of Body desirable for their own sakes, tho' we happen not to be fated either for Porters or Draymen? And have not Health and Strength of Mind their intrinsic Worth also, tho' not condemned to the low drudgery of sordid Emolument? Why should there not be a Good (could we have the Grace to recognize it) in the mere Energy of our Intellect, as much as in Energies of lower degree? The Sportsman believes there is Good in his Chace; the Man of Gaiety, in his Intrigue; even the Glutton, in his Meal. We may justly ask of these, why they pursue such things; but if they answer, they pursue them, because they are Good, 'twould be folly to ask them farther, WHY they PURSUE what is Good. It might well in such case be replied on*

their behalf (how strange soever it may Ch. V.
at first appear) *that if there was not some-*
thing GOOD, which was in no respect USE-
FUL, even things useful themselves could not
possibly have existence. For this is in fact
no more than to assert, that some things
are ENDS, some things are MEANS, and
that if there were NO ENDS, there could
be of course NO MEANS.

IT should seem then the Grand Question
was, WHAT IS GOOD—that is to say,
what is that which is desirable, not for
something else, but for itself; for whe-
ther it be the Chace, or the Intrigue, or
the Meal, may be fairly questioned, since
Men in each instance are far from being
agreed.

IN the mean time 'tis plain from daily
experience, there are infinite Pleasures,
Amusements, and Diversions, some for
Summer, others for Winter; some for
Country,

Ch. V. Country, others for Town; some, easy, indolent and soft; others, boisterous, active, and rough; a multitude diversified to every taste, and which for the time are enjoyed as PERFECT GOOD, *without a thought of any End, that may be farther obtained.* Some Objects of this kind are at times sought by all men, excepting alone that contemptible Tribe, who, from a love to the Means of life wholly forgetting its End, are truly for that reason called *Misers*, or Miserable.

If there be supposed then a Pleasure, a Satisfaction, a Good, a Something valuable for its self without view to any thing farther, in so many Objects of the *subordinate* kind; shall we not allow the same praise to the *sublimest* of all Objects? Shall THE INTELLECT alone feel no pleasures *in its Energy*, when we allow them to the grossest Energies of Appetite, and Sense? Or if the Reality of all Pleasures and Goods

were

were to be controverted, may not the *In-* Ch. V.
tellectual Sort be defended, as rationally as
 any of them? Whatever may be urged in
 behalf of the rest (for we are not now
 arraigning them) we may safely affirm of
 INTELLECTUAL GOOD, that 'tis " the
 " Good of that Part, which is most ex-
 " cellent within us; that 'tis a Good ac-
 " commodated to all Places and Times;
 " which neither depends on the will of
 " others, nor on the affluence of external
 " Fortune; that 'tis a Good, which de-
 " cays not with decaying Appetites, but
 " often rises in vigour, when those are no
 " more (*d*)."

THERE is a Difference, we must own,
 between this *Intellectual* Virtue, and *Moral*
 Virtue. MORAL VIRTUE, from its Em-
 ployment, may be called more HUMAN,

as

(*d*) See Vol. I. p. 119, 120, &c.

Ch. V. as it tempers our Appetites to the purposes of human Life. But INTELLECTUAL VIRTUE may be surely called more DIVINE, if we consider the Nature and Sublimity of its End.

INDEED for *Moral Virtue*, as it is almost wholly conversant about Appetites, and Affections, either to reduce the natural ones to a proper Mean, or totally to expel the unnatural and vitious, 'twould be impious to suppose THE DEITY to have occasion for such an Habit, or that any work of this kind should call for his attention. Yet GOD IS, and LIVES. So we are assured from Scripture it self. What then may we suppose the DIVINE LIFE to be? Not a Life of Sleep, as Fables tell us of *Endymion*. If we may be allowed then to conjecture with a becoming reverence, what more likely, than A PERPETUAL ENERGY OF THE PUREST INTELLECT ABOUT THE FIRST, ALL-COMPREHENSIVE

COMPREHENSIVE OBJECTS OF INTEL-
LECTION, WHICH OBJECTS ARE NO
OTHER THAN THAT INTELLECT IT-
SELF? For in pure INTELLECTION it
holds the reverse of all Sensation, that
THE PERCEIVER AND THING PER-
CEIVED are ALWAYS ONE AND THE
SAME (e).


'Twas

(e) 'Εἰ ἐν ὕψους εὖ ἔχει, ὡς ἡμεῖς ποτὲ, ὁ Θεὸς αἰεί,
θαυμαστόν· εἰ δὲ μᾶλλον, ἔτι θαυμασιώτερον· ἔχει δὲ
ὧδε, καὶ ζωὴ δὲ γε ὑπάρχει· ἡ γὰρ Νῦ ἐνέργεια, ζωὴ
ἑκείνος δὲ, ἡ ἐνέργεια· ἐνέργεια δὲ ἡ καθ' αὐτὴν, ἐκείνη
ζωὴ ἀρίστη καὶ αἰδῖος. Φαμὲν δὲ τὸν Θεὸν εἶναι ζῶον
αἰδίου, ἀριστον· ὥστε ζωὴ καὶ αἰὼν συνεχὴς καὶ αἰδῖος
ὑπάρχει τῷ Θεῷ· ΤΟΤΟ γὰρ Ο ΘΕΟΣ. Τῶν
μετὰ τὰ Φυσ· Α'. Ζ'. 'Tis remarkable in Scripture
that GOD is peculiarly characterized as A LIVING
GOD, in opposition to all false and imaginary Deities,
of whom some had no pretensions to Life at all; others
to none higher than that of Vegetables or Brutes; and
the best were nothing better than illustrious Men, whose
existence was circumscribed by the short period of Hu-
manity.

To

Ch. V. 'Twas Speculation of this kind concerning THE DIVINE NATURE, which induced one of the wisest among the Antients to believe—" That the Man, " who could live in the pure enjoyment " of his *Mind*, and who properly cultivated that *divine* Principle, was *happiest in himself*, and *most beloved by the Gods*. " For if the Gods had any regard to " what pass among Men (as it appeared " they had) 'twas probable they should " rejoice in *that which was most excellent*, " and by nature *the most nearly allied to themselves*; and, as this was MIND, " that they should requite the Man, who " most loved and honoured *This*, both " from his regard to that which was " *dear*

To the passage above quoted, may be added another, which immediately precedes it. Ἀυτὸν δὲ νοεῖ ὁ νῆς κατὰ μετάληψιν τῷ νοητῷ· νοητὸς γὰρ γίνεται, διγλάνων καὶ νοῶν· ὥς· TATTON NOTE KAI NOHTON.

“ *dear* to themselves, and from his act- Ch. V.
 “ ing a Part, which was laudable and 
 “ right (*f*).”

AND thus in all SCIENCE there is
 something *valuable for itself*, because it
 contains within it something which is
divine.

(*f*) Ἡθικ· Νικομαχ· τὸ Κ'. κεφ. ι'.

End of the SECOND BOOK.

H E R-

the first of the century, and from the year 1700 to 1750, the population of the colony was estimated at 100,000. The first of the century was a period of great prosperity, and the colony was the most important of the British Empire.

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H E R M E S

OR A PHILOSOPHICAL INQUIRY
CONCERNING UNIVERSAL GRAMMAR

B O O K III.

C H A P. I.

*Introduction—Division of the Subject into
its principal Parts.*

SOME things the MIND performs Ch. I.
thro' the BODY; as for example, 
the various Works and Energies of
Art. Others it performs *without such Me-
dium*; as for example, when it thinks,
and reasons, and concludes. Now tho'
the Mind, in either case, may be called
the Principle or Source, yet are these last
X  more

Ch. I. more properly *its own* peculiar Acts, as being immediately referable to its own innate Powers. And thus is MIND *ultimately the Cause of all*; of every thing at least that is *Fair* and *Good*.

AMONG those Acts of Mind more immediately its own, that of *mental Separation* may be well reckoned one. *Corporeal* Separations, however accurate otherwise, are in one respect incomplete, as they may be repeated without end. The smallest Limb, severed from the smallest Animalcule (if we could suppose any instrument equal to such dissection) has still a triple Extension of length, breadth, and thickness; has a figure, a colour, with perhaps many other qualities; and so will continue to have, tho' thus divided to infinity. But (a) the *Mind* surmounts all power of *Concretion*,

(a) *Itaque Naturæ facienda est prorsus Solutio et Separatio; non per Ignem certe, sed per Mentem, tanquam ignem divinum.* Bacon. Nov. Organ. Lib. II. 16.

cretion, and can place in the simplest manner every Attribute by itself; convex without concave; colour without superficies; superficies without Body; and Body without its Accidents; as distinctly each one, as tho' they had never been united. Ch. I.

AND thus 'tis that it penetrates into the recesses of all things, not only dividing them, as *Wholes*, into their *more conspicuous Parts*, but persisting, till it even separate those *Elementary Principles*, which, being blended together after a more mysterious manner, are united in the *minuteſt Part*, as much as in the *mightieſt Whole* (b).

NOW if MATTER and FORM are among these Elements, and deserve perhaps to be esteemed as *the principal* among them, it may not be foreign to the Design of this Treatise, to seek whether *these*, or *any things analogous to them*, may be found in

X 2 SPEECH

(b) See below, p. 312.

Ch. I. SPEECH or LANGUAGE (*c*). This therefore we shall attempt after the following method.

EVERY

(*c*) See before p. 2. 7. MATTER and FORM (in Greek ΤΑΗ and ΕΙΔΟΣ) were Terms of great import in the days of antient Philosophy, when things were scrutinized rather at their Beginning than at their End. They have been but little regarded by modern Philosophy, which almost wholly employs itself about the last order of Substance, that is to say, the *tangible, corporeal or concrete*, and which acknowledges no separations even in this, but those made by mathematical Instruments or Chemical Procefs.

The original meaning of the Word ΤΑΗ, was SYLVA, a WOOD. Thus *Homer*,

——— Τρέμε δ' ἄρεα μακρὰ κ' ΤΑΗ,
Ποσσὶν ὑπ' ἀθανάτοισι Ποσειδάωνος ἰόντος.

*As Neptune pass, the Mountains and the WOOD
Trembled beneath the God's immortal Feet.*

Hence as WOOD was perhaps the first and most useful kind of Materials, the Word "Υλη, which denoted it, came to be by degrees extended, and at length to denote MATTER or MATERIALS in general. In this sense Brass was called the "Υλη or *Matter* of a Statue; Stone, the "Υλη or *Matter* of a Pillar; and so in other instances. The *Platonic Chalcidius*, and other
Authors

EVERY thing in a manner, whether Ch. I.
 natural or artificial, is in its constitution
 com-

Authors of the latter Latinity use SYLVA under the same extended and comprehensive Signification.

Now as the Species of *Matter* here mentioned, (Stone, Metal, Wood, &c.) occur most frequently in common life, and are all nothing more than natural Substances or Bodies, hence by the Vulgar, MATTER and BODY have been taken to denote the same thing; *Material* to mean *Corporeal*; *Immaterial*, *Incorporeal*, &c. But this was not the Sentiment of Philosophers of old, by whom the Term *Matter* was seldom used under so narrow an acceptation. With these, every thing was called ΤΑ Η, or MATTER, whether corporeal or incorporeal, which was *capable of becoming something else, or of being moulded into something else*, whether from the operation of Art, of Nature, or a higher Cause.

In this sense they not only called *Brass* the "Τλη of a Statue, and Timber of a Boat, but Letters and Syllables they called the "Τλαι of Words; Words or simple Terms, the "Τλαι of Propositions; and Propositions themselves the "Τλαι of Syllogisms. The *Stoics* held all things out of our own power (τὰ ἐκ ἐφ' ἡμῶν) such as Wealth and Poverty, Honour and Dishonour,
 X 3 Health

Ch. I. compounded of something COMMON, and
 something PECULIAR; of something Com-
 mon,

Health and Sickness, Life and Death, to be the *ῥαί,* or *Materials of Virtue or Moral Goodness*, which had its essence in a proper conduct with respect to all these. (Vid. *Arr. Epict. L. I. c. 29.* Also Vol. the first of these miscellaneous Treatises, p. 187, 309. *M. Ant. XII. 29. VII. 29. X. 18, 19.* where the *ῥαί* and *Ἀτιώδες* are opposed to each other). The *Peripatetics*, tho' they expressly held the Soul to be *ἀσώματος*, or *Incorporeal*, yet still talked of a *Νῆς ῥαί*, a *material Mind or Intellect*. This to modern Ears may possibly sound something harsh. Yet if we translate the Words, *Natural Capacity*, and consider them as only denoting that *original and native Power* of Intellection, which being previous to all *human Knowledge*, is yet necessary to its *reception*; there seems nothing then to remain, that can give us offence. And so much for the Idea of *ΥΛΗ*, or *MATTER*. See *Alex. Aphrod. de Anim. p. 144. b. 145. Arist. Metaph. p. 121, 122, 141. Edit. Sylb. Procl. in Euclid. p. 22, 23.*

As to *ΕΙΔΟΣ*, its original meaning was that of *FORM* or *FIGURE*, considered as denoting *visible Symmetry*, and *Proportion*; and hence it had its name from *Εἶδω* to see, Beauty of person being one of the noblest, and most excellent Objects of Sight. Thus *Euripides*,

Πεῶτον μὲν Εἶδος ἄξιον τυραννίδος.

Fair FORM to Empire gave the first pretence.

Now

mon, and belonging to many other things; Ch. I.
 and of something *Peculiar*, by which it }
 is

Now as the *Form* or *Figure* of visible Beings tended principally to *distinguish* them, and to give to each its Name and Essence; hence in a more general sense, *whatever of any kind (whether corporeal or incorporeal)* was peculiar, essential, and distinctive, so as by its accession to any Beings, as to its *ὕλη* or *Matter*, to mark them with a Character, which they had not before, was called by the Antients ΕΙΔΟΣ or *FORM*. Thus not only *the Shape* given to the Brass was called the Εἶδος or *Form* of the Statue; but the *Proportion* assigned to the Drugs was the Εἶδος or *Form* of the Medicine; *the orderly Motion* of the human Body was the Εἶδος or *Form* of the Dance; *the just Arrangement* of the Propositions, the Εἶδος or *Form* of the Syllogism. In like manner *the rational and accurate Conduct* of a wise and good man, in all the various Relations and Occurrences of life, made that Εἶδος or *Form*, described by Cicero to his Son,—FORMAM quidem ipsam, Marce fili, et tanquam faciem HONESTI vides: quæ, si oculis cerneretur, mirabiles amores (ut ait Plato) excitaret sapientiæ, &c. De Offic. I.

We may go farther still—THE SUPREME INTELLIGENCE, which passes thro' all things, and which is the same to our Capacities, as Light is to our Eyes,

Ch. I. is distinguished, and made to be its true and proper self.

HENCE


this supreme Intelligence, has been called ΕΙΔΟΣ ΕΙΔΩΝ, THE FORM OF FORMS, as being the Fountain of all Symmetry, of all Good, and of all Truth; and as imparting to every Being those *essential* and *distinctive* Attributes, which make it to be *itself*, and *not any thing* else.

And so much concerning FORM, as before concerning MATTER. We shall only add, 'tis in the *uniting* of these, that every thing, which is generable, may be said to *commence*; as on the contrary, in their *Separation*, to *perish* and *be at an end*—that while they co-exist, 'tis not by *mere juxtaposition*, like the stones in a wall, but by a more *intimate Co-incidence*, complete in the minutest part—that hence, if we were to persist in dividing any substance (for example Marble) to infinity, there would still remain after every section both *Matter* and *Form*, and these as perfectly united, as before the Division began—lastly, that they are both *pre-existent* to the Beings, which they constitute; the *Matter* being to be found in the world at large; the *Form*, if artificial, pre-existing within the *Artificer*, or if natural, within the *supreme Cause*, the Sovereign Artist of the Universe,

—*Pulchrum pulcherrimus ipse*

Mundum mente gerens, similique in imagine formans.

Even

HENCE LANGUAGE, if compared ac- Ch. I.
 cording to this notion to the murmurs of 

a

Even without speculating so high as this, we may see among all animal and vegetable Substances, the Form pre-existing in their *immediate generating Cause*; Oak being the parent of Oak, Lion of Lion, Man of Man, &c.

Cicero's account of these Principles is as follows.

MATTER.

Sed subjectam putant omnibus sine ulla specie, atque carentem omni illa qualitate (faciamus enim tractando usitatus hoc verbum et tritius) MATERIAM quandam, ex qua omnia expressa atque efficta sint: (quæ tota omnia accipere possit, omnibusque modis mutari atque ex omni parte) eoque etiam interire, non in nihilum, &c. Acad. I. 8.

FORM.

Sed ego sic statuo, nihil esse in ullo genere tam pulchrum, quo non pulchrius id sit, unde illud, ut ex ore aliquo, quasi imago, exprimatur, quod neque oculis, neque auribus, neque ullo sensu percipi potest: cogitatione tantum et mente complectimur.—HAS RERUM FORMAS appellat Ideas ille non intelligendi solum, sed etiam dicendi gravissimus auctor et magister, Plato: easque gigni negat, et ait semper esse, ac ratione et intelligentiâ contineri: cætera nasci, accidere, fluere, labi; nec diutius esse uno et eodem

Ch. I. a Fountain, or the dashings of a Cataract, has *in common* this, that like them, *it is a SOUND*. But then on the contrary it has *in peculiar* this, that whereas those Sounds have *no Meaning or Signification*, to Language a *MEANING or SIGNIFICATION is essential*. Again, *Language*, if compared to the Voice of irrational Animals, has *in common* this, that like them, *it has a Meaning*. But then it has this *in peculiar* to distinguish it from them, that whereas the *Meaning* of those Animal Sounds is derived *from NATURE*, that of Language is derived, not from Nature, but *from COMPACT (d)*.

FROM

eodem statu. Quidquid est igitur, de quo ratione et viâ disputetur, id est ad ultimam sui generis Formam speciemque redigendum. Cic. ad M. Brut. Orat.

(d) The *Peripatetics* (and with just reason) in all their definitions as well of Words as of Sentences, made it a part of their character to be significant *κατὰ συνθήκην*, by *Compact*. See *Aristot. de Interp. c. 2. 4.* *Boethius* translates the Words *κατὰ συνθήκην*, *ad placitum*,

FROM hence it becomes evident, that Ch. I.
 LANGUAGE, taken in the most comprehensive view, *implies certain Sounds, having certain Meanings*; and that of these two Principles, the SOUND is as the MATTER, common (like other Matter) to many different things; the MEANING as that peculiar and characteristic FORM, by which the Nature or Essence of Language becomes complete.

tum, or secundum placitum, and thus explains them in his comment—SECUNDUM PLACITUM vero est, quod secundum quandam positionem, placitumque ponentis aptatur: nullum enim nomen naturaliter constitutum est, neque unquam, sicut subiecta res à naturâ est, ita quoque a naturâ veniente vocabulo nuncupatur. Sed hominum genus, quod et ratione, et oratione vigeret, nomina posuit, eaque quibus libuit literis syllabisque conjungens, singulis subiectarum rerum substantiis dedit. Boeth. in Lib. de Interpret, p. 308.

C H A P. II.

*Upon the Matter, or common Subject of
Language.*

Ch. II. **T**HE TAH OR MATTER OF LAN-
GUAGE comes first to be considered,
 a Subject, which Order will not suffer us
 to omit, but in which we shall endeavour
 to be as concise as we can. Now this
TAH or Matter is SOUND, and SOUND is
that Sensation peculiar to the Sense of Hear-
ing, when the Air bath felt a Percussion,
adequate to the producing such Effect (a).

As

(a) This appears to be *Priscian's* Meaning when he says of a VOICE, what is more properly true of SOUND in general, that it is—*suum sensibile aurium, id est, quod propriè auribus accidit.* Lib. I. p. 537.

The following account of the *Stoics*, which refers the cause of SOUND to an *Undulation in the Air propagated circularly*, as when we drop a stone into a Cistern of water, seems to accord with the modern Hypothesis,
 and

As the Causes of this Percussion are Ch. II.
various, so from hence *Sound* derives the
Variety of its Species.

FARTHER, as all these Causes are either
Animal or Inanimate, so the two grand
Species of Sounds are likewise *Animal* or
Inanimate.

THERE is no peculiar Name for *Sound*
Inanimate; nor even for that of Animals,
when made by the trampling of their Feet,
the fluttering of their Wings, or any other
Cause, which is merely *accidental*. But
that,

and to be as plausible as any—'Ακούειν δὲ, τῷ μεταξὺ
τῷ τε Φωνούντος καὶ τῷ ἀκούντος αἵρος πληττομένῃ σφαι-
ροειδῶς, εἴτα κυματουμένῃ, καὶ ταῖς ἀκοαῖς προσπίπτου-
σας, ὡς κυματῶνται τὸ ἐν τῇ δεξαμένῃ ὕδωρ κατὰ κύκλους
ὑπὸ τῷ ἐμβληθέντος λίθου—*Porro audire, cum is, qui me-
dius inter loquentem, et audientem est, aer verberatur or-
biculariter, deinde agitatus auribus influit, quemadmodum
et cisternæ aqua per orbes injecto agitur lapide.* Diog.
Laert. VII.

Ch. II. that, *which they make by proper Organs, in consequence of some Sensation or inward Impulse, such Animal Sound is called a VOICE.*

As Language therefore implies that Sound called HUMAN VOICE; we may perceive that *to know the Nature and Powers of the Human Voice*, is in fact *to know THE MATTER or common Subject of Language.*

Now the Voice of Man, and it should seem of all other Animals, is formed by certain Organs between the Mouth and the Lungs, and which Organs maintain the intercourse between these two. The Lungs furnish Air, out of which the Voice is formed; and the Mouth, when the Voice is formed, serves to publish it abroad.

WHAT these Vocal Organs precisely are, is not in all respects agreed by Philosophers

sophers and Anatomists. Be this as it will, 'tis certain that the *mere primary and simple Voice is completely formed, before ever it reach the Mouth*, and can therefore (as well as Breathing) find a Passage thro' the Nose, when the Mouth is so far stopt, as to prevent the least utterance. Ch. II.

Now *pure and simple VOICE*, being thus produced, is (as before was observed) *transmitted to the Mouth*. HERE then, by means of certain *different Organs*, which do not change its primary Qualities, but only superadd others, it receives *the Form or Character of ARTICULATION*. For ARTICULATION is in fact nothing else, than *that Form or Character, acquired to simple Voice, by means of the Mouth and its several Organs, the Teeth, the Tongue, the Lips, &c.* The Voice is not by Articulation made more grave or acute, more loud or soft (which are its *primary Qualities*) but it acquires to these Characters

2

certain

Ch. II. certain *others additional*, which are perfectly adapted *to exist along with them* (b).

THE

(b) The several Organs above mentioned not only serve the purposes of *Speech*, but those very different ones likewise of *Mastication* and *Respiration*; so frugal is Nature in thus assigning them double duty, and so careful to maintain her character of *doing nothing in vain*.

He, that would be informed, how much better the Parts here mentioned are framed for *Discourse* in *Man*, who is a *Discursive Animal*, than they are in other Animals, who are not so, may consult *Aristotle* in his *Treatise de Animal. Part. Lib. II. c. 17. L. III. c. 1. 3. De Animâ. L. II. c. 8. §. 23, &c.*

And here by the way, if such Inquirer be of a Genius truly modern, he may possibly wonder how the Philosopher, considering (as 'tis modestly phrased) the Age in which he lived, should know so much, and reason so well. But if he have any taste or value for antient literature, he may with much juster cause wonder at the Vanity of his Contemporaries, who dream all Philosophy to be the Invention of their own Age, knowing nothing of those Antients still remaining for their perusal, tho' they are so ready on every occasion to give the Preference to *themselves*.

The following Account from *Animonius* will shew whence the Notions in this Chapter are taken, and
what

THE *simplest* of these new Characters Ch. II.
are those acquired thro' the mere Openings
of

what authority we have to distinguish VOICE from mere SOUND; and ARTICULATE VOICE from SIMPLE VOICE.

Καὶ ΨΟΦΟΣ μὲν ἐστὶ πλεονή ἀέρος αἰδητὴ ἀκοή·
ΦΩΝΗ δὲ, ψόφος ἐξ ἐμπυχῆς γινόμενος. ὅταν διὰ
τῆς συστολῆς τῆ θώρακος ἐκθλιβόμενος ἀπὸ τῆ πνεύματος
ὁ εἰσπνευθεὶς ἀὴρ προσπίπῃ ἀθρόως τῇ καλυμένῃ τρα-
χείᾳ ἀρτηρίᾳ, καὶ τῇ ὑπερώᾳ, ἥτοι τῷ γαργαρεῶνι, καὶ
διὰ τῆς πλεονῆς ἀποτελεῖ τινὰ ἤχον αἰδητὸν, κατὰ τινὰ
ὁρμὴν τῆς ψυχῆς· ὅπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ἐμπνευστῶν παρὰ τοῖς
μουσικοῖς καλυμένων ὀργάνων συμβαίνει, τοῦ αὐλῶν καὶ
συστήγγων τῆς γλώττης, καὶ τῶν ὀδόντων, καὶ χειλέων
πρὸς μὲν ΤΗΝ ΔΙΑΛΕΚΤΟΝ ἀναγκαίῃς ὄντων,
πρὸς δὲ ΤΗΝ ἈΠΛΩΣ ΦΩΝΗΝ ἐπ' αὐτῶς συμ-
βαλλομένων.—*Estque SONUS, ictus aeris qui auditu sen-*
titur: VOX autem est sonus, quem animans edit, cum per
thoracis compressionem aer attractus a pulmone, elisus simul
totus in arteriam, quam asperam vocant, et palatum, aut
gurgulionem impingit, et ex ictu sonum quendam sensibilem
pro animi quodam impetu perficit. Id quod in instrumentis
quæ quia inflant, ideo ἐμπνευστὰ a musicis dicuntur, usu
venit, ut in tibiis, ac fistulis contingit, cum lingua, dentes,
labiaque ad loquelam necessaria sint, ad vocem vero simpli-
cem nom omnino conferant. Ammon. in Lib. de Interpr.
p. 25. b. Vid. etiam Boerhaave Institut. Medic. Sect.
p. 26. 630.

Ch. II. *of the Mouth*, as these Openings differ in giving the Voice a Passage. 'Tis the Variety of Configurations in these Openings only, which gives birth and origin to the several VOWELS; and hence 'tis they derive their Name, by being thus *eminently Vocal* (*c*), and *easy to be sounded of themselves alone*.

THERE are *other articulate Forms*, which the Mouth makes not by mere Openings, but by *different Contacts of its different parts*; such for instance, as by the Junction of the two Lips, of the Tongue with
the

It appears that the *Stoics* (contrary to the notion of the *Peripatetics*) used the word ΦΩΝΗ to denote SOUND in general. They defined it therefore to be—Τὸ ἴδιον αἰσθητὸν ἀκοῆς, which justifies the definition given by *Priscian*, in the Note preceding. ANIMAL SOUND they defined to be—Ἀπὸ ὁρμῆς πεπληγμένος, *Air struck* (and so made audible) *by some animal impulse*; and HUMAN or RATIONAL SOUND they defined—Ἐναρξος καὶ ἀπὸ διανοίας ἐκπεμπομένη, *Sound articulate and derived from the discursive faculty*. *Diog. Laert. VII, 55.*

(c) ΦΩΝΗΕΝΤΑ,

the Teeth, of the Tongue with the Palate, Ch. II.
and the like.

Now as all these several Contacts, unless some Opening of the Mouth either immediately precede, or immediately follow, would rather lead to Silence, than to produce a Voice; hence 'tis, that with some such Opening, either previous or subsequent, they are always connected. Hence also it is, that the *Articulations so produced* are called CONSONANTS, because they sound not of themselves, and from their own powers, but *at all times in company with some auxiliary Vowel (d).*

THERE are other subordinate Distinctions of these primary Articulations, which to enumerate would be foreign to the design of this Treatise.

'Tis enough to observe, that they are all denoted by the common Name of ELE-

Y 2 MENT

(d) ΣΤΜΦΩΝΑ.

Ch. II. MENT (*e*), in as much as every Articulation of every other kind is from them derived, and into them resolved. Under their *smallest* Combination they produce a *Syllable*; Syllables properly combined produce a *Word*; Words properly combined produce a *Sentence*; and Sentences properly combined produce an *Oration* or *Discourse*.

AND thus is it that to Principles *apparently* so trivial (*f*), as about twenty plain elements

(*e*) The Stoic Definition of an ELEMENT is as follows—Ἐστὶ δὲ στοιχεῖον, ἐξ οὗ πρῶτον γίνεταί τὰ γινόμενα, καὶ εἰς ὃ ἔσχατον ἀναλύεται. An ELEMENT is that, out of which, as their first Principle, things generated are made, and into which, as their last remains, they are resolved. Diog. Laert. VII. 176. What Aristotle says upon ELEMENTS with respect to the Subject here treated, is worth attending to—Φωνῆς στοιχεῖα, ἐξ ὧν σύγκεται ἡ φωνή, καὶ εἰς ἃ διαίρεται ἔχοντα· ἐκείνα δὲ μηκέτι εἰς ἄλλας φωνὰς ἑτέρας τῷ εἶδει αὐτῶν. The ELEMENTS OF ARTICULATE VOICE are those things, out of which the VOICE is compounded, and into which, as its last remains, it is divided: the Elements themselves being no farther divisible into other articulate Voices, differing in Species from them. Metaph. V. c. 3.

(*f*) The Egyptians paid divine Honours to the Inventor of Letters, and Regulator of Language, whom they

elementary Sounds, we owe that variety Ch. II.
 of articulate Voices, which have been suf-
 ficient to explain the Sentiments of so in-
 numerable a Multitude, as all the present
 and past Generations of Men.

IT

they called THEUTH. By the GREEKS he was wor-
 shipped under the Name of HERMES, and represented
 commonly by a *Head alone without other Limbs, stand-
 ing upon a quadrilateral Basis. The Head itself was
 that of a beautiful Youth, having on it a Petasus, or
 Bonnet, adorned with two Wings.*

There was a peculiar reference in this Figure to the
 ΕΡΜΗΣ ΛΟΓΙΟΣ, THE HERMES OF LAN-
 GUAGE OR DISCOURSE. He possessed no other part
 of the human figure but the HEAD, because *no other
 was deemed requisite to rational Communication. Words
 at the same time, the medium of this Communication,
 being (as Homer well describes them) Επεα πτερόεντα,
 Winged Words, were represented in their Velocity by the
 WINGS of his Bonnet.*

Let us suppose such a HERMES, having the *Front of
 his Basis* (the usual place for Inscriptions) *adorned with
 some old Alphabet, and having a Veil flung across, by
 which that Alphabet is partly covered. Let A YOUTH
 be seen drawing off this Veil; and A NYMPH, near the
 Youth, transcribing what She there discovers.*

Such a Design would easily indicate its Meaning.
 THE YOUTH we might imagine to be THE GENIUS

Ch. II. It appears from what has been said,
 that THE MATTER OR COMMON SUBJECT
 OF LANGUAGE IS *that Species of Sounds*
called VOICES ARTICULATE.

WHAT

OF MAN (*Naturæ Deus humanæ*, as Horace styles him;) THE NYMPH to be ΜΝΗΜΟΣΤΝΗ, or MEMORY; as much as to insinuate that “MAN, for the
 “ Preservation of his *Deeds and Inventions*, was neces-
 “ sarily obliged to have recourse to LETTERS; and that
 “ MEMORY, being conscious of her own *Insufficiency*,
 “ was glad to avail herself of so valuable an Acquisi-
 “ tion.”

MR. STUART, well known for his accurate and elegant Edition of the *Antiquities of Athens*, has adorned this Work with a Frontispiece agreeable to the above Ideas, and that in a Taste truly *Attic and Simple*, which no one possesses more eminently than himself.

As to HERMES, his History, Genealogy, Mythology, Figure, &c. Vid. *Platon. Phileb.* T. II. p. 18. *Edit. Serran.* *Diod. Sic. L. I.* *Horat. Od. X. L. I.* *Hesiod. Theog. V. 937. cum Comment.* *Joan. Diaconi. Thycid. VI. 27. et Scholiast. in loc.* *Pighium apud Gronov. Thesaur. T. IX. p. 1164.*

For the value and importance of Principles, and the difficulty in attaining them, see *Aristot. de Sophist. Elench. c. 34.*

WHAT remains to be examined in the Ch. II. following Chapter, is Language under its characteristic and peculiar FORM, that is to say, Language considered, not as a *Sound*, but as a *Meaning*.

Y 4

C H A P.

CHAP. III.

*Upon the Form, or peculiar Character of
Language.*

Ch.III. **W**HEN to any articulate Voice there accedes *by compact* a Meaning or Signification, such Voice by such accession is then called A WORD; and many Words, possessing their Significations (as it were) *under the same Compact* (a), unite in constituting a PARTICULAR LANGUAGE.

IT

(a) See before Note (c) p. 314. See also Vol. I. Treatise II. c. I. Notes (a) and (c).

The following Quotation from *Ammonius* is remarkable—Καθάπερ ἔν τὸ μὲν κατὰ τόπον κινεῖσθαι, φύσει, τὸ δὲ ὀρχεῖσθαι, θέσει καὶ κατὰ συνθήκην, καὶ τὸ μὲν ξύλον, φύσει, ἡ δὲ θύρα, θέσει· ἔτω καὶ τὸ μὲν φωνεῖν, φύσει, τὸ δὲ δι' ὀνομάτων ἢ ῥημάτων σημαίνειν, θέσει—καὶ ἔοικε τὴν μὲν φωνητικὴν δύναμιν, ὄργανον ἔσαν τῶν ψυχικῶν ἐν ἡμῖν δυνάμεων γνωστικῶν, ἢ ὀρεκτικῶν, κατὰ φύσιν ἔχειν ὁ ἄνθρωπος· παραπλησίως τοῖς ἀλόγοις ζώοις·

It appears from hence, that A WORD Ch.III.
 may be defined *a Voice articulate, and sig-*
nificant by Compact—and that LANGUAGE
 may be defined *a System of such Voices, so*
significant.

It is from notions like these concern-
 ing Language and Words, that one may
 be

ζώοις· τὸ δὲ ὀνόμασιν, ἢ ῥήμασιν, ἢ τοῖς ἐκ τέτων συγ-
 κειμένοις λόγοις χρῆσθαι πρὸς τὴν σημασίαν, (ἐκεί-
 φύσει ἔσιν, ἀλλὰ θίσει) ἐξαίρετον ἔχειν πρὸς τὰ ἄλογα
 ζῶα, διότι καὶ μόνον τῶν θνητῶν αὐτοκινήτε μετέχει
 ψυχῆς, καὶ τεχνικῶς ἐνεργεῖν δυνάμενης, ἵνα καὶ ἐν αὐτῷ
 τῷ φωνεῖν ἡ τεχνικὴ αὐτῆς διακρίνηται δύναμις· δηλαδὴ
 δὲ ταῦτα οἱ εἰς κάλλος συντιθέμενοι λόγοι μετὰ μέτρων,
 ἢ ἄνευ μέτρων. *In the same manner therefore, as local*
Motion is from Nature, but Dancing is something posi-
tive; and as Timber exists in Nature, but a Door is
something positive; so is the Power of producing a vocal
Sound founded in Nature, but that of explaining ourselves
by Nouns, or Verbs, something positive. And hence it is,
that as to the simple power of producing vocal Sound (which
is as it were the Organ or Instrument to the Soul's facul-
ties of Knowledge or Volition) as to this vocal power I say,
Man seems to possess it from Nature, in like manner as

Ch.III. be tempted to call LANGUAGE a kind of
 { PICTURE OF THE UNIVERSE, where the
 Words are as the Figures or Images of all
 particulars.

AND yet it may be doubted, how far
 this is true. For if *Pictures* and *Images*
 are all of them *Imitations*, it will follow,
 that whoever has natural faculties to know
 the

*irrational animals : but as to the employing of Nouns, or
 Verbs, or Sentences composed out of them, in the explana-
 tion of our Sentiments (the things thus employed being
 founded not in Nature, but in Position) this he seems to
 possess by way of peculiar eminence, because he alone of all
 mortal Beings partakes of a Soul, which can move itself,
 and operate artificially ; so that even in the Subject of
 Sound his artificial Power shews itself ; as the various
 elegant Compositions both in Metre, and without Metre,
 abundantly prove. Ammon. de Interpr. p. 51. a.*

It must be observed, that *the operating artificially*,
 (ἐνεργεῖν τεχνικῶς) of which Ammonius here speaks, and
 which he considers as a distinctive Mark peculiar to the
Human Soul, means something very different from the
mere producing works of elegance and design ; else it could
 never be a mark of Distinction between Man, and many
 other Species of Animals, such as the Bee, the Beaver,
 the Swallow, &c. See Vol. I. p. 8, 9, 10, 158, 159,
 &c.

the Original, will by help of the same Ch.III.
 faculties know also its Imitations. But it
 by no means follows, that he who knows
 any Being, should know for that reason
 its *Greek or Latin Name*.

THE Truth is, that every Medium,
 through which we exhibit any thing to
 another's Contemplation, is either derived
 from *Natural Attributes*, and then it is
 an IMITATION; or else from *Accidents*
quite arbitrary, and then it is a SYM-
 BOL (*b*).

Now,

(*b*) Διαφέρει δὲ τὸ ΟΜΟΙΩΜΑ τῷ ΣΥΜΒΟ-
 ΛΟΥ, καθόσον τὸ μὲν ὁμοίωμα τὴν φύσιν αὐτὴν τῷ
 πράγματι κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν ἀπεικονίζεσθαι βέλεται,
 καὶ ἔστιν ἐφ' ἡμῶν αὐτὸ μεταπλάσσει· τὸ γὰρ ἐν τῇ
 εἰκόνι γεγραμμένον τῷ Σωκράτει ὁμοίωμα, εἰ μὴ καὶ τὸ
 Φαλακρον, καὶ τὸ σιμόν, καὶ τὸ ἐξώφθαλμον ἔχει τῷ
 Σωκράτει, ἐκείν' αὖ αὐτῷ λέγοιτο εἶναι ὁμοίωμα· τὸ
 δὲ γε σύμβολον, ἥτοι σημεῖον, (ἀμφοτέρω γὰρ ὁ Φιλό-
 σοφος αὐτὸ ὀνομάζει) τὸ ὅλον ἐφ' ἡμῶν ἔχει, ἅτε καὶ
 ἐκ μόνης ὑφίσταμενον τῆς ἡμετέρας ἐπινοίας· οἷον, τῷ
 ὥστε οὐκ συμβάλλειν ἀλλήλοις τὰς πολεμῶντας, δύναται
 σύμ-

Ch.III. Now, if it be allowed that in far the greater part of things, not any of their *natural* Attributes are to be found in articulate Voices, and yet thro' such Voices are things of every kind exhibited, it will follow that Words *must of necessity be* SYMBOLS, because it appears that they cannot be *Imitations*.

BUT here occurs a Question, which deserves attention—" Why in the common
 " intercourse of men with men have
 " Imitations been neglected, and Symbols
 " pre-

σύμβολου ἔσται καὶ σάλπιγξ ἀπήχης, καὶ λαμπάδος
 ῥίψις, καθάπερ φησὶν Εὐριπίδης,

Ἐπεὶ δ' ἀφείθη πυρρὸς, ὡς τυρσηνικῆς

Σάλπιγξ ἤχος, σῆμα φοινίου μάχης.

Δύναται δὲ τις ὑποθέσθαι καὶ δόξατ' ἀνάτασιν, καὶ βέλους
 ἀφείσιν, καὶ ἀλλὰ μυρία.—A REPRESENTATION or
 RESEMBLANCE differs from a SYMBOL, in as much as
 the Resemblance aims as far as possible to represent the
 very nature of the thing, nor is it in our power to shift or
 vary it. Thus a REPRESENTATION intended for So-
 crates in a Picture, if it have not those circumstances pe-
 culiar

“ preferred, although Symbols are only Ch.III.
 “ known by Habit or Institution, while
 “ Imitations are recognized by a kind of
 “ natural Intuition ?”—To this it may be
 answered, that if the Sentiments of the
 Mind, like the Features of the Face, were
 immediately visible to every beholder, the
 Art of Speech or Discourse would have
 been perfectly superfluous. But now,
 while our Minds lie enveloped and hid,
 and the Body (like a Veil) conceals every
 thing but itself, we are necessarily compelled,
 when we communicate our Thoughts,
 to

cular to Socrates, the bald, the flat-nosed, and the projecting Eyes, cannot properly be called a Representation of him. But a SYMBOL or SIGN (for the Philosopher Aristotle uses both names) is wholly in our own power, as depending singly for its existence on our imagination. Thus for example, as to the time when two armies should engage, the Symbol or Sign may be the sounding of a Trumpet, the throwing of a Torch, (according to what Euripides says,

*But when the flaming Torch was hurl'd, the sign
 Of purple fight, as when the Trumpet sounds, &c.]*

or else one may suppose the elevating of a Spear, the darting of a Weapon, and a thousand ways besides. Ammon. in Lib. de Interp. p. 17. b.

Ch. III. to pass them to each other *through a Medium which is corporeal (c)*. And hence it is that all Signs, Marks, Imitations, and Symbols must needs be *sensible*, and addressed *as such* to the *Senses (d)*. Now THE SENSES, we know, never exceed their natural Limits; the Eye perceives no Sounds; the Ear perceives no Figures nor Colours. If therefore we were to converse, not by *Symbols* but by *Imitations*, as far as things are characterized by Figure

(c) Αἱ ψυχὰι αἱ ἡμέτεραι, γυμναὶ μὲν ἔσαι τῶν σωμάτων, ἡδύνατο δὲ αὐτῶν τῶν νοημάτων σημαίνειν ἀλλήλαις τὰ πράγματα. Ἐπειδὴ δὲ σώμασι συνδέονται, δίκην νέφους περικαλύπτουσιν αὐτῶν τὸ νοερόν, ἐδέηθησαν τῶν ὀνομάτων, δι' ὧν σημαίνουσιν ἀλλήλαις τὰ πράγματα. *Animi nostri a corporis compage secreti res vicissim animi conceptionibus significare possent: cum autem corporibus involuti sint, perinde ac nebulâ, ipsorum intelligendi vis obtegatur: quocirca opus eis fuit nominibus, quibus res inter se significarent.* Ammon. in Prædicam. p. 18. 2.

(d) *Quicquid scindi possit in differentias satis numerosas, ad notionum varietatem explicandam (modo differentiarum illarum sensui perceptibiles sint) fieri potest vehiculum cogitationum de homine in hominem.* Bacon. de Augm. Scient. VI. 1.

gure and Colour, our Imitation would be Ch.III.
 necessarily thro' Figure and Colour also. }

Again, as far as they are characterized by Sounds, it would for the same reason be thro' the Medium of Sounds. The like may be said of all the other Senses, the Imitation still shifting along with the Objects imitated. We see then how *complicated* such Imitation would prove.

IF we set LANGUAGE therefore, as a *Symbol*, in opposition to *such Imitation*; if we consider the Simplicity of the one, and the Multiplicity of the other; if we consider the Ease and Speed, with which Words are formed (an Ease which knows no trouble or fatigue; and a* Speed, which equals the Progress of our very Thoughts) if we oppose to this the difficulty and length of Imitations; if we remember that some Objects are capable of no Imitations at all, but that all Objects universally may be typified by Symbols; we may
 plainly

* Επερ πλεονέκτα—See before p. 325.

Ch. III. plainly perceive an Answer to the Question here proposed “ Why, in the common
 “ intercourse of men with men, Imita-
 “ tions have been rejected, and Symbols
 “ preferred.”

HENCE too we may perceive a Reason, *why there never was a Language, nor indeed can possibly be framed one, to express the Properties and real Essences of things,* as a Mirrour exhibits their Figures and their Colours. For if Language of itself imply nothing more, than *certain Species of Sounds with certain Motions concomitant ;* if to some Beings Sound and Motion are no Attributes at all ; if to many others, where Attributes, they are no way essential (such as the Murmurs and Wavings of a Tree during a storm) if this be true—’tis impossible the Nature of such Beings should be expressed, or the least essential Property be any way imitated, while between *the Medium and themselves* there is nothing CONNATURAL (e).

’TIS

(e) See Vol. I. Treatise II. c. 3. p. 70.

Ch.III.

'Tis true indeed, when *Primitives* were once established, 'twas easy to follow the Connection and Subordination of Nature, in the just deduction of *Derivatives* and *Compounds*. Thus the Sounds, *Water*, and, *Fire*, being once annexed to those two Elements, 'twas certainly more natural to call Beings participating of the first, *Watry*, of the last, *Fiery*, than to commute the Terms, and call them by the reverse. But why, and from what *natural Connections* the Primitives themselves might not be commuted, 'twill be found, I believe, difficult to assign a Reason, as well in the instances before us, as in most others. We may here also see the Reason, why ALL LANGUAGE IS FOUNDED IN COMPACT, and not in Nature; for so are all Symbols, of which Words are a certain Species.

THE Question remains if WORDS are Symbols, then SYMBOLS OF WHAT?—

Z

If

Ch III. If it be answered, OF THINGS, the Question returns, OF WHAT THINGS?—If it be answered, *of the several Individuals of Sense, the various particular Beings, which exist around us*—to this, 'tis replied, may be raised certain Doubts. In the first place every Word will be in fact a *proper Name*. Now if all Words are proper Names, how came Lexicographers, whose express business is to explain Words, either wholly to omit proper Names, or at least to explain them, not from their own Art, but from History?

AGAIN, if all *Words* are *proper Names*, then in strictness no Word can belong to more than one Individual. But if so, then, as *Individuals* are *infinite*, to make a perfect Language, *Words must be infinite also*. But if infinite, then *incomprehensible*, and never to be attained by the wisest Men; whose labours in Language upon this Hypothesis would be as idle as that study of infinite written Symbols, which

Mission-

Missionaries (if they may be credited) at-
tribute to the *Chinese*.

AGAIN, *if all Words are proper Names*, or (which is the same) the Symbols of *Individuals*; it will follow, as *Individuals* are not only *infinite*, but *ever passing*, that the Language of those, who lived ages ago, will be as unknown *now*, as the very Voices of the Speakers. Nay the Language of every Province, of every Town, of every Cottage, must be every where different, and every where changing, since such is the Nature of *Individuals*, which it follows.

AGAIN, *if all Words are proper Names*, the Symbols of *Individuals*, it will follow that in Language there can be no *General Proposition*, because upon the Hypothesis *all Terms are particular*; nor any *Affirmative Proposition*, because *no one Individual in nature is another*. It remains, there can be no Propositions, but *Particular Negatives*.

Ch.III. *tives*. But if so, then is Language incapable of communicating *General Affirmative Truths*—If so, then of communicating *Demonstration*—If so, then of communicating *Sciences*, which are so many Systems of Demonstrations—If so, then of communicating *Arts*, which are the Theorems of Science applied practically—If so, we shall be little the better for it either in Speculation or in Practice (*e*). And so much for this Hypothesis; let us now try another.

IF WORDS are not the Symbols of *external Particulars*, it follows of course, they must be THE SYMBOLS OF OUR IDEAS: For this is evident, if they are not
Symbols

(*e*) The whole of *Euclid* (whose Elements may be called the basis of Mathematical Science) is founded upon *general Terms*, and *general Propositions*, most of which are *affirmative*. So true are those Verses, however barbarous as to their stile,

*Syllogizari non est ex Particulari,
Neve Negativis, rectè concludere si vis.*

Symbols of things *without*, they can only be Symbols of something *within*. Ch.III.
}

HERE then the Question recurs, if SYMBOLS OF IDEAS, then of WHAT IDEAS? —OF SENSIBLE IDEAS.—Be it so, and what follows?—Every thing in fact, which has followed already from the supposition of their being the Symbols of *external Particulars*; and that from this plain and obvious reason, because the several *Ideas*, which *Particulars* imprint, must needs be as *infinite* and *mutable*, as they are themselves.


IF then Words are neither the Symbols of *external Particulars*, nor yet of *particular Ideas*, they can be SYMBOLS of nothing else, except of GENERAL IDEAS, because nothing else, except these, remains.—And what do we mean by GENERAL IDEAS?—We mean SUCH AS ARE COMMON TO MANY INDIVIDUALS; not only to Individuals which exist now, but which

Ch.III. existed in ages past, and will exist in ages future; such for example, as the Ideas belonging to the Words, *Man, Lion, Cedar*. —Admit it, and what follows?—It follows, that *if Words are the Symbols of such general Ideas*, Lexicographers may find employ, though they meddle not with *proper Names*.

It follows that *one Word* may be, not *homonymously*, but *truly and essentially common to many Particulars*, past present and future; so that however these Particulars may be *infinite*, and *ever fleeting*, yet Language notwithstanding may be *definite* and *steady*. But if so, then attainable even by ordinary Capacities, without danger of incurring the *Chinese Absurdity* *.

AGAIN, it follows that the Language of those, who lived ages ago, as far as it stands

* See p. 338, 339.

stands *for the same general Ideas*, may be as Ch.III.
intelligible *now*, as it was *then*. The like 
may be said of the same Language being
accommodated to distant Regions, and
even to distant Nations, amidst all the va-
riety of *ever new* and *ever changing* Ob-
jects.

AGAIN, it follows that Language may
be expressive of *general Truths*; and if so,
then of Demonstration, and Sciences, and
Arts; and if so, become subservient to
purposes of every kind (*f*).

Now if it be true “ that none of these
“ things could be asserted of Language,
“ were not Words the Symbols of *general*
“ *Ideas*—and it be further true, that these
“ things may be all undeniably asserted
“ of Language”—it will follow (and that
necessarily) that WORDS ARE THE SYM-
BOLS OF GENERAL IDEAS.

Z 4

AND

(*f*) See before Note (*e*).

Ch. III.

AND yet perhaps even here may be an Objection. It may be urged, if Words are the Symbols of *general Ideas*, Language may answer well enough the purpose of Philosophers, who reason about *general*, and *abstract* Subjects—but what becomes of the business of ordinary Life? Life we know is merged in a multitude of *Particulars*, where an Explanation by Language is as requisite, as in the highest Theorems. The Vulgar indeed want it to *no other End*. How then can this End in any respect be answered, if Language be expressive of nothing farther than *general Ideas*?

To this it may be answered, that *Arts* surely respect the business of ordinary Life; yet so far are *general Terms* from being an Obstacle here, that without them no Art can be *rationaly* explained. How for instance should the measuring Artist ascertain to the Reapers the price of their labours, had not he first through *general*

Terms learnt those *general Theorems*, that Ch.III.
 respect the doctrine and practice of Men-
 suration?

BUT suppose this not to satisfy a persevering Objector—suppose him to insist, that, admitting this to be true, *there were still a multitude of occasions for minute particularizing, of which 'twas not possible for mere Generals to be susceptible*—suppose, I say, such an Objection, what should we answer?—*That the Objection was just; that 'twas necessary to the Perfection and Completion of LANGUAGE, that it should be expressive of PARTICULARS, as well as of GENERALS.* We must however add, that its *general Terms* are by far its most *excellent and essential Part*, since from these it derives “ that comprehensive *Universality*, that just proportion of *Precision* and *Permanence*, without which it could not possibly be either learnt, or understood, or applied to the purposes of Reasoning and
 “ Science;”

Ch. III. “ Science;”—that *particular* Terms have their Utility and End, and that therefore care too has been taken for a supply of these.

ONE Method of expressing Particulars, is that of PROPER NAMES. This is the least artificial, because *proper Names* being in every district arbitrarily applied, may be unknown to those, who know the Language perfectly well, and can hardly therefore with propriety be considered as parts of it. The other and more artificial Method is that of DEFINITIVES or ARTICLES (*g*), whether we assume the *pro-nominal*, or those *more strictly* so called. And here we cannot enough admire the exquisite *Art* of Language, which, *without wandering into infinitude, contrives how to denote things infinite*; that is to say in other words, which, by the small Tribe of *Definitives properly applied to general*
Terms,

(*g*) See before p. 72, &c. 233, &c.

Terms, knows how to employ these last, Ch.III. tho' in number *finite*, to the accurate expression of *infinite* Particulars.

To explain what has been said by a single example. Let the general Term be MAN. I have occasion to apply this Term to the denoting of some Particular. Let it be required to express this Particular, *as unknown*; I say, A *Man—known*; I say, THE *Man—indefinite*; ANY *Man—definite*; A CERTAIN *Man—present and near*; THIS *Man—present and distant*; THAT *Man—like to some other*; SUCH A *Man—an indefinite Multitude*; MANY *Men—a definite Multitude*; A THOUSAND *Men*;—*the ones of a Multitude, taken throughout*; EVERY *Man—the same ones, taken with distinction*; EACH *Man—taken in order*; FIRST *Man*, SECOND *Man*, &c.—*the whole Multitude of Particulars taken collectively*; ALL *Men—the Negation of this Multitude*; NO *Man*. But of this we have spoken already, when we inquired concerning Definitives.

THE

Ch.III. THE Sum of all is, that WORDS ARE THE SYMBOLS OF IDEAS BOTH GENERAL AND PARTICULAR; YET OF THE GENERAL, PRIMARILY, ESSENTIALLY, AND IMMEDIATELY; OF THE PARTICULAR, ONLY SECONDARILY, ACCIDENTALLY, AND MEDIATELY.

SHOULD it be asked, “ why has Language this *double* Capacity ? ” — May we not ask, by way of return, Is it not a kind of reciprocal Commerce, or *Intercourse of our Ideas* ? Should it not therefore be framed, so as to express *the whole* of our Perception ? Now can we call that Perception intire and whole, which implies either INTELLECTION without *Sensation*, or SENSATION without *Intellection* ? If not, how should Language explain *the whole* of our Perception, had it not Words to express the Objects, proper to each of the two Faculties ?

To

To conclude—As in the preceding Ch.III. Chapter we considered Language with a view to its MATTER, so here we have considered it with a view to its FORM. Its MATTER is recognized, when 'tis considered *as a Voice*; its FORM, as 'tis *significant of our several Ideas*; so that upon the whole it may be defined—A SYSTEM OF ARTICULATE VOICES, THE SYMBOLS OF OUR IDEAS, BUT OF THOSE PRINCIPALLY, WHICH ARE GENERAL OR UNIVERSAL.

C H A P.

C H A P. IV.

Concerning general or universal Ideas.

Ch.IV. **M**UCH having been said in the preceding Chapter about GENERAL OR UNIVERSAL IDEAS, it may not perhaps be amiss to inquire, *by what process we come to perceive them, and what kind of Beings they are*; since the generality of men think so meanly of their existence, that they are commonly considered, as little better than Shadows. These Sentiments are not unusual even with the Philosopher now a days, and that from causes much the same with those, which influence the Vulgar.

THE VULGAR merged *in Sense* from their earliest Infancy, and never once dreaming any thing to be worthy of pursuit, but what either pampers their Appetite, or fills their Purse, imagine nothing
to

to be *real*, but what may be *tasted*, or Ch.IV.
touched. THE PHILOSOPHER, as to these
matters being of much the same Opinion,
in Philosophy looks no higher, than to
experimental Amusements, deeming nothing
Demonstration, if it be not made *ocular*.
Thus instead of ascending from *Sense* to
Intellect (the natural progress of all true
Learning) he hurries on the contrary into
the midst of *Sense*, where he wanders at
random without any end, and is lost in a
Labyrinth of infinite Particulars. Hence
then the reason why the sublimer parts of
Science, the Studies of MIND, INTELLEC-
TION, and INTELLIGENT PRINCIPLES,
are in a manner neglected; and, as if the
Criterion of all Truth were an Alembic or
an Air-pump, what cannot be proved by
Experiment, is deemed no better than
mere Hypothesis.

AND yet 'tis somewhat remarkable,
amid the prevalence of such Notions, that
there should still remain two Sciences in
fashion,

Ch.IV. fashion, and these having their Certainty of all the least controverted, *which are not in the minutest article depending upon Experiment.* By these I mean ARITHMETIC, and GEOMETRY (a). But to come to our Subject concerning GENERAL IDEAS.

MAN'S

(a) The many noble Theorems (so useful in life, and so admirable in themselves) with which these two SCIENCES so eminently abound, arise originally from PRINCIPLES, THE MOST OBVIOUS IMAGINABLE; Principles, so little wanting the pomp and apparatus of EXPERIMENT, that they are *self-evident* to every one, possessed of common sense. I would not be understood, in what I have here said, or may have said elsewhere, to undervalue EXPERIMENT; whose importance and utility I freely acknowledge, in the many curious Nostrums and choice Receipts, with which it has enriched the necessary Arts of life. Nay, I go farther—I hold *all justifiable Practice in every kind of Subject* to be founded in EXPERIENCE, which is no more than *the result of many repeated EXPERIMENTS.* But I must add withal, that the man who acts *from Experience alone*, tho' he act ever so well, is but an *Empiric* or *Quack*, and that not only in Medicine, but in every other Subject. 'Tis then only that we recognize ART, and that the EMPIRIC quits his name for the more honourable one of ARTIST, when to his EXPERIENCE he adds
SCIENCE,

MAN'S FIRST PERCEPTIONS are those Ch.IV.
 of the SENSES, in as much as they com-
 mence from his earliest Infancy. These
 Perceptions, if not infinite, are at least
indefinite, and more *fleeting* and *transient*,
 than the very Objects, which they exhibit,
 because

SCIENCE, and is thence enabled to tell us, not only,
 WHAT is to be done, but WHY 'tis to be done; for ART
 is a composite of Experience and Science, Experience
 providing it Materials, and Science giving them A
 FORM.

In the mean time, while EXPERIMENT is thus ne-
 cessary to all PRACTICAL WISDOM, with respect to
 PURE and SPECULATIVE SCIENCE, as we have
 hinted already, it has not the least to do. For who
 ever heard of *Logic*, or *Geometry*, or *Arithmetic* being
 proved *experimentally*? 'Tis indeed by the application
 of these that *Experiments* are rendered useful; that they
 are assumed into Philosophy, and in some degree made
 a part of it, being otherwise nothing better than puerile
 amusements. But that these Sciences themselves should
 depend upon the Subjects, on which they work, is, as
 if the Marble were to fashion the Chizzle, and not the
 Chizzle the Marble.

Ch.IV. because they not only depend upon the *existence* of those Objects, but because they cannot subsist, without their *immediate Presence*. Hence therefore it is, that there can be *no Sensation of either Past or Future*, and consequently had the Soul no other Faculties, than the *Senses*, it never could acquire the least Idea of TIME (b).

BUT happy for us we are not deserted here. We have in the first place a Faculty, called IMAGINATION or FANCY, which however as to its *energies* it may be subsequent to Sense, yet is truly prior to it both in *dignity* and *use*. THIS 'tis which *retains the fleeting Forms of things*, when Things themselves are gone, and *all Sensation* at an end.

THAT this Faculty, however connected with Sense, is still perfectly different, may
be

(b) See before p. 105. See also p. 112. Note (f).

be seen from hence. We have an *Imagination* of things, that are gone and extinct; but no such things can be made objects of *Sensation*. We have an easy command over the Objects of our *Imagination*, and can call them forth in almost what manner we please; but our *Sensations* are necessary, when their Objects are present, nor can we controul them, but by removing either the Objects, or ourselves (c).

As

(c) Besides the distinguishing of SENSATION from IMAGINATION, there are two other Faculties of the Soul, which from their nearer alliance ought carefully to be distinguished from it, and these are ΜΝΗΜΗ, and ΑΝΑΜΝΗΣΙΣ, MEMORY, and RECOLLECTION.

When we view some *reliet* of sensation reposed within us, *without thinking of its rise, or referring it to any sensible Object*, this is PHANSY or IMAGINATION.

When we view some such *reliet*, and *refer it withal to that sensible Object, which in time past was its cause and original*, this is MEMORY.

Ch.IV. As the Wax would not be adequate to its business of Signature, had it not a Power to *retain*, as well as to *receive*; the same holds of the SOUL, with respect to *Sense* and *Imagination*. SENSE is its *receptive*

Lastly the Road, which leads to Memory through a series of Ideas, however connected whether rationally or casually, this is RECOLLECTION. I have added casually, as well as rationally, because a casual connection is often sufficient. Thus from seeing a Garment, I think of its Owner; thence of his Habitation; thence of Woods; thence of Timber; thence of Ships, Sea-fights, Admirals, &c.

If the Distinction between *Memory* and *Phansy* be not sufficiently understood, it may be illustrated by being compared to the view of a Portrait. When we contemplate a Portrait, *without thinking of whom it is the Portrait*, such Contemplation is analogous to PHANSY. When we view it *with reference to the Original, whom it represents*, such Contemplation is analogous to MEMORY.

We may go farther. IMAGINATION or PHANSY may exhibit (after a manner) even *things that are to come*. 'Tis here that *Hope* and *Fear* paint all their pleasant, and all their painful Pictures of *Futurity*. But MEMORY is confined in the strictest manner *to the past*.

What

ceptive Power; IMAGINATION, its *re-* Ch.IV.
tentive. Had it Sense without Imagina-
 tion, 'twould not be as Wax, but as Wa-
 ter, where tho' all Impressions may be
 instantly made, yet as soon as made they
 are as instantly lost.

THUS then, from a view of the two
 Powers taken together, we may call SENSE
 (if we please) *a kind of transient Imagina-*
tion; and IMAGINATION on the contrary
a kind of permanent Sense (d).

Now

What we have said, may suffice for our present pur-
 pose. He that would learn more, may consult *Aristot.*
de Animâ, L. III. c. 3, 4. and his Treatise *de Mem. et*
Reminisc.

(d) Τί τοίνυν ἐστὶν ἡ Φαῦλασία ὥδε ἂν γνωρίσαιμεν·
 δεῖ νοεῖν ἐν ἡμῖν ἀπὸ τῶν ἐνεργειῶν τῶν περὶ τὰ αἰσθητὰ,
 οἷον τύπου (lege τύπον) τινὰ καὶ ἀναζωγράφημα ἐν τῷ
 πρώτῳ αἰσθητηρίῳ, ἐγκατάλειμμα τι τῆς ὑπὸ τῷ αἰσθητῷ
 γινομένης κινήσεως, ὃ καὶ μηκέτι τῷ αἰσθητῷ παρόντος,
 ὑπομένει τὸ καὶ σώζεται, ὅν ὥσπερ εἰκὼν τις αὐτῷ, ὃ καὶ

Ch.IV. Now as our Feet in vain venture to walk upon the River, till the Frost bind the Current, and harden the yielding Surface; so does the SOUL in vain seek to exert its higher Powers, the Powers I mean of REASON and INTELLECT, till IMAGINATION first fix the *fluency* of SENSE, and thus provide a proper Basis for the support of its higher Energies.

AFTER

τῆς μνήμης ἡμῶν σωζόμενον αἴσιον γίνεται· τὸ τοιούτου ἐγκατάλειμμα, καὶ τὸν τοιούτον ὥσπερ τύπον, ΦΑΝΤΑΣΙΑΝ καλεῖσιν. Now what PHANSY or IMAGINATION is, we may explain as follows. We may conceive to be formed within us, from the operations of our Senses about sensible Subjects, some Impression (as it were) or Picture in our original Sensorium, being a reliet of that motion caused within us by the external object; a reliet, which when the external object is no longer present, remains and is still preserved, being as it were its Image, and which, by being thus preserved, becomes the cause of our having Memory. Now such a sort of reliet and (as it were) Impression they call PHANSY or IMAGINATION. Alex. Aphrod. de Animâ, p. 135. b. Edit. Ald.

AFTER this manner, in the admirable Ch. IV.
 Oeconomy of the Whole, are Natures sub-
 ordinate made subservient to the higher.
 Were there *no Things external, the Senses*
 could not operate; were there *no Sensa-*
tions, the Imagination could not operate;
 and were there *no Imagination*, there could
 be *neither Reasoning nor Intellection*, such
 at least as they are found in *Man*, where
 they have their Intensions and Remissions
 in alternate succession, and are at first no-
 thing better, than *a mere CAPACITY or*
POWER. Whether every Intellect begins
 thus, may be perhaps a question; espe-
 cially if there be any one of a nature *more*
divine, to which “Intension and Remission
 “and mere Capacity are unknown (*e*).”
 But not to digress.

’TIS

(*e*) See p. 162. The *Life, Energy, or Manner* of
 MAN’s Existence is not a little different from that of
 the DEITY. THE LIFE OF MAN has its Essence in

Ch.IV. 'Tis then on these *permanent* Phantasms
 that THE HUMAN MIND first works, and
 by

MOTION. This is not only true with respect to that lower and subordinate Life, which he shares in common with Vegetables, and which can no longer subsist than while the Fluids circulate, but 'tis likewise true in that *Life*, which is peculiar to him as *Man*. Objects from without *first move* our faculties, and thence we move of ourselves either to *Practice* or *Contemplation*. But the LIFE or EXISTENCE of GOD (as far as we can conjecture upon so transcendent a Subject) is not only complete throughout Eternity, but complete in every Instant, and is for that reason IMMUTABLE and SUPERIOR TO ALL MOTION.

'Tis to this distinction that *Aristotle* alludes, when he tells us—Οὐ γὰρ μόνον κινήσεώς ἐστὶν ἐνέργεια, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀκινήσεως· καὶ ἡδονὴ μᾶλλον ἐν ἡρεμίᾳ ἐστὶν, ἢ ἐν κινήσει· μεταβολὴ δὲ πάντων γλυκύ, κατὰ τὸν ποιητὴν, διὰ πονηρίαν τινά· ὥσπερ γὰρ ἀνθρώπος ἐνμετάβολος ὁ πονηρὸς, καὶ ἡ φύσις ἡ δεομένη μεταβολῆς· ἡ γὰρ ἀπλή, οὐδ' ἐπιεικής. For there is not only an Energy of MOTION, but of IMMOBILITY; and PLEASURE or FELICITY exists rather in REST than in MOTION; Change of all things being sweet (according to the Poet) from a principle of Pravity in those who believe so. For
 in

by an Energy as spontaneous and familiar Ch.IV.
 to its Nature, as the seeing of Colours is
 familiar to the Eye, it discerns at once
 what

in the same manner as the bad man is one fickle and changeable, so is that Nature bad that requireth Variety, in as much as such Nature is neither simple nor even. Eth. Nicom. VII. 14. & Ethic. Eudem. VI. sub fin.

'Tis to this UNALTERABLE NATURE OF THE DEITY that *Boethius* refers, when he says in those elegant verses,

———*Tempus ab Ævo*

*Ire jubes, STABILISQUE MANENS das cuncta
 moveri.*

From this single principle of IMMOBILITY, may be derived some of the noblest of the *Divine Attributes*; such as that of IMPASSIVE, INCORRUPTIBLE, INCORPOREAL, &c. Vide *Aristot.* Physic. VIII. Metaphys. XIV. c. 6, 7, 9, 10. Edit. *Du-Val.* See also Vol. I. of these Treatises, p. 262 to 266—also p. 295, where the Verses of *Boethius* are quoted at length.

It must be remembered however, that tho' we are not Gods, yet as *rational* Beings we have within us something *Divine*, and that the more we can become superior to our mutable, variable, and irrational part, and place our welfare in that Good, which is immutable,
 per-

Ch.IV. what in MANY is ONE ; what in things
 DISSIMILAR and DIFFERENT is SIMILAR
 and the SAME (*f*). By this it comes to
 behold

permanent, and rational, the higher we shall advance in real Happiness and Wisdom. This is (as an antient writer says)—Ὁμοίωσις τῷ Θεῷ κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν, *the becoming like to GOD, as far as in our power.* Τοῖς μὲν γὰρ Θεοῖς πᾶς ὁ βίη μακάριος τοῖς δ' ἀνθρώποις, ἵφ' ὅσον ὁμοιωμὰ τι τῆς τοιαύτης ἐνεργείας ὑπάρχει. *For to THE GODS (as says another antient) the whole of life is one continued happiness; but to MEN, 'tis so far happy, as it rises to the resemblance of so divine an Energy.* See *Plat. in Theætet. Arist. Eth. X. 8.*

(*f*) This CONNECTIVE ACT of the Soul, by which it views ONE IN MANY, is perhaps one of the principal Acts of its most excellent Part. 'Tis this removes that impenetrable mist, which renders *Objects of Intelligence* invisible to lower faculties. Were it not for this, even the *sensible* World (with the help of all our Sensations) would appear as unconnected, as the words of an Index. 'Tis certainly not the Figure alone, nor the Touch alone, nor the Odour alone, that makes the Rose, but 'tis made up of all these, and other attributes UNITED ; not an *unknown* Constitution of *insensible* Parts, but a *known* Constitution of *sensible* Parts, unless we chuse to extirpate the possibility of natural Knowledge.

WHAT

behold a kind of *superior* Objects ; a new Ch.IV.
 Race of Perceptions, more comprehensive
 than

WHAT then perceives this CONSTITUTION or UNION?—Can it be any of the Senses?—No one of these, we know, can pass the limits of its own province. Were the Smell to perceive the union of the Odour and the Figure, it would not only be Smell, but it would be Sight also. 'Tis the same in other instances. We must necessarily therefore recur to some HIGHER COLLECTIVE POWER, to give us a prospect of Nature, even in these her *subordinate Wholes*, much more in that *comprehensive Whole*, whose Sympathy is universal, and of which these smaller Wholes are all no more than Parts.

But no where is this *collecting*, and (if I may be allowed the expression) this *unifying* Power more conspicuous, than in the subjects of PURE TRUTH. By virtue of this power the Mind views *One general Idea* in *many Individuals* ; *One Proposition* in *many general Ideas* ; *One Syllogism* in *many Propositions* ; till at length by properly repeating and connecting Syllogism with Syllogism, it ascend into those bright and *steady regions* of SCIENCE,

*Quas neque concutiunt venti, neque nubila nimbis
 Adspargunt, &c.*

Lucr.

Even

Ch.IV. *than those of Sense ; a Race of Perceptions, each one of which may be found intire and*

Even *negative* Truths and *negative* Conclusions cannot subsist, but by bringing Terms and Propositions together, so *necessary* is this UNITING Power to every Species of KNOWLEDGE. See p. 3. 250.

He that would better comprehend the distinction between SENSITIVE PERCEPTION, and INTELLECTIVE, may observe that, when a Truth is spoken, it is *heard* by our Ears, and *understood* by our Minds. That these two Acts are different, is plain, from the example of such, as *hear* the sounds, without *knowing* the language. But to shew their difference still stronger, let us suppose them to concur in the same Man, who shall both *hear* and *understand* the Truth proposed. Let the Truth be for example, *The Angles of a Triangle are equal to two right Angles*. That this is ONE Truth, and not *two* or *many* Truths, I believe none will deny. Let me ask then, in what manner does this Truth become perceptible (if at all) to SENSATION?—The Answer is obvious ; 'tis by successive Portions of little and little at a time. When the first Word is *present*, all the subsequent are *absent* ; when the last Word is *present*, all the previous are *absent* ; when any of the middle Words are *present*, then are there some *absent*, as well of one sort as the other. No more exists at once than a single Syllable, and the Remainder as much *is not*, (to Sensation at least) as tho'

and whole in the separate individuals of an Ch. IV.
infinite and fleeting Multitude, without de- }
parting

tho' it never had been, or never was to be. And so much for the Perception of SENSE, than which we see nothing can be more *dissipated, fleeting, and detached*.—And is that of the MIND, similar?—Admit it, and what follows?—It follows, that *one* Mind would no more recognize *one* Truth, by recognizing its Terms *successively* and *apart*, than *many* distant Minds would recognize it, were it distributed among them, a different part to each. The case is, every TRUTH is ONE, tho' its TERMS are MANY. It is in no respect true *by parts at a time*, but 'tis true of necessity *at once, and in an instant*.—What Powers therefore recognize this ONENESS or UNITY?—Where even does it reside, or what makes it?—Shall we answer with the *Stagirite*, Τὸ δὲ ΕΝ ΠΟΙΟΤΗ ΤῆΤΟ ὁ ΝΟΥΣ ἕκαστον—If this be allowed, it should seem, where SENSATION and INTELLECTION appear to concur, that Sensation was of MANY, Intellection was of ONE; that Sensation was *temporary, divisible and successive*; Intellection, *instantaneous, indivisible, and at once*.

If we consider the Radii of a Circle, we shall find at the Circumference that they are MANY; at the Center that they are ONE. Let us then suppose SENSE and MIND to view the same Radii, only let Sense view them at the *Circumference*, Mind at the *Center*;
and


Ch.IV. *parting from the unity and permanence of its own nature.*

AND

and hence we may conceive, how these Powers differ, even where they jointly appear to operate in perception of the same object.

There is ANOTHER ACT OF THE MIND, the very reverse of that here mentioned; an Act, by which it perceives not *one in many*, but MANY IN ONE. This is that *mental Separation*, of which we have given some account in the first Chapter of this Book; that Resolution or Analysis, which enables us to *investigate the Causes, and Principles, and Elements of things*. 'Tis by Virtue of this, that we are enabled to abstract any particular Attribute, and make it *by itself* the Subject of philosophical Contemplation. Were it not for this, it would be difficult for *particular Sciences* to exist; because otherwise they would be as much blended, as the several Attributes of sensible Substances. How, for example, could there be such a Science as *Optics*, were we necessitated to contemplate *Colour concentered with Figure*, two Attributes, which the Eye can never view, but associated? I mention not a multitude of other sensible qualities, some of which still present themselves, whenever we look on any *coloured Body*.

Those

AND thus we see the *Process by which* Ch.IV.
we arrive at GENERAL IDEAS; for the 
 Per-

Those two noble Sciences, ARITHMETIC and GEOMETRY, would have no basis to stand on, were it not for this *separative* Power. They are both conversant about QUANTITY; *Geometry* about CONTINUOUS Quantity, *Arithmetic* about DISCRETE. EXTENSION is essential to *continuous* Quantity; MONADS, or UNITS, to *Discrete*. By separating from the infinite Individuals, with which we are surrounded, those infinite Accidents, by which they are all *diversified*, we leave nothing but those SIMPLE and PERFECTLY SIMILAR UNITS, which being combined make NUMBER, and are the Subject of ARITHMETIC. Again, by separating from *Body* every possible subordinate Accident, and leaving it nothing but its *triple Extension of Length, Breadth, and Thickness*, (of which were it to be deprived, it would be *Body* no longer) we arrive at that pure and unmixed MAGNITUDE, the contemplation of whose properties makes the Science of *Geometry*.

By the same *analytical* or *separative* Power, we investigate DEFINITIONS of all kinds, each one of which is a *developed Word*, as the same Word is an *involved Definition*.

To conclude—IN COMPOSITION AND DIVISION
 CONSISTS THE WHOLE OF SCIENCE, COMPOSITION

Ch.IV. Perceptions here mentioned are in fact no
 { other. In these too we perceive the ob-
 jects of SCIENCE and REAL KNOWLEDGE,
 which can by no means be, but *of that*
which is general, and definite, and fixt (g).

Here

TION MAKING AFFIRMATIVE TRUTH, AND
 SHEWING US THINGS UNDER THEIR SIMILARI-
 TIES AND IDENTITIES; DIVISION MAKING NE-
 GATIVE TRUTH, AND PRESENTING THEM TO
 US UNDER THEIR DISSIMILARITIES AND DI-
 VERSITIES.

And here, by the way, there occurs a Question.—
 If all Wisdom be Science, and it be the business of
 Science as well to *compound* as to *separate*, may we not
 say that those Philosophers took *Half* of Wisdom for
 the *Whole*, who distinguished it from Wit, as if WIS-
 DOM only *separated*, and WIT only *brought together*?
 —Yet so held the Philosopher of *Malmesbury*, and the
 Author of the *Essay on the Human Understanding*.

(g) The very Etymologies of the Words ΕΠΙ-
 ΣΤΗΜΗ, SCIENTIA, and UNDERSTANDING,
 may serve in some degree to shew the nature of these
 Faculties, as well as of those Beings, their true and
 proper Objects. ΕΠΙΣΤΗΜΗ νόμασι, διὰ τὸ
 ΕΠΙΣΤΑΣΙΝ καὶ ἔξου τῶν πραγμάτων ἀγειν ἡμᾶς,
 τῆς

Here too even *Individuals*, however of Ch.IV. themselves unknowable, become objects of } Knowledge,

τῆς ἀορισίας καὶ μεταβολῆς τῶν ἐπὶ μέρος ἀπάγνυσα· ἡ γὰρ ἐπιστήμη περὶ τὰ καθόλου καὶ ἀμετάπλωτα καταγίνεται. SCIENCE (ΕΠΙΣΤΗΜΗ) has its name from bringing us (ΕΠΙ ΣΤΑΣΙΝ) TO SOME STOP and BOUNDARY of things, taking us away from the unbounded nature and mutability of Particulars; for it is conversant about Subjects, that are general, and invariable. Niceph. Blem. Epit. Logic. p. 21.

This Etymology given by Blemmides, and long before him adopted by the *Peripatetics*, came originally from *Plato*, as may be seen in the following account of it from his *Cratylus*. In this Dialogue *Socrates*, having first (according to the *Heraclitean* Philosophy which *Cratylus* favoured) etymologized a multitude of Words with a view to that *Flow* and *unceasing Mutation*, supposed by *Heraclitus* to run thro' all things, at length changes his System, and begins to etymologize from another, which supposed something in nature to be *permanent* and *fixed*. On this principle he thus proceeds — Σκοπῶμεν δὴ, ἐξ αὐτῶν ἀναλαβόντες πρῶτον μὲν τὸτο τὸ ὄνομα τὴν ΕΠΙΣΤΗΜΗΝ, ὡς ἀμφιζόλου ἐστὶ, καὶ μᾶλλον ἔοικε σημαῖνόν τι ὅτι ΙΣΤΗΣΙΝ ἡμῶν ΕΠΙ τοῖς πράγμασι τὴν ψυχὴν, ἢ ὅτι συμπεριφέρεται. Let us consider then (says he) some of the very


Ch.IV. Knowlege, as far as their nature will permit. For then only may *any Particular* be

Words already examined ; and in the first place, the Word SCIENCE ; how disputable is this (as to its former Etymology) how much more naturally does it appear to signify, that IT STOPS THE SOUL AT THINGS, than that it is carried about with them. Plat. Cratyl. p. 437. Edit. Serr.

The disputable Etymology, to which he here alludes, was a strange one of his own making in the former part of the Dialogue, adapted to the *flowing* System of *Heraclitus* there mentioned. According to this notion, he had derived ΕΠΙΣΤΗΜΗ from ἐπεσθαι and μένειν, as if it *kept along* with things, by perpetually following them in their motions. See *Plato* as before, p. 412.

As to SCIENTIA, we are indebted to *Scaliger* for the following ingenious Etymology. RATIOCINATIO, *motus quidam est* ; SCIENTIA, *quies : unde et nomen, tum apud Græcos, tum etiam nostrum. Παρὰ τὸ ΕΠΙ ΙΣΤΑΣΘΑΙ, ΕΠΙΣΤΗΜΗ. Sifistur enim mentis agitatio, et fit species in animo. Sic Latinum SCIENTIA, ὅτι γίνεταί ΣΧΕΣΙΣ ΤΟΥ ΟΝΤΟΣ. Nam Latini, quod nomen entis simplex ab usu abjecerunt atque repudiarunt, omnibus activis participiis idem adjunxerunt. Audiens, ἀκούων ὦν. Sciens, ᾔων ὦν. Scal. in Theophr. de Causis Plant. Lib. I. p. 17.*

The,

be said to be known, when by asserting it Ch.IV.
to be a *Man*, or an *Animal*, or the like, 
we

The *English* Word, UNDERSTANDING, means not so properly *Knowledge*, as that *Faculty of the Soul*, where *Knowledge* resides. Why may we not then imagine, that the framers of this Word intended to represent it as a kind of firm *Basis*, on which the fair Structure of Sciences was to rest, and which was supposed to STAND UNDER them, as their immoveable Support?

Whatever may be said of these Etymologies, whether they are true or false, they at least prove their Authors to have considered SCIENCE and UNDERSTANDING, not as *fleeting* powers of Perception, like *Sense*, but rather as *steady*, *permanent*, and *durable* COMPREHENSIONS. But if so, we must somewhere or other find for them certain *steady*, *permanent*, and *durable* OBJECTS; since if PERCEPTION OF ANY KIND BE DIFFERENT FROM THE THING PERCEIVED, (whether it perceive straight as crooked, or crooked as straight; the moving as fixed, or the fixed as moving) SUCH PERCEPTION MUST OF NECESSITY BE ERRONEOUS AND FALSE. The following passage from a *Greek Platonic* (whom we shall quote again hereafter) seems on the present occasion not without its weight—Εἰ ἐστὶ γνώσις ἀκριβέστερα τῆς αἰδήσεως, ἢ ἂν καὶ γνώσῃ ἀληθεστέρα τῶν αἰδητῶν. *If there be*

Ch. IV. we refer it to some such *comprehensive, or*
general Idea.


Now 'tis of these COMPREHENSIVE and
 PERMANENT IDEAS, THE GENUINE PER-
 CEPTIONS OF PURE MIND, that WORDS
 of all Languages, however different, are
 the SYMBOLS. And hence it is, that *as*
the PERCEPTIONS include, so do these their
 SYMBOLS

A KNOWLEDGE *more accurate than* SENSATION ; *there*
must be certain OBJECTS of such knowlege MORE TRUE
 THAN OBJECTS OF SENSE.

The following then are Questions worth consider-
 ing,—*What* these Objects are?—*Where* they reside?
 —And *how* they are to be discovered?—Not by *expe-*
riental Philosophy 'tis plain ; for that meddles with no-
 thing, but what is tangible, corporeal, and mutable—
 nor even by the more refined and rational speculation
 of *Mathematics* ; for this, at its very commencement,
 takes such Objects for granted. We can only add,
 that *if they reside in our own MINDS*, (and who, that
 has never looked there, can affirm they do not ?) then
 will the advice of the Satirist be no ways improper,

—NEC TE QUÆSIVERIS EXTRA.

Perf.

SYMBOLS *express, not this or that set of* Ch.IV.
Particulars only, but all indifferently, as 
they happen to occur. Were therefore the
 Inhabitants of *Salisbury* to be transferred
 to *York*, tho' new particular objects would
 appear on every side, they would still no
 more want a new Language to explain
 themselves, than they would want new
 Minds to comprehend what they beheld.
 All indeed, that they would want, would
 be the *local proper Names*; which Names,
 as we have said already *, are hardly a part
 of Language, but must equally be learnt
 both by learned and unlearned, as often
 as they change the place of their abode.

'Tis upon the same principles we may
 perceive the reason, why the dead Lan-
 guages (as we call them) are *now* intelli-
 gible; and why the Language of *modern*
England is able to describe *antient Rome*;

B b 3 and

* Sup. p. 345, 346.

Ch.IV. and that of *ancient Rome* to describe *modern England* (b). But of these matters we have spoken before.

§. 2. AND now having viewed *the Process, by which we acquire general Ideas*, let us begin anew from other Principles, and try to discover (if we can prove so fortunate) *whence 'tis that these Ideas originally come*. If we can succeed here, we may discern perhaps, *what kind of Beings they are*, for this at present appears somewhat obscure.

LET

(b) As far as *Human Nature*, and the *primary Genera* both of *Substance* and *Accident* are the same in all places, and have been so thro' all ages; so far all *Languages* share one common IDENTITY. As far as *peculiar species of Substance* occur in different regions; and much more, as far as the *positive Institutions of religious and civil Politics* are every where different; so far each *Language* has its peculiar DIVERSITY. To the Causes of *Diversity* here mentioned, may be added the *distinguishing Character and Genius of every Nation*, concerning which we shall speak hereafter.

LET us suppose any man to look for Ch. IV.
 the first time upon *some Work of Art*, as
 for example upon a Clock, and having
 sufficiently viewed it, at length to depart.
 Would he not retain, when absent, an Idea
 of what he had seen?—And what is it, *to*
retain such Idea?—'Tis to have A FORM
 INTERNAL *correspondent to* THE EXTER-
 NAL; only with this difference, that the
Internal Form is devoid of the Matter; the
External is united with it, being seen in
 the metal, the wood, and the like.


Now if we suppose this Spectator to
 view *many such Machines*, and not simply
 to view, but to consider every part of them,
 so as to comprehend how these parts all
 operate to one End, he might be then
 said to possess a kind of INTELLIGIBLE
 FORM, by which he would not only un-
 derstand, and know the Clocks, which he
 had seen *already*, but every Work also of
 like Sort, which he might see *hereafter*.—

Ch.IV. Should it be ask'd "*which of these Forms*
 "*is prior, the External and Sensible; or*
the Internal and Intelligible;" the Answer is obvious, that *the prior is the Sensible,*

THUS then we see, THERE ARE INTELLIGIBLE FORMS, WHICH TO THE SENSIBLE ARE SUBSEQUENT.

BUT farther still—If these Machines be allowed the Work *not of Chance*, but of *an Artist*, they must be the Work of one, who *knew what he was about*. And what is it, *to work, and know what one is about?* —'Tis *to have an Idea of what one is doing; to possess* A FORM INTERNAL, *correspondent to the* EXTERNAL, *to which external it serves for an* EXEMPLAR *or* ARCHETYPE.

HERE then we have AN INTELLIGIBLE FORM, WHICH IS PRIOR TO THE SENSIBLE FORM; *which, being truly prior*

as well in dignity as in time, can no more Ch.IV.
become subsequent, than Cause can to Effect. 

THUS then, with respect to Works of ART, we may perceive, if we attend, A TRIPLE ORDER OF FORMS ; *one* Order, *intelligible* and *previous* to these Works ; a *second* Order, *sensible* and *concomitant* ; and a *third* again, *intelligible* and *subsequent*. After the first of these Orders the Maker may be said to *work* ; thro' the second, the Works themselves *exist*, and are what they are ; and in the third they become *recognized, as mere Objects of Contemplation*. To make these Forms by different Names more easy to be understood ; *the first* may be called THE MAKER'S FORM ; *the second*, that of THE SUBJECT ; and the *third*, that of THE CONTEMPLATOR.

LET us pass from hence to Works of NATURE. Let us imagine ourselves viewing some diversified Prospect ; “ a Plain,
“ for example, spacious and fertile ; a
“ river

Ch.IV. “ river winding thro’ it; by the banks
 “ of that river, men walking and cattle
 “ grazing; the view terminated with
 “ distant hills, some craggy, and some
 “ covered with wood.” Here ’tis plain
 we have plenty of FORMS NATURAL.
 And could any one quit so fair a Sight,
 and retain no traces of what he had be-
 held?—And what is it, *to retain traces*
of what one has beheld?—’Tis to have cer-
 tain FORMS INTERNAL correspondent to
 the EXTERNAL, and resembling them in
 every thing, *except the being merged in*
Matter. And thus, thro’ the same *reten-*
tive and *collective* Powers, the Mind be-
 comes fraught with *Forms natural*, as be-
 fore with *Forms artificial*.—Should it be
 asked, “ *which of these natural Forms are*
prior, the External ones view’d by the
Senses, or the Internal existing in the
Mind;” the Answer is obvious, that
the prior are the External.

THUS

THUS therefore in NATURE, as well as Ch.IV.
 in ART, THERE ARE INTELLIGIBLE FORMS, WHICH TO THE SENSIBLE ARE SUBSEQUENT. Hence then we see the meaning of that noted School Axiom, *Nil est in INTELLECTU, quod non prius fuit in SENSU*; an Axiom, which we must own to be so far allowable, as it respects the *Ideas of a mere Contemplator.*

BUT to proceed somewhat farther—Are *natural* Productions made BY CHANCE, or BY DESIGN?—Let us admit *by Design*, not to lengthen our inquiry. They are certainly* more exquisite than *any* Works of ART, and yet *these* we cannot bring ourselves to suppose made by *Chance*.—Admit it, and what follows?—*We must of necessity admit a MIND also, because DESIGN implies MIND, wherever 'tis to be found.*—Allowing therefore this, what do we mean

* *Arist. de Part. Animal. L. I. c. 1.*

Ch.IV. mean by the Term, MIND?—We mean
something, which, when it acts, knows what it is going to do; something stored with Ideas of its intended Works, agreeably to which Ideas those Works are fashioned.

THAT such EXEMPLARS, PATTERNS, FORMS, IDEAS (call them as you please) must of necessity be, requires no proving, but follows of course, if we admit the Cause of Nature to be A MIND, as above mentioned. For take away these, and *what a Mind* do we leave without them? CHANCE surely is as knowing, as MIND WITHOUT IDEAS; or rather, MIND WITHOUT IDEAS is no less blind than CHANCE.

THE Nature of these IDEAS is not difficult to explain, if we once come to allow a possibility of their Existence. That they are exquisitely *beautiful, various, and orderly*, is evident from the exquisite Beauty, Variety, and Order, seen in natural Substances,

stances, which are but their *Copies* or *Pictures*. That they are *mental* is plain, as *they are of the Essence of MIND*, and consequently no Objects to any of the *Senses*, nor therefore circumscribed either by *Time* or *Place*. Ch.IV.

HERE then, on this System, we have plenty of FORMS INTELLIGIBLE, WHICH ARE TRULY PREVIOUS TO ALL FORMS SENSIBLE. Here too we see that NATURE is not defective in her TRIPLE ORDER, having (like Art) her FORMS PREVIOUS, HER CONCOMITANT, and HER SUBSEQUENT (i).

THAT

(i) *Simplicius*, in his commentary upon the Predicaments, calls the *first* Order of these intelligible Forms, τὰ πρὸ τῆς μεθέξεως, *those previous to Participation*, and at other times, ἡ ἐξηρημένη κοινότης, *the transcendent Universality* or *Sameness*; the *second* Order he calls τὰ ἐν μετέξει, *those which exist in Participation*, that is, those merged in Matter; and at other times, he calls them ἡ κατὰ τεταγμένη κοινότης, *the subordinate Universality* or *Sameness*; lastly, of the *third* Order he says, that

Ch.IV. *THAT the Previous may be justly so called is plain, because they are essentially prior*

that they have no independent existence of their own, but that—*ἡμεῖς ἀφελόντες αὐτὰ ἐν ταῖς ἡμετέραις ἐννοίαις, καθ' ἑαυτὰ ὑπεσῆσαμεν, we ourselves abstracting them in our own Imaginations, have given them by such abstraction an existence as of themselves.* *Simp. in Prædic. p. 17.* In another place he says, in a language somewhat mysterious, yet still conformable to the same doctrine—*Μήποτε ἔν τριτλὸν ληπλίον τὸ κοινόν, τὸ μὲν ἐξηρημένον τῶν καθ' ἑκάστα, καὶ αἰτίον τῆς ἐν αὐτοῖς κοινότητος, κατὰ τὴν μίαν ἑαυτῷ φύσιν, ὥσπερ καὶ τῆς διαφορότητος κατὰ τὴν πολυειδῆ πρόληψιν—δεύτερον δὲ ἐστὶ τὸ κοινόν, τὸ ἀπὸ κοινῆς αἰτίας τοῖς διαφόροις εἶδесιν ἐνδιδόμενον, καὶ ἐνυπάρχον αὐτοῖς—τρίτον δὲ, τὸ ἐν ταῖς ἡμετέραις διανοαῖς ἐξ ἀφαιρέσεως ὑφιστάμενον, ὑπερογενὲς ὄν—**Perhaps therefore we must admit a TRIPLE ORDER OF WHAT IS UNIVERSAL AND THE SAME; that of the first Order, transcendent and superior to Particulars, which thro' its uniform nature is the cause of that Sameness existing in them, as thro' its multiform pre-conception it is the cause of their Diversity—that of the second Order, what is infused from the first universal Cause into the various Species of Beings, and which has its existence in those several Species—that of the third Order, what subsists by abstraction in our own Understandings, being of subsequent origin to the other two.* *Ibid. p. 21.*

To

prior to all things else. The whole visible Ch.IV.
 BLE WORLD exhibits nothing more, than }
 so

To *Simplicius* we shall add the two following Quotations from *Ammonius* and *Nicephorus Blemmides*, which we have ventured to transcribe, without regard to their uncommon length, as they so fully establish the Doctrine here advanced, and the works of these Authors are not easily to be procured.

Ἐννοεῖδω τοίνυν δακτύλιός τις ἐκλύπωμα ἔχων, εἰ τύχοι, Ἀχιλλεύς, καὶ κηρία πολλὰ παρακείμενα· ὁ δὲ δακτύλιος σφραγιζέτω τοὺς κηρὺς πάντας· ὕστερον δὲ τις εἰσελθὼν καὶ θεασάμενος τὰ κηρία, ἐπιστήσας ὅτι πάντα ἐξ ενός εἰσιν ἐκλυπώματος, ἐχέτω παρ' αὐτῷ τὸ ἐκλύπωμα τῇ διανοίᾳ. Ἡ τοίνυν σφραγίς ἡ ἐν τῷ δακτυλίῳ λέγεται ΠΡΟ ΤΩΝ ΠΟΛΛΩΝ εἶναι· ἡ δὲ ἐν τοῖς κηρίοις, ΕΝ ΤΟΙΣ ΠΟΛΛΟΙΣ· ἡ δὲ ἐν τῇ διανοίᾳ τῷ ἀπομαξαμένῳ, ΕΠΙ ΤΟΙΣ ΠΟΛΛΟΙΣ, καὶ ὕστερογενής. Τοῦτο οὖν ἐννοεῖδω καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν γενῶν καὶ εἰδῶν· ὁ γὰρ Δημιουργός, ποιῶν πάντα, ἔχει παρ' ἑαυτοῦ τὰ πάντων παραδείγματα· οἷον, ποιῶν ἄνθρωπον, ἔχει τὸ εἶδος παρ' ἑαυτοῦ τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ, πρὸς ὃ ἀφορῶν, πάντας ποιεῖ. Ἐἰ δέ τις ἐνσαΐη λέγων, ὡς οὐκ εἰσὶ παρὰ τῷ Δημιουργῷ τὰ εἶδη, ἀκουέτω ταῦτα, ὡς ὁ Δημιουργός δημιουργεῖ, ἢ εἰδὼς τὰ ὑπ' αὐτῷ δημιουργούμενα, ἢ οὐκ εἰδὼς. Ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν μὴ εἰδὼς, οὐκ αὖ δημιουργήσει. Τίς γὰρ, μέλλων ποιήσῃν τί, ἀγνοεῖ ὃ μέλλει

Ch.IV. so many *passing* Pictures of these *immutable*
Archetypes: Nay thro' these it attains even

a

μέλλει ποιεῖν; οὐ γὰρ, ὡς ἡ φύσις, ἀλόγῳ δυνάμει ποιεῖ. (ὅθεν καὶ ποιεῖ ἡ φύσις, οὐκ ἐφιστάουσα γνωστῇ κῶς τῷ γιγνόμενῳ) Ἐἰ δέ τι καθ' ἕξιν λογικὴν ποιεῖ, οἶδέπε πάντως τὸ γιγνόμενον ὑπ' αὐτῆς. Ἐἰ τοίνυν μὴ χεῖρον, ἢ κατὰ ἄνθρωπον, ὁ Θεὸς ποιεῖ, οἶδε τὸ ὑπ' αὐτῆς γιγνόμενον· εἰ δὲ οἶδεν ὃ ποιεῖ, αὐτόθι δῆλον, ὡς ἔστιν ἐν τῷ Δημιουργῷ τὰ ἔιδη. Ἔστι δὲ τὸ εἶδος ἐν τῷ Δημιουργῷ, ὡς ὁ ἐν τῷ δακτυλίῳ τύπος· καὶ λέγεται τῷτο τὸ εἶδος ΠΡΟ ΤΩΝ ΠΟΛΛΩΝ, καὶ χωριστὸν τῆς ὕλης. Ἔστι δὲ τὸ εἶδος τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ ἐν τοῖς καθ' ἕκαστον ἀνθρώποις, ὡς τὰ ἐν τοῖς κηροῖς ἐκτυπώματα· καὶ λέγεται τὰ τοιαῦτα ΕΝ ΤΟΙΣ ΠΟΛΛΟΙΣ ἔιναι, καὶ ἀχώριστα τῆς ὕλης. Θεασάμενοι δὲ τὰς κατὰ μέρος ἀνθρώπους, ὅτι πάντες τὸ αὐτὸ εἶδος τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ ἔχουσιν, (ὡς ἐπὶ τῷ ὕδατι ἐλθόντος, καὶ θεασαμένους τὰ κηρία) ἀνεμαξάμεθα αὐτὸ ἐν τῇ διανοίᾳ· καὶ λέγεται τῷτο ΕΠΙ ΤΟΙΣ ΠΟΛΛΟΙΣ, ἡγουν μετὰ τὰ πολλὰ, καὶ ὕστερογενές. *Intelligatur annulus, qui alicujus, utpote Achillis, imaginem insculptam habeat: multæ insuper ceræ sint, et ab annulo imprimantur: veniat deinde quispiam, videatque ceras omnes unius annuli impressione formatas, annulique impressionem in mente contineat: sigillum annulo insculptum, ANTE MULTA dicetur: in cerulis impressum, in MULTIS: quod vero in illius, qui illo venerat intelligentiâ remanserit, POST MULTA, et postea-*


a Semblance of Immortality, and con- Ch. IV.
tinues

rius genitum dicetur. Idem in generibus et formis intelligendum censeo: etenim ille optimus procreator mundi Deus, omnium rerum formas, atque exempla habet apud se: ut si hominem efficere velit, in hominis formam, quam habet, intueatur, et ad illius exemplum cæteros faciat omnes. At si quis resisterit, dicatque rerum formas apud Creatorem non esse: quæso ut diligenter attendat: Opifex, quæ facit, vel cognoscit, vel ignorat: sed is, qui nesciet, nunquam quicquam faciet: quis enim id facere aggreditur, quod facere ignorat? Neque enim facultate quâdam rationis experte aliquid aget, prout agit natura (ex quo conficitur, ut natura etiam agat, etsi quæ faciat, non advertat:) Si vero ratione quâdam aliquid facit, quodcunque ab eo factum est omnino cognovit. Si igitur Deus non pejore ratione, quam homo, facit quid, quæ fecit cognovit: si cognovit quæ fecit, in ipso rerum formas esse perspicuum est. Formæ autem in opifice sunt perinde ac in annulo sigillum, hæcque forma ANTE MULTA, et avulsa a materiâ dicitur. Atqui hominis species in unoquoque homine est, quemadmodum etiam sigilla in ceris; et IN MULTIS, nec avulsa a materiâ dicitur. At cum singulos homines animo conspiciamus, et eandem in unoquoque formam atque effigiem videmus, illa effigies in mente nostrâ insidens POST MULTA, et posterius genita dicetur: veluti in illo quoque dicebamus; qui multa sigilla in cerâ uno et eodem annulo impressa conspexerat. Ammon. in Porphy. Introduct. p. 29. b.

Ch.IV. tinues throughout ages to be SPECIFI-
CALLY

Λέγουται δὲ τὰ γένη καὶ τὰ εἶδη ΠΡΟ ΤΩΝ ΠΟΛΛΩΝ, ΕΝ ΤΟΙΣ ΠΟΛΛΟΙΣ, ΕΠΙ ΤΟΙΣ ΠΟΛΛΟΙΣ· οἷον ἐνωσεῖδω τι σφραγιστήριον, ἔχον καὶ ἐκλύπωμα τὸ τυχόν, ἐξ οὗ κηρία πολλά μεταλαβέτω τῷ ἐκλύπωματι, καὶ τις ὑπ' ὧν ἀγαγέτω ταῦτα, μὴ προκατιδὼν μηδ' ὅλως τὸ σφραγιστήριον· ἐωρακώς δὲ τὰ ἐν οἷς τὸ ἐκλύπωμα, καὶ ἐπισήσας ὅτι πάντα τῷ αὐτῷ μετέχουσιν ἐκλύπωματι, καὶ τὰ δοκῶντα πολλά τῷ λόγῳ συναθροίσας εἰς ἓν, ἐχέτω τῆτο κατὰ διάνοιαν. Τὸ μὲν ἔν σφραγιστήριον τύπωμα λέγεται ΠΡΟ ΤΩΝ ΠΟΛΛΩΝ· τό δ' ἐν τοῖς κηρίοις, ΕΝ ΤΟΙΣ ΠΟΛΛΟΙΣ· τὸ δὲ ἐξ αὐτῶν καταληφθὲν, καὶ κατὰ διάνοιαν αὐτῶς ὑποστάν, ΕΠΙ ΤΟΙΣ ΠΟΛΛΟΙΣ. Οὕτως ἔν καὶ τὰ γένη καὶ τὰ εἶδη ΠΡΟ ΤΩΝ ΠΟΛΛΩΝ μὲν εἰσιν ἐν τῷ Δημιουργῷ, κατὰ τὰς ποιητικὰς λόγους· ἐν τῷ Θεῷ γὰρ οἱ οὐσιαστοὶ λόγοι τῶν ἔντων ἐναικίως προὔφεσθήकाσι, καθ' οὓς λόγους ὁ ὑπερέστι τὰ ὅλα πάντα καὶ προώρισε καὶ παρήγαγεν· ὑφεστηκέναι δὲ λέγουται τὰ γένη καὶ τὰ εἶδη ΕΝ ΤΟΙΣ ΠΟΛΛΟΙΣ, διότι ἐν τοῖς κατὰ μέρος ἀνθρώποις τὸ τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ εἶδος ἐστίν, καὶ τοῖς κατὰ μέρος ἵπποις τὸ τῷ ἵππῳ εἶδος· ἐν ἀνθρώποις δὲ, καὶ ἵπποις, καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ζώοις τὸ γένος εὐρίσκεται τῶν τοιούτων εἰδῶν, ὅπερ ἐστὶ τὸ ζῶον· καὶ τοῖς ζώοις ὁμῶς καὶ τοῖς ζωοφύτοις τὸ καθολικώτερον γένος, τὸ βιωτικόν, ἐξετάζεται· συναχθέντων δὲ καὶ τῶν φυτῶν,

Ἰεω-

CALLY ONE, amid those infinite parti- Ch.IV.
cular 

θεωρεῖται τὸ ἔμφυχον· εἰ δὲ σὺν τοῖς ἐμφύχοις ἐθέλει
τις ἐπισκοπεῖν καὶ τὰ ἄψυχα, τὸ σῶμα σύμπαν κα-
τόψεται· συνδραμυσῶν δὲ τοῖς ἐξημένοις τῶν ἀσωμάτων
ἔσιων, τὸ πρῶτον γένος Φανεῖται καὶ γενικώτατον· καὶ
οὕτω μὲν EN TOIS ΠΟΛΛΟΙΣ ὑφέσθηκε τὰ εἶδη
καὶ τὰ γένη. Καταλαβὼν δὲ τις ἐκ τῶν κατὰ μέρος ἀν-
θρώπων τὴν αὐτῶν φύσιν, τὴν ἀνθρωπότητα, ἐκ δὲ τῶν
κατὰ μέρος ἵππων αὐτὴν τὴν ἱππότητα, καὶ ὕτω τὸν
καθόλου ἀνθρώπου, καὶ τὸν καθόλου ἵππου ἐπινοήσας· καὶ
τὸ καθόλου ζῶον ἐκ τῶν κατέκαστα τῷ λόγῳ συναγαγών·
καὶ τὸ καθόλου αἰσθητικόν, καὶ τὸ καθόλου ἔμφυχον, καὶ
τὸ καθόλου σῶμα, καὶ τὴν καθολικωτάτην ἔσιναν ἐξ
ἀπάντων συλλογισάμενος, ὁ τοιῶτος ἐν τῇ ἑαυτοῦ δια-
νοίᾳ τὰ γένη καὶ τὰ εἶδη ἀθλῶς ὑπέσθησεν ΕΠΙ
ΤΟΙΣ ΠΟΛΛΟΙΣ, τετέστι, μετὰ τὰ πολ-
λὰ καὶ ὑπερογενῶς. *Genera verò et Species dicuntur
esse ANTE MULTA, IN MULTIS, POST
MULTA. Ut puta, intelligatur sigillum, quamlibet figu-
ram habens, ex quo multæ ceræ ejusdem figuræ sint parti-
cipes, et in medium aliquis has proferat, nequaquam præ-
visto sigillo. Cum autem vidisset eas ceras in quibus figura
exprimitur, et animadvertisset omnes eandem figuram par-
ticipare, et quæ videbantur multæ, ratione in unum coegis-
set, hoc in mente teneat. Nempe sigillum dicitur esse species
ANTE MULTA; illa vero in ceris, IN MULTIS; quæ
vero ab iis desumitur, et in mente immaterialiter subsistit,
POST MULTA. Sic igitur et Genera et Species ANTE
MULTA in Creatore sunt, secundum rationes efficientes.*

Ch.IV. cular changes, that befall it every moment (*k*).

MAY

In Deo enim rerum effectrices rationes una et simpliciter præ-existunt; secundum quas rationes ille supra-substantialis omnes res et prædestinavit et produxit. Existere autem dicuntur Genera et Species IN MULTIS, quoniam in singulis hominibus hominis Species, et in singulis equis equi Species est. In hominibus æque ac in equis et aliis animalibus Genus invenitur harum specierum, quod est animal. In animalibus etiam una cum Zoophytis magis universale Genus, nempe sensitivum exquiritur. Additis vero plantis, spectatur Genus animatum. Si verò una cum animatis quisquam velit perscrutari etiam inanimata, totum Corpus perspiciet. Cum autem entia incorporea conjuncta fuerint iis modo tractatis, apparebit primum et generalissimum Genus. Atque ita quidem IN MULTIS subsistunt Genera et Species. Comprehendens vero quisquam ex singulis hominibus naturam ipsam humanam, et ex singulis equis ipsam equinam, atque ita universalem hominem et universalem equum considerans, et universale animal ex singulis ratione colligens, et universale sensitivum, et universale animatum, et universale corpus, et maximè universale ens ex omnibus colligens, hic, inquam, in sua mente Genera et Species immaterialiter constituit ΕΠΙ ΤΟΙΣ ΠΟΛΛΟΙΣ, hoc est, POST MULTA, et posterius genita. Niceph. Blem. Log. Epit. p. 62. Vid. etiam Alcín. in Platonic. Philosoph. Introduct. C. IX. X.

(*k*) THE following elegant Lines of *Virgil* are worth attending to, tho' applied to no higher a subject than Bees.

Ergo

MAY we be allowed then to credit those Ch.IV.
speculative men, who tell us, “ ’tis in
“ these

*Ergo ipsas quamvis angusti terminus ævi
Excipiat : (neque enim plus septima ducitur ætas)
AT GENUS IMMORTALE MANET—G. IV.*

The same *Immortality*, that is, the *Immortality of the Kind* may be seen in all *perishable* substances, whether animal or inanimate; for tho’ *Individuals perish*, the *several Kinds still remain*. And hence, if we take *TIME*, as denoting the *system of things temporary*, we may collect the meaning of that passage in the *Timæus*, where the Philosopher describes *TIME* to be——*μένοντος αἰῶνος ἐν ἐνὶ κατ’ ἀριθμὸν ἴσσαν αἰώνιον εἰκόνα. Æternitatis in uno permanentis Imaginem quandam, certis numerorum articulis progredientem. Plat. V. III. p. 37. Edit. Serran.*

We have subjoined the following extract from *Boethius*, to serve as a commentary on this description of *TIME*.—*ÆTERNITAS igitur est, interminabilis vitæ tota simul et perfecta possessio. Quod ex collatione temporalium clarius liquet. Nam quidquid vivit in TEMPORE, id præsens à præteritis in futura procedit : nihilque est in tempore ita constitutum, quod totum vitæ suæ spatium pariter possit amplecti ; sed crastinum quidem nondum apprehendit, hesternum vero jam perdidit. In hodiernâ quoque vitâ non amplius vivitis, quam in illo mobili transitorioque*

Ch.IV. “ *these permanent and comprehensive FORMS*
 “ *that THE DEITY views at once, without*
 “ *looking abroad, all possible productions*
 “ *both present, past, and future—that this*
 “ *great and stupendous View is but a View*
 “ *of himself, where all things lie inveloped*
 “ *in their Principles and Exemplars, as be-*
 “ *ing*

momento. Quod igitur Temporis patitur conditionem, licet illud, sicut de mundo censuit Aristoteles, nec cæperit unquam esse, nec desinat, vitæque ejus cum temporis infinitate tendatur, nondum tamen tale est, ut æternum esse jure credatur. Non enim totum simul infinitæ licet vitæ spatium comprehendit, atque complectitur, sed futura nondum transacta jam non habet. Quod igitur interminabilis vitæ plenitudinem totam pariter comprehendit, ac possidet, cui neque futuri quidquam absit, nec præteriti fluxerit, id ÆTERNUM esse jure perhibetur: idque necesse est, et sui compos præsens sibi semper assistere, et infinitatem mobilis temporis habere præsentem. Unde quidam non rectè, qui cum audiunt visum Platoni, mundum hunc nec habuisse initium, nec habiturum esse defectum, hoc modo conditori conditum mundum fieri co-æternum putant. Aliud est enim PER INTERMINABILEM DUCI VITAM, (quod Mundo Plato tribuit) aliud INTERMINABILIS VITÆ TOTAM PARITER COMPLEXAM ESSE PRÆSENTIAM, quod Divinæ Mentis proprium esse manifestum est. Neque enim
Deus

“ *ing essential to the fulness of his universal* Ch.IV.
 “ *Intellection?*”—If so, ’twill be proper,
 that we invert the Axiom before men-
 tioned. We must now say—*Nil est in*
SENSU, quod non prius fuit in INTELLEC-
TU. For tho’ the contrary may be true
 with respect to Knowledge *merely human,*
 yet never can it be true with respect to

C c 4

Know-

Deus conditis rebus antiquior videri debet temporis quanti-
tate, sed simplicis potius proprietate naturæ. HUNC
 ENIM VITÆ IMMOBILIS PRÆSENTARIUM STA-
 TUM, INFINITUS ILLE TEMPORALIUM RERUM
 MOTUS IMITATUR; cumque eum effingere, atque æquare
 non possit, ex immobilitate deficit in motum; ex simplicitate
 præsentiae decrescit in infinitam futuri ac præteriti quanti-
 tatem; et, cum totam pariter vitæ suæ plenitudinem ne-
 queat possidere, hoc ipso, quod aliquo modo nunquam esse
 desinit, illud, quod implere atque exprimere non potest,
 aliquatenus videtur æmulari, alligans se ad qualemcunque
 præsentiam hujus exigui volucrisque momenti: quæ, quo-
 niam MANENTIS ILLIUS PRÆSENTIÆ QUANDAM
 GESTAT IMAGINEM, quibuscumque contigerit, id præ-
 stat, ut ESSE videantur. Quoniam vero manere non pe-
 tuit, infinitum Temporis iter arripuit: eoque modo factum
 est, ut CONTINUARET VITAM EUNDO, cujus pleni-
 tudinem complecti non valuit PERMANENDO. Itaque,
 &c. De Consolat. Philosoph. L. V.

Ch. IV. Knowledge universally, *unless we give Precedence to ATOMS and LIFELESS BODY,* making MIND, *among other things, to be struck out by a lucky Concourse,*

§. 3. 'Tis far from the design of this Treatise, to insinuate that Atheism is the Hypothesis of our later Metaphysicians. But yet 'tis somewhat remarkable, in their several Systems, how readily they admit of the above *Precedence,*

FOR mark the Order of things, according to *their* account of them. First comes that huge Body, *the sensible World,* Then this and its Attributes beget *sensible Ideas.* Then out of sensible Ideas, by a kind of lopping and pruning, are made *Ideas intelligible, whether specific or general.* Thus, should they admit that MIND was coeval with BODY, yet *till BODY gave it Ideas,* and awakened its dormant Powers, it could at best have been nothing more

more, than a sort of dead Capacity; for Ch. IV.
 INNATE IDEAS it could not possibly have
 any.

AT another time we hear of *Bodies* so exceedingly fine, that their very *Exility* makes them susceptible of *sensation* and *knowledge*; as if they shrunk into *Intellect* by their exquisite subtlety, which rendered them too delicate to be *Bodies* any longer. 'Tis to this notion we owe many curious inventions, such as *subtle Æther*, *animal Spirits*, *nervous Ducts*, *Vibrations*, and the like; Terms, which MODERN PHILOSOPHY, upon parting with *occult Qualities*, has found expedient to provide itself, to supply their place.


BUT the *intellectual* Scheme, which never forgets Deity, postpones every thing *corporeal* to the *primary mental Cause*. 'Tis *here* it looks for the origin of *intelligible* Ideas, even of those, which exist in *human Capacities*. For tho' *sensible* Objects may
 be

Ch.IV. be the destined medium, *to awaken* the dormant Energies of *Man's* Understanding, yet are those Energies themselves no more contained in *Sense*, than the Explosion of a Cannon, in the Spark which gave it fire (*l*).

IN

(*l*) The following Note is taken from a Manuscript Commentary of the *Platonic Olympiodorus*, (quoted before p. 371.) upon the *Phædo* of *Plato*; which tho' perhaps some may object to from inclining to the Doctrine of *Platonic Reminiscence*, yet it certainly gives a better account how far the *Senses* assist in the acquisition of *Science*, than we can find given by vulgar Philosophers.

Οὐδέποτε γὰρ τὰ χεῖρῳ καὶ δεύτερα ἀρχαὶ ἢ αἰτίαι εἰσὶ τῶν κρείττωνων· εἰ δὲ δεῖ καὶ ταῖς ἐγκυκλίσις ἐξηγήσῃσι περὶθεῖσθαι, καὶ ἀρχὴν εἰπεῖν τὴν αἰδησι τῆς ἐπιστήμης, λέξομεν αὐτὴν ἀρχὴν ἔχ' ὡς ποιητικὴν, ἀλλ' ὡς ἐρεθίζουσαν τὴν ἡμετέραν ψυχὴν εἰς ἀνάμνησιν τῶν καθόλου.—κατὰ ταύτην δὲ τὴν ἐννοίαν ἔρηται καὶ τὸ ἐν Τιμαίῳ, ὅτι δι' ὀψέως καὶ ἀκοῆς τὸ τῆς φιλοσοφίας ἐπορίσαμεθα γένος, διότι ἐκ τῶν αἰδητῶν εἰς ἀνάμνησιν ἀφικνήμεθα. *Those things, which are inferior and secondary, are by no means the Principles or Causes of the more excellent; and tho' we admit the common interpretations, and allow SENSE to be a Principle of SCIENCE, we must however call it a Principle, not as if it was the efficient*

IN short ALL MINDS, that are, are Si- Ch.IV.
MILAR and CONGENIAL; and so too are 
their

efficient Cause, but as it rouses our Soul to the Recollection of general Ideas.—According to the same way of thinking is it said in the Timæus, that through the Sight and Hearing we acquire to ourselves Philosophy, because we pass from Objects of SENSE to REMINISCENCE or RECOLLECTION.

And in another passage he observes—Ἐπειδὴ γὰρ πᾶμμορφον ἀγαλμά ἐστιν ἡ ψυχὴ, πάντων τῶν ὄντων ἔχουσα λόγους, ἐριθιζομένη ὑπὸ τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἀναμιμνήσκεται ὧν ἔνδον ἔχει λόγων, καὶ τῶντος προσάλλεται. *For in as much as the SOUL, by containing the Principles of all Beings, is a sort of OMNIFORM REPRESENTATION or EXEMPLAR; when it is roused by objects of Sense, it recollects those Principles, which it contains within, and brings them forth.*

Georgius Gemistus, otherwise called Pletho, writes upon the same subject in the following manner. Τὴν ψυχὴν φασὶν οἱ τὰ ἴδη τιθέμενοι ἀναλαμβάνουσιν ἔσγε ἐπιστήμην τῆς ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς λόγους, ἀκριτέστερον αὐτὸς ἔχοντας καὶ τελεώτερον ἐν ἑαυτῇ ἶχειν, ἢ ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς ἔχουσι. Τὸ ὅν τελεώτερον τῆτο καὶ ἀκριτέστερον οὐκ αὐτὸ ἀπὸ τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἶχειν τὴν ψυχὴν, ὅγε μὴ ἐστὶν ἐν αὐτοῖς. Οὐ δ' αὖ μὴδαμῶ ἀλλόθι ὅν αὐτὴν ἐξ αὐτῆς δια-
νειώσται.

Ch.IV. *their Ideas, or intelligible Forms.* Were
 it otherwise, there could be no intercourse
 between

νοεῖσθαι· οὐ δὲ γὰρ πεφυκέναι τὴν ψυχὴν μηδαμῇ ὄν, τι
 διανοεῖσθαι· τὰς γὰρ ψευδεῖς τῶν δοξῶν ἔχῃ μὴ ὄντων
 ἀλλ' ὄντων μὲν, ἄλλων δὲ κατ' ἄλλων εἶναι συνθέσεις
 τινὰς, ἃ κατὰ τὸ ὀρθὸν γινόμενας. Λέιπεσθαι δὲ ἀφ'
 ἑτέρας τινὸς φύσεως πολλῶ ἔτι κρείττονός τε καὶ τελεωτέ-
 ρας ἀφ' ἧκεν τῇ ψυχῇ τὸ τελεώτερον τῆτο τῶν ἐν τοῖς
 αἰσθητοῖς λόγων. *Those who suppose IDEAL FORMS,*
say that the Soul, when she assumes, for the purposes of
Science, those Proportions, which exist in sensible objects,
possesses them with a superior accuracy and perfection, than
that to which they attain in those sensible objects. Now
this superior Perfection or Accuracy the Soul cannot have
from sensible objects, as it is in fact not in them; nor yet
can she conceive it herself as from herself, without its
having existence any where else. For the Soul is not
formed so as to conceive that, which has existence no where,
since even such opinions, as are false, are all of them com-
positions irregularly formed, not of mere Non-Beings, but
of various real Beings, one with another. It remains
therefore that this Perfection, which is superior to the
Proportions existing in sensible objects, must descend to the
Soul from SOME OTHER NATURE, WHICH IS BY
MANY DEGREES MORE EXCELLENT AND PER-
FECT. Pleth. de Aristotcl. et Platonic. Philosoph.
Diff. Edit. Paris 1541.

The ΛΟΓΟΙ or PROPORTIONS, of which Ge-
 misius here speaks, mean not only those relative Pro-
 portions

between Man and Man, or (what is more Ch.IV.
important) between Man and God.

FOR

portions of *Equality* and *Inequality*, which exist in Quantity, (such as double, sesquialter, &c.) but in a larger sense, they may be extended to mathematical *Lines*, *Angles*, *Figures*, &c. of all which Λόγοι, or *Proportions*, tho' we possess in the *Mind* the most clear and precise Ideas, yet it may be justly questioned, whether any one of them ever existed in the *sensible* World.

To these two Authors we may add *Boethius*, who, after having enumerated many acts of the MIND or INTELLECT, wholly distinct from *Sensation*, and independent of it, at length concludes,

*Hæc est efficiens magis
Longè caussa potentior,
Quam quæ materiæ modo
Impressas patitur notas.
Præcedit tamen excitans,
Ac vires animi movens,
Vivo in corpore passio.
Cum vel lux oculos ferit,
Vel vox auribus instrepat ;
Tum MENTIS VIGOR excitus,
QUAS INTUS SPECIES TENET,
Ad motus simileis vocans,
Notis applicat exteris,
INTRORSUMQUE RECONDITIS
FORMIS miscet imagines.*

De Consolat. Philosoph. L. V.

Ch. IV. FOR what is Conversation between Man and Man?—'Tis a mutual intercourse of *Speaking* and *Hearing*.—To the Speaker, 'tis *to teach*; to the Hearer, 'tis *to learn*.—To the Speaker, 'tis *to descend* from *Ideas* to *Words*; to the Hearer, 'tis *to ascend* from *Words* to *Ideas*.—If the Hearer, in this ascent, can arrive at *no* Ideas, then is he said *not to understand*; if he ascend to Ideas dissimilar and heterogeneous, then is he said *to misunderstand*.—What then is requisite, that he may be said *to understand*?—That he should ascend to certain Ideas, treasured up *within himself*, correspondent and similar to those *within the Speaker*. The same may be said of a *Writer* and a *Reader*; as when any one reads to day or to morrow, or here or in *Italy*, what *Euclid* wrote in *Greece* two thousand years ago.

Now is it not marvelous, there should be *so exact an Identity of our Ideas*, if they

were only generated from *sensible* Objects, Ch.IV.
 infinite in number, ever changing, distant
 in Time, distant in Place, and no one
 Particular the same with any other?

AGAIN, do we allow it possible for GOD to signify his *will* to Men; or for MEN to signify their *wants* to GOD?—In both these cases there must be an *Identity of Ideas*, or else nothing is done either one way or the other. Whence then do these COMMON IDENTIC IDEAS come?—Those of *Men*, it seems, come all from *Sensation*. And whence come *God's Ideas*?—Not surely from *Sensation* too; for this we can hardly venture to affirm, without giving to *Body* that notable *Precedence of being prior to the Intellection of even God himself*.—Let them then be *original*; let them be *connate*, and *essential to the divine Mind*.—If this be true, is it not a fortunate Event, that *Ideas of corporeal rise, and others of mental, (things derived from subjects so totally distinct)* should
 so

Ch.IV. *so happily co-incide in the same wonderful Identity?*

HAD we not better reason thus upon so abstruse a Subject?—Either all MINDS have their Ideas *derived*; or all have them *original*; or *some have them original, and some derived*. If all Minds have them derived, they must be derived from something, *which is itself not Mind*, and thus we fall insensibly into a kind of Atheism. If all have them original, *then are all Minds divine*, an Hypothesis by far more plausible than the former. But if this be not admitted, then must *one* Mind (at least) have *original* Ideas, and the rest have them *derived*. Now supposing this last, whence are those Minds, whose Ideas are derived, most likely to derive them?—From MIND, or from BODY?—From MIND, a thing *homogeneous*; or from BODY, a thing *heterogeneous*? From MIND, such as (from the Hypothesis) has
original

original Ideas ; or from BODY, which we cannot discover to have any Ideas at all? (1) Ch.IV.

—An Examination of this kind, pursued with accuracy and temper, is the most probable method of solving these doubts.

'Tis thus we shall be enabled with more assurance to decide, whether we are to admit the Doctrine of *the Epicurean Poet*,

CORPOREA NATURA *animum constare,*
animamque ;

or trust *the Mantuan Bard*, when he sings in divine numbers,

Ignæus est ollis vigor, et CÆLESTIS ORIGO
Seminibus.————

BUT

(1) ΝΟΤΝ ΔΕ ΕΔΕΝ ΣΩΜΑ ΓΕΝᾶ· πῶς γὰρ ἂν
τὸ ΑΝΟΗΤΑ ΝΟΤΝ ΓΕΝΝΗΣΟΙ; No BODY pro-
duces MIND: for how should THINGS DEVOID OF
MIND produce MIND? *Sallust de Diis et Mundo*, c. 8.

Ch.IV. BUT 'tis now time, to quit these Speculations. Those, who would trace them farther, and have leisure for such studies, may perhaps find themselves led into regions of Contemplation, affording them prospects both interesting and pleasant. We have at present said as much as was requisite to our Subject, and shall therefore pass from hence to our concluding chapter.

C H A P.

C H A P. V.

Sub-ordination of Intelligence—Difference of Ideas, both in particular Men, and in whole Nations—Different Genius of different Languages—Character of the English, the Oriental, the Latin, and the Greek Languages—Superlative Excellence of the Last—Conclusion.

ORIGINAL TRUTH (a), having the Ch. V.
 most intimate connection with *the*
supreme Intelligence, may be said (as it were)
 to

(a) Those Philosophers, whose Ideas of *Being* and *Knowledge* are derived from *Body* and *Sensation*, have a short method to explain the nature of TRUTH. 'Tis a *facilitious* thing, made by every man for himself; which comes and goes, just as 'tis remembred and forgot; which in the order of things makes its appearance *the last* of any, being not only subsequent to *sensible* Objects, but even to our *Sensations* of them. According to this Hypothesis, there are many Truths, which have been, and are no longer; others, that will be, and have

Ch. V. to shine with unchangeable splendour, enlightening throughout the Universe every possible Subject, by nature susceptible of its benign influence. Passions and other obstacles may prevent indeed its efficacy, as clouds and vapours may obscure the Sun; but it self neither admits *Diminution*, nor *Change*, because the Darkness respects only particular Percipients. Among *these* therefore we must look for ignorance and

not been yet; and multitudes, that possibly may never exist at all.

But there are other Reasoners, who must surely have had very different notions; those I mean, who represent TRUTH not as the *last*, but the *first* of Beings; who call it *immutable, eternal, omnipresent*; Attributes, that all indicate something more than human. To these it must appear somewhat strange, how men should imagine, that a crude account of the method *how they perceive* Truth, was to pass for an account of *Truth itself*; as if to describe the road to *London*, could be called a Description of that Metropolis.

For my own part, when I read the detail about Sensation and Reflection, and am taught the process at large how my Ideas are all generated, I seem to view the

and error, and for that *Subordination of* Ch. V.
Intelligence, which is their natural conse-
 quence.

WE have daily experience in the works
 of ART, that a *partial Knowledge* will suf-
 fice for *Contemplation*, tho' we know not
 enough, to profess ourselves Artists. Much
 more is this true, with respect to NA-
 TURE; and well for mankind is it found


D d 3 to

the human Soul in the light of a Crucible, where Truths
 are produced by a kind of logical Chemistry. They
 may consist (for aught we know) of *natural materials*,
 but are as much *cratures of our own*, as a Bolus or
 Elixir.

If *Milton* by his URANIA intended to represent
 TRUTH, he certainly referred her to a much more an-
 tient, as well as a far more noble origin.

—————Heav'nly born!
 Before the hills appear'd, or fountains flow'd,
 Thou with eternal Wisdom didst converse,
 Wisdom thy Sister; and with her didst play,
 In presence of th' almighty Father, pleas'd
 With thy celestial Song. ————— P. L. VII.

See *Proverbs* VIII. 22, &c. *Jeremiah* X. 10.
Marc Antonin. IX. 1.

Ch. V.  to be true, else never could we attain any *natural* Knowledge at all. For if the *constitutive Proportions of a Clock* are so subtle, that few conceive them truly, but the Artist himself; what shall we say to *those seminal Proportions*, which make the essence and character of every *natural Subject*?—Partial views, the Imperfections of Sense; Inattention, Idleness, the turbulence of Passions; Education, local Sentiments, Opinions, and Belief, conspire in many instances to furnish us with Ideas, some *too general*, some *too partial*, and (what is worse than all this) with many that are *erroneous*, and contrary to Truth. These it behoves us to correct as far as possible, by cool suspense and candid examination.

Νῆφε, καὶ μέμνησ' ἀπιστεῖν, ἄρθρα ταῦτα
τῶν φρενῶν.

AND thus by a connection perhaps little expected, the Cause of LETTERS, and
that

that of VIRTUE appear to co-incide, it Ch. V.
 being the business of both *to examine our*
Ideas, and to amend them by the Standard
of Nature and of Truth (b).

IN this important Work, we shall be
 led' to observe, how Nations, like single
 Men, have their *peculiar* Ideas; how these
peculiar Ideas become THE GENIUS OF
 THEIR LANGUAGE, since the *Symbol* must
 of course correspond to its *Archetype* (c);

D d 4 how

(b) How useful to ETHIC SCIENCE, and indeed to
 KNOWLEDGE in general, a GRAMMATICAL DIS-
 QUISSION into the *Etymology* and *Meaning* of WORDS
 was esteemed by the chief and ablest Philosophers, may
 be seen by consulting *Plato* in his *Cratylus*; *Xenoph.*
Mem. IV. 5, 6. *Arrian. Epict.* I. 17. II. 10. *Marc.*
Anton. III. 11. V. 8. X. 8.

(c) ΗΘΟΥΣ ΧΑΡΑΚΤΗΡ ΕΣΤΙ Τ' ΑΝΘΡΩΠΟΥ
 ΛΟΓΟΣ. Stob. *Capiuntur Signa haud levia, sed ob-*
servatu digna (quod fortasse quispiam non putarit) de in-
geniis et moribus populorum et nationum ex linguis ipsorum.
Bacon de Augm. Scient. VI. 1. Vid. etiam *Quintil.*
L. XI. p. 675. *Edit. Capperon. Diag. L. I.* p. 58. et
Menag. Com. Tusc. Disp. V. 16.

Ch. V. how the *wisest* Nations, having the *most* and *best* Ideas, will consequently have the *best* and *most copious* Languages; how others, whose Languages are motley and compounded, and who have borrowed from different countrys different Arts and Practices, discover by WORDS, to whom they are indebted for THINGS.

To illustrate what has been said, by a few examples. WE BRITONS in our time have been remarkable borrowers, as our *multiform* Language may sufficiently shew. Our Terms in *polite Literature* prove, that this came from *Greece*; our Terms in *Music* and *Painting*, that these came from *Italy*; our Phrases in *Cookery* and *War*, that we learnt these from the *French*; and our Phrases in *Navigation*, that we were taught by the *Flemings* and *Low Dutch*. These many and very different Sources of our Language may be the cause, why it is so deficient in *Regularity* and *Analogy*. Yet we have this advantage to compensate the defect,

defect, that what we want in *Elegance*, we Ch. V.
 gain in *Copiousness*, in which last respect
 few Languages will be found superior to
 our own.

LET us pass from ourselves to the RE-
 GIONS OF THE EAST. The (*d*) Eastern
 World, from the earliest days, has been at
 all times the Seat of enormous Monarchy.
 On them fair Liberty never shed its genial
 influence. If at any time civil Discords
 arose among them (and arise there did in-
 numerable) the contest was never about
the Form of their Government; (for this
 was an object, of which the Combatants
 had no conception;) 'twas all from the
 poor motive of, *who should be their MASTER*,
 whether

(*d*) Διὰ γὰρ τὸ δουλικώτεροι εἶναι τὰ ἥθη οἱ μὲν
 Βάρβαροι τῶν Ἑλλήνων, οἱ δὲ περὶ τὴν Ἀσίαν τῶν περὶ
 τὴν Εὐρώπην, ὑπομένεισι τὴν δεσποτικὴν ἀρχὴν, ἔδην
 δουχεραίνοντες. *For the Barbarians by being more slavish*
in their Manners than the Greeks, and those of Asia than
those of Europe, submit to despotic Government without
murmuting or discontent. Arist. Polit. III. 4.

Ch. V. whether a *Cyrus* or an *Artaxerxes*, a *Mahomet* or a *Mustapha*.

SUCH was their Condition, and what was the consequence?—Their Ideas became consonant to their servile State, and their Words became consonant to their servile Ideas. The great Distinction, for ever in their sight, was that of *Tyrant* and *Slave*; the most unnatural one conceivable, and the most susceptible of pomp, and empty exaggeration. Hence they talk'd of Kings as Gods, and of themselves, as the meanest and most abject Reptiles. Nothing was either great or little in moderation, but every Sentiment was heightened by incredible Hyperbole. Thus tho' they sometimes ascended into *the Great* and *Magnificent* (e), they as frequently degenerated

(e) The truest Sublime of the East may be found in the Scriptures, of which perhaps the principal cause is the intrinsic Greatness of the Subjects there treated; the Creation of the Universe, the Dispensations of divine Providence, &c.

nerated into the *Tumid* and *Bumbast*. *The* Ch. V. *Greeks too of Asia* became infected by their neighbours, who were often at times not only their neighbours, but their masters; and hence that Luxuriance of the *Asiatic Stile*, unknown to the chaste eloquence and purity of *Athens*. But of the *Greeks* we forbear to speak now, as we shall speak of them more fully, when we have first considered the Nature or Genius of the *Romans*.

AND what sort of People may we pronounce the ROMANS?—A Nation engaged in wars and commotions, some foreign, some domestic, which for seven hundred years wholly engrossed their thoughts. Hence therefore their LANGUAGE became, *like their Ideas*, copious in all Terms expressive of things *political*, and well adapted to the purposes both of *History* and *popular Eloquence*.——But what was their *Philosophy*? — As a Nation, 'twas none, if we may credit their ablest Writers. And hence the Unfitness of their Language
to

Ch. V. to this Subject ; a defect, which even *Cicero* is compelled to confess, and more fully makes appear, when he writes *Philosophy* himself, from the number of Terms, which he is obliged to invent (*f*). *Virgil* seems

(*f*) See *Cic. de Fin.* I. C. 1, 2, 3. III. C. 1, 2, 4, &c. but in particular *Tusc. Disp.* I. 3. where he says, *PHILOSOPHIA jacuit usque ad hanc ætatem, nec ullum habuit lumen LITERARUM LATINARUM; quæ illustranda et excitanda nobis est; ut si, &c.* See also *Tusc. Disp.* IV. 3. and *Acad.* I. 2. where it appears, that 'till *CICERO* applied himself to the writing of *Philosophy*, the *Romans* had nothing of the kind in their language, except some mean performances of *Anafanius* the *Epicurean*, and others of the same sect. How far the *Romans* were indebted to *Cicero* for *Philosophy*, and with what industry, as well as eloquence, he cultivated the Subject, may be seen not only from the titles of those Works that are now lost, but much more from the many noble ones still fortunately preserved.

The *Epicurean* Poet *LUCRETIVUS*, who flourished nearly at the same time, seems by his silence to have overlooked the *Latin* writers of his own Sect ; deriving all his *Philosophy*, as well as *Cicero*, from *Grecian* Sources ; and, like him, acknowledging the difficulty of writing *Philosophy* in *Latin*, both from the *Poverty* of the Tongue, and from the *Novelty* of the Subject.

Nec

seems to have judged the most truly of his Ch. V.
 Countrymen, when admitting their inferiority in the more elegant Arts, he concludes at last with his usual majesty,

Tu

*Nec me animi fallit, GRAIORUM obscura reperta
 Difficile inlustrare LATINIS versibus esse,
 (Multa novis rebus præsertim quom sit agendum,)
 Propter EGESTATEM LINGUÆ et RERUM NOVITATEM :*

*Sed tua me virtus tamen, et sperata voluptas
 Suavis amicitia quemvis perferre laborem
 Suadet——*

Lucr. I. 137.

In the same age, VARRO, among his numerous works, wrote some in the way of *Philosophy*; as did the Patriot BRUTUS, a *Treatise concerning Virtue*, much applauded by *Cicero*; but these Works are now lost.

Soon after the Writers above-mentioned came HORACE, some of whose Satires and Epistles may be justly ranked among the most valuable pieces of *Latin Philosophy*, whether we consider the Purity of their Style, or the great Address, with which they treat the Subject.

After *Horace*, tho' with as long an interval as from the days of *Augustus* to those of *Nero*, came the Satirist PERSIUS, the friend and disciple of the Stoic *Cornutus*; to whose precepts as he did honour by his virtuous Life,
 so

Ch. V. *Tu* REGERE IMPERIO POPULOS, Ro-
 mane, memento,
 (*Hæ tibi erunt artes*) *pacisque imponere*
marem,
Parcere subje&ctis, et debellare superbos.

FROM

so his works, tho' small, shew an early proficiency in the Science of Morals. Of him it may be said, that he is almost the single *difficult* writer among the *Latin* Classics, whose meaning has sufficient merit, to make it worth while to labour thro' his obscurities.

In the same degenerate and tyrannic period, lived also SENECA; whose character, both as a Man and a Writer, is discussed with great accuracy by the noble Author of the *Characteristics*, to whom we refer.

Under a milder Dominion, that of *Hadrian* and the *Antonines*, lived AULUS GELLIUS, or (as some call him) AGELLIUS, an entertaining Writer in the miscellaneous way; well skilled in Criticism and Antiquity; who tho' he can hardly be entitled to the name of a *Philosopher*, yet deserves not to pass unmentioned here, from the curious fragments of Philosophy interspersed in his works.

With *Aulus Gellius* we range MACROBIUS, not because a Contemporary, (for he is supposed to have lived under

FROM considering *the Romans*, let us Ch. V.
 pass to THE GREEKS. THE GRECIAN
 COMMON-

under *Honarius* and *Theodosius*) but from his near resemblance, in the character of a Writer. His Works, like the other's, are miscellaneous; filled with Mythology and antient Literature, some Philosophy being intermixed. His Commentary upon the *Somnium Scipionis* of *Cicero* may be considered as wholly of the *philosophical* kind.

In the same age with *Aulus Gellius*, flourished *APULEIUS* of *Madaura* in *Africa*, a *Platonic* Writer, whose Matter in general far exceeds his perplexed and affected Stile, too conformable to the false Rhetoric of the Age when he lived.

Of the same Country, but of a later Age, and a harsher Stile, was *MARTIANUS CAPELLA*, if indeed he deserve not the name rather of a *Philologist*, than of a *Philosopher*.

After *Capella*, we may rank *CHALCIDIUS* the *Platonic*, tho' both his Age, and Country, and Religion are doubtful. His manner of writing is rather more agreeable than that of the two preceding, nor does he appear to be their inferior in the knowledge of Philosophy, his work being a laudable Commentary upon the *Timæus* of *Plato*.

The

Ch. V. COMMONWEALTHS, while they maintained
 their Liberty, were the most heroic Confederacy, that ever existed. They were
 the

The last *Latin* Philosopher was BOETHIUS, who was descended from some of the noblest of the *Roman* Families, and was Consul in the beginning of the sixth Century. He wrote many philosophical Works, the greater part in the *Logical* way. But his *Ethic* piece, *On the Consolation of Philosophy*, and which is partly prose, and partly verse, deserves great encomiums both for the Matter, and for the Stile; in which last he approaches the Purity of a far better age than his own, and is in all respects preferable to those crabbed *Africans* already mentioned. By command of *Theoderic* king of the *Goths*, 'twas the hard fate of this worthy Man to suffer death; with whom the *Latin Tongue*, and the last remains of *Roman Dignity*, may be said to have sunk in the western World.

There were other *Romans*, who left *Philosophical* Writings; such as MUSONIUS RUFUS, and the two Emperors, MARCUS ANTONINUS and JULIAN; but as these preferred the use of the *Greek Tongue* to their own, they can hardly be considered among the number of *Latin Writers*.

And so much (by way of sketch) for THE LATIN AUTHORS OF PHILOSOPHY; a small number for so vast an Empire, if we consider them as all the product of near six successive centuries.

the politest, the bravest, and the wisest of Ch. V. men. In the short space of little more than a Century, they became such Statesmen, Warriors, Orators, Historians, Physicians, Poets, Critics, Painters, Sculptors, Architects, and (last of all) Philosophers, that one can hardly help considering THAT GOLDEN PERIOD, as a Providential Event in honour of human Nature, to shew to what perfection the Species might ascend (g).

Now


(g) If we except *Homer*, *Hesiod*, and the *Lyric* Poets, we hear of few *Grecian* Writers before the expedition of *Xerxes*. After that Monarch had been defeated, and the dread of the *Persian* Power was at an end, the EFFULGENCE OF GRECIAN GENIUS (if I may use the expression) broke forth, and shone till the time of *Alexander the Macedonian*, after whom it disappeared, and never rose again. This is that *Golden Period* spoken of above. I do not mean that *Greece* had not many writers of great merit subsequent to that period, and especially of the philosophic kind; but the *Great*, the *Striking*, the *Sublime* (call it as you please) attained at that time to a height, to which it never could ascend in any after age.

Ch. V. NOW THE LANGUAGE OF THESE
 GREEKS was truly like themselves, 'twas
 con-

The same kind of fortune befel the People of *Rome*. When the *Punic* wars were ended, and *Carthage* their dreaded Rival was no more, then (as *Horace* informs us) they began to cultivate the politer arts. 'Twas soon after this, their great Orators, and Historians, and Poets arose, and *Rome*, like *Greece*, had her *Golden Period*, which lasted to the death of *Octavius Cæsar*.

I call these two Periods, from the two greatest Geniuses that flourished in each, one THE SOCRATIC PERIOD, the other THE CICERONIAN.

There are still farther analogies subsisting between them. Neither Period commenced, as long as sollicitude for the common welfare engaged men's attentions, and such wars impended, as threatned their destruction by Foreigners and Barbarians. But when once these fears were over, a general security soon ensued, and instead of attending to the arts of defence and self-preservation, they began to cultivate those of Elegance and Pleasure. Now, as these naturally produced a kind of wanton insolence (not unlike the vicious temper of high-fed animals) so by this the bands of union were insensibly dissolved. Hence then among

conformable to their transcendent and Ch. V.
universal Genius. Where Matter so 
abounded,

the *Greeks* that fatal *Peloponnesian* War, which together with other wars, its immediate consequence, broke the confederacy of their Commonwealths; wasted their strength; made them jealous of each other; and thus paved a way for the contemptible kingdom of *Macedon* to enslave them all, and ascend in a few years to universal Monarchy.

A like luxuriance of prosperity sowed discord among the *Romans*; raised those unhappy contests between the *Senate* and the *Gracchi*; between *Sylla* and *Marius*; between *Pompey* and *Cæsar*; 'till at length, after the last struggle for Liberty by those brave Patriots *Brutus* and *Cassius* at *Philippi*, and the subsequent defeat of *Antony* at *Actium*, the *Romans* became subjects to the dominion of a FELLOW-CITIZEN.

It must indeed be confessed, that after *Alexander* and *Octavius* had established their Monarchies, there were many bright Geniuses, who were eminent under their Government. *Aristotle* maintained a friendship and epistolary correspondence with *Alexander*. In the time of the same Monarch lived *Theophrastus*, and the Cynic, *Diogenes*. Then also *Demosthenes* and *Æschines* spoke their two celebrated Orations. So likewise in the time of *Octavius*, *Virgil* wrote his *Æneid*, and with

Ch. V. abounded, Words followed of course, and those exquisite in every kind, as the Ideas for which they stood. And hence it followed, there was not a Subject to be found, which could not with propriety be exprest in *Greek*.

HERE were Words and Numbers for the Humour of an *Aristophanes*; for the native

Horace, Varius, and many other fine Writers, partook of his protection and royal munificence. But then it must be remembred, that these men were bred and educated in the principles of a free Government. 'Twas hence they derived that high and manly spirit, which made them the admiration of after ages. The Successors and Forms of Government left by *Alexander* and *Octavius*, soon stopt the growth of any thing farther in the kind. So true is that noble saying of *Longinus*—
 Θρέψαι τε γὰρ ἱκανὴ τὰ Φρονήματα τῶν μεγαλοφρόνων
 ἢ ΕΛΕΥΘΕΡΙΑ, καὶ ἐπελπίσαι, καὶ ἅμα διωθεῖν τὸ
 πρῶτον τῆς πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἐξέως, καὶ τῆς περὶ τὰ
 πρωτῆα Φιλοτιμίας. 'Tis LIBERTY that is formed to
 nurse the sentiments of great Geniuses; to inspire them
 with hope; to push forward the propensity of contest one
 with another, and the generous emulation of being the first
 in rank. De Subl. Sect. 44.

native Elegance of a *Philemon* or *Menander*; for the amorous Strains of a *Mimnermus* or *Sappho*; for the rural Lays of a *Theocritus* or *Bion*; and for the sublime Conceptions of a *Sophocles* or *Homer*. The same in Prose. Here *Isocrates* was enabled to display his Art, in all the accuracy of Periods, and the nice counterpoise of Diction. Here *Demosthenes* found materials for that nervous Composition, that manly force of unaffected Eloquence, which rushed, like a torrent, too impetuous to be withstood.

Who were more different in exhibiting their *Philosophy*, than *Xenophon*, *Plato*, and his disciple, *Aristotle*? Different, I say, in their character of *Composition*; for as to their *Philosophy itself*, 'twas in reality *the same*. *Aristotle*, strict, methodic, and orderly; subtle in Thought; sparing in Ornament; with little address to the Passions or Imagination; but exhibiting the whole with

Ch. V. such a pregnant brevity, that in every sentence we seem to read a page. How exquisitely is this all performed in *Greek*? Let those, who imagine it may be done as well in another Language, satisfy themselves either by attempting to translate him, or by perusing his translations already made by men of learning. On the contrary, when we read either *Xenophon* or *Plato*, nothing of this *method* and *strict order* appears. The *Formal* and *Didactic* is wholly dropt. Whatever they may teach, 'tis without professing to be teachers; a train of Dialogue and truly polite Address, in which, as in a *Mirror*, we behold human Life, adorned in all its colours of Sentiment and Manners.

AND yet though these differ in this manner from the *Stagirite*, how different are they likewise in character from each other?—*Plato*, copious, figurative,

tive, and majestic; intermixing at times Ch. V.
 the facetious and satiric; enriching his
 Works with Tales and Fables, and the
 mystic Theology of ancient times. *Xe-*
nophon, the Pattern of perfect simpli-
 city; every where smooth, harmonious,
 and pure; declining the figurative, the
 marvelous, and the mystic; ascending
 but rarely into the Sublime; nor then
 so much trusting to the colours of Stile,
 as to the intrinsic dignity of the Sentiment
 itself.

THE Language in the mean time, in
 which *He* and *Plato* wrote, appears to suit
 so accurately with the Stile of both, that
 when we read either of the two, we can-
 not help thinking, that 'tis he alone, who
 has hit its character, and that it could not
 have appeared so elegant in any other
 manner.

AND thus is THE GREEK TONGUE,
from its Propriety and Universality, made

Ch. V. *for all that is great, and all that is beautiful, in every Subject, and under every Form of writing.*

GRAIIS ingenium, GRAIIS dedit ore
rotundo
Musa loqui.

'TWERE to be wished, that those amongst us, who either write or read, with a view to employ their liberal leisure (for as to such, as do either from views more sordid, we leave them, like Slaves, to their destined drudgery) 'twere to be wished, I say, that the liberal (if they have a relish for letters) would inspect the finished Models of *Grecian Literature*; that they would not waste those hours, which they cannot recall, upon the meaner productions of the *French and English Press*; upon that fungous growth of Novels and of Pamphlets, where 'tis to be feared, they rarely find

any rational pleasure, and more rarely Ch. V.
still, any solid improvement.

To be *competently* skilled in antient learning, is by no means a work of such insuperable pains. The very progress itself is attended with delight, and resembles a Journey through some pleasant Country, where every mile we advance, new charms arise. 'Tis certainly as easy to be a Scholar, as a Gamester, or many other Characters equally illiberal and low. The same application, the same quantity of habit will fit us for one, as completely as for the other. And as to those who tell us, with an air of seeming wisdom, that *'tis Men, and not Books* we must study to become knowing; this I have always remarked from repeated Experience, to be the common consolation and language of Dunces. They shelter their ignorance under a few bright Examples, whose transcendent abilities, without the
common

Ch. V. common helps, have been sufficient of
 themselves to great and important Ends.
 But alas!

Decipit exemplar vitii imitabile—

IN truth, each man's Understanding, when ripened and mature, is a composite of *natural Capacity*, and of *super-induced Habit*. Hence the greatest Men will be necessarily those, who possess *the best Capacities*, cultivated with *the best Habits*. Hence also moderate Capacities, when adorned with valuable Science, will far transcend others the most acute by nature, when either neglected, or applied to low and base purposes. And thus for the honour of CULTURE and GOOD LEARNING, *they are able to render a man, if he will take the pains, intrinsically more excellent than his natural Superiors.*

AND

AND so much at present as to GENERAL Ch. V.
IDEAS; *how we acquire them; whence*
they are derived; what is their Nature;
and what their connection with Language.
So much likewise as to the Subject of this
Treatise, UNIVERSAL GRAMMAR.

End of the THIRD BOOK.

A D.

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ADVERTISEMENT.

THE following Notes are either Translations of former Notes, or Additions to them. The additional are chiefly Extracts from Greek Manuscripts, which (as the Author has said already concerning others of the same kind) are valuable both for their Rarity, and for their intrinsic Merit.

ADDITIONAL NOTES.

PAG. 95. — TO STOP, &c.] The Quotation from *Proclus* in the Note may be thus rendred — THAT THING IS AT REST, *which* FOR A TIME PRIOR AND SUBSEQUENT IS IN THE SAME PLACE, *both itself, and its Parts.*

P. 105. In the Note, for γιγνόμενον read γενόμενον, and render the passage thus—*For by this Faculty (namely the Faculty of Sense) we neither know the Future, nor the Past, but the Present only.*

P. 106. NOTE (d).] The passage of *Philoponus* here referred to, but by mistake omitted, has respect to the notion of beings *corporeal* and *sensible*, which were said to be nearly approaching to *Non-Entitys*. The Author explains this, among other reasons, by the following—Πῶς δὲ τοῖς μὴ ἔσι γειτνιάζει; Πρῶτον μὲν, ἐπεὶδὴ ἐνταῦθα τὸ παρελθόν ἐστι καὶ τὸ μέλλον, ταῦτα δὲ μὴ ὄντα· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἠφάνισται καὶ ἄκ' ἔτι ἐστὶ, τὸ δὲ ἐπὶ ἔστι· συμπαραθεῖ δὲ τῷ χρόνῳ τὰ φύσικα πάντα, μᾶλλον δὲ τῆς κινήσεως αὐτῶν παρακολέθημά ἐστι ὁ χρόνος. *How therefore is it that they approach nearly to Non-Entitys? In the first place, because HERE (where they exist) exists THE PAST and THE FUTURE, and these are NON-ENTITYS; for the one is vanished, and is no more, the other is not as yet. Now all natural Substances pass away along with TIME, or rather 'tis upon their Motion that TIME is an Attendant.*

P. 119.—in the Note here subjoined mention is made of the REAL NOW, or INSTANT, and its efficacy. To which we may add, that there is not only a *necessary* Connection between *Existence* and the *Present Instant*, because *no other Point* of Time can properly be said to be, but also between *Existence* and *Life*, because whatever *lives*, by the same reason necessarily *Is*. Hence *Sophocles*, speaking of *Time present*, elegantly says of it—

—— χρόνῳ τῷ ζώῳτι, καὶ παρόντι νῦν.

THE LIVING, and Now present TIME.

Trachin. V. 1185.

P. 227.—The Passage in *Virgil*, of which *Servius* here speaks, is a description of *Turnus's* killing two brothers, *Amycus* and *Diores*; after which the Poet says of him,

—— curru abscissa DUORUM

Suspendit capita————

This, literally translated, is —he hung up on his chariot the heads of Two persons, which were cut off, whereas the Sense requires, of THE Two persons, that is to say, of *Amycus* and *Diores*. Now this by *Amborum* would have been exprest properly, as *Amborum* means THE Two; by *Duorum* is exprest improperly, as it means only Two indefinitely.

P. 259.—The Passage in Note (o) from *Themistius*, may be thus rendered——Nature in many instances appears to make her transition by little and little, so that in some Beings it may be doubted, whether they are Animal, or Vegetable.

P. 294. Note (c)—*There are in the number of things many, which have a most known EXISTENCE, but a most unknown ESSENCE; such for example as Motion, Place, and more than either of them, Time. The EXISTENCE of each of these is known and indisputable, but what their ESSENCE is, or Nature, is among the most difficult things to discern. The Soul also is in the same Class: that it is Something, is most evident; but what it is, is a matter not so easy to learn. Alex. Aphrod. p. 142.*

P. 340.—LANGUAGE—INCAPABLE OF COMMUNICATING DEMONSTRATION.] See Three Treatises, or Vol. I. p. 220, and the additional note on the words, *The Source of infinite Truths, &c.*

P. 368—in the Note—*yet so held the Philosophers of Malmesbury, and the Author of the Essay, &c.]*

*Philoponus, from the Philosophy of Plato and Pythagoras, seems to have far excelled these Moderns in his account of WISDOM or PHILOSOPHY, and its Attributes, or essential Characters.—*Ἰδίου γὰρ φιλοσοφίας τὸ ἐν τοῖς πολλοῖς ἔχουσι διαφορὰν δεῖξαι τὴν κοινωνίαν, καὶ τὸ ἐν τοῖς πολλοῖς ἔχουσι κοινωνίαν δεῖξαι τίνι διαφορῇ. καὶ γὰρ δυσχερὲς τὸ δεῖξαι φάτνης (*lege φάτνης*) καὶ περισσεύου κοινωνίαν, (πᾶσι γὰρ ὑπερπλέον) ἀλλ' εἰ (*lege ὅπερ*) τὸ διάφορον τῶν εἰπεῖν. εἰ δὲ κοινὸς καὶ ἵππευ διαφορὰν, ἀλλὰ τί κοινὸν ἔχουσιν. IT IS THE PROPER BUSINESS OF PHILOSOPHY TO SHEW IN MANY THINGS, WHICH HAVE DIFFERENCE, WHAT IS THEIR COMMON CHARACTER; and IN MANY THINGS, WHICH HAVE A COMMON CHARACTER, THRO' WHAT 'TIS THEY DIFFER. *Id*

is indeed no difficult matter to shew the common Character of a Wood-Pigeon and a Dove, (for this is evident to every one) but rather to tell where lies the Difference; nor to tell the Difference between a Dog and a Horse, but rather to shew, what they possess in common. Philop. Com. MS. in Nicomach. Arithm.

P. 379—THEY ARE MORE EXQUISITE THAN, &c.] The Words of Aristotle, here referred to, are these—μᾶλλον δ' ἐστὶ τὸ ἕνεκα καὶ τὸ καλὸν ἐν τοῖς τῆς φύσεως ἔργοις, ἢ ἐν τοῖς τῆς τεχνῆς. THE PRINCIPLES OF DESIGN and BEAUTY are more in the Works of NATURE, than they are in those of ART.

P. 379—WE MUST OF NECESSITY ADMIT A MIND, &c.] The following quotation, taken from the third book of a manuscript Comment of Proclus on the Parmenides of Plato, is here given for the sake of those, who have curiosity with regard to the doctrine of IDEAS, as held by antient Philosophers.

Εἰ δὲ δεῖ συντόμως εἰπεῖν τὴν αἰτίαν τῆς τῶν ἰδεῶν ὑποστάσεως, δι' ἣν ἐκείνοις ἤρесе, ρητέον ὅτι τὰυτὰ πάντῃ ὅσα ὁρατὰ, ἡράνεια καὶ ὑπὸ σελήνῃ, ἢ ἀπὸ ταυτομάτου ἰσθῆν, ἢ κατ' αἰτίαν· ἀλλ' ἀπὸ ταυτομάτου ἀδύνατον· ἔστι γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ὑστέροις τὰ κρείττονα, νῦς, καὶ λόγος, καὶ αἰτία, καὶ τὰ αἰτίας, καὶ ὅτω τὰ ἀποτελέσματα κρείττω τῶν ἀρχῶν, πρὸς τῷ καὶ ὃ φησιν ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης· δεῖ πρὸ τῶν κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς αἰτίων εἶναι τὰ καθ' αὐτὰ, τέττων γὰρ ἕκαστις τὸ κατὰ συμβεβηκός· ὥστε τὴν ἀπὸ ταυτομάτου πρεσβύτερον αὐτῇ τὸ κατ' αἰτίαν, εἰ καὶ ἀπὸ ταυτομάτου τὰ Θεϊότατα ἦν τῶν φανερώων. If there-

therefore we are to relate concisely the Cause, why THE HYPOTHESIS OF IDEAS pleased them (namely Parmenides, Zeno, Socrates, &c.) we must begin by observing that all the various visible objects around us, the heavenly as well as the sublunary, are either from CHANCE, or according to a CAUSE. FROM CHANCE IS IMPOSSIBLE; for then the more excellent things (such as Mind, and Reason, and Cause, and the Effects of Cause) will be among those things that come last, and so the ENDINGS of things will be more excellent than their BEGINNINGS. To which too may be added what Aristotle says; that ESSENTIAL CAUSES OUGHT TO BE PRIOR TO ACCIDENTAL, in as much as EVERY ACCIDENTAL CAUSE IS A DEVIATION FROM THEM; so that whatever is the Effect of such essential Cause [as is indeed every work of Art and human Ingenuity] must needs be prior to that which is the Effect of Chance, even tho' we were to refer to Chance the most divine of visible objects, [the Heavens themselves].

The Philosopher, having thus proved a definite Cause of the World in opposition to Chance, proceeds to shew that from the Unity and concurrent Order of things this Cause must be ONE. After which he goes on, as follows.——

——'Εἰ μὲν ἔν ἄλογον τῷτο ἄτοπον· ἔσαι γάρ τι πάλιν τῶν ὑσέρων τῆς τέτων αἰτίας κρείττον, τὸ κατὰ λόγον καὶ γινῶσιν ποιῶν, εἰσω τῇ Παντός ὄν, καὶ τῇ Ὅλας μέρος, ὃ ἐστὶν ἀπ' αἰτίας ἀλόγως τοιῷτο. 'Εἰ δὲ λόγον ἔχον, καὶ αὐτὸ γινῶσκον, οἶδεν ἑαυτὸ δῆπερ τῶν πάντων αἰτίου ὄν, ἢ τῷτο ἀγνοῶν, ἀγνοήσει τὴν ἑαυτῇ φύσιν. 'Εἰ δὲ οἶδεν, ὅτι κατ' ὕσιν ἐστὶ τῇ παντός αἰτίου, τὸ

ὁ δὲ ὠρισμένως εἰδὸς θάτερον, καὶ θάτερον οἶδεν ἐξ ἀνάγκης, οἶδεν ἄρα καὶ ὃ ἔστιν αἰτίου ὠρισμένως· οἶδεν ἔν καὶ τὸ Πᾶν, καὶ πάντα ἐξ ὧν τὸ Πᾶν, ὧν ἔστι καὶ αἰτίου. Καὶ εἰ τῷτο, ἥτοι εἰς ἑαυτὸ ἄρα βλέπου, καὶ ἑαυτὸ γινώσκον, οἶδε τὰ μετ' αὐτό. Λόγοις ἄρα καὶ εἴεσιν αὐτοῖς οἶδε τὰς Κοσμικὰς Λόγους, καὶ τὰ εἶδη, ἐξ ὧν τὸ Πᾶν, καὶ ἔστιν ἐν αὐτῷ τὸ Πᾶν, ὡς ἐν αἰτίῳ, χωρὶς τῆς ὕλης. — Now IF THIS CAUSE BE VOID OF REASON,

that indeed would be absurd; for then again there would be something among those things, which come last in order, more excellent than their Principle or Cause. I mean by more excellent, something operating according to Reason and Knowledge, and yet within that Universe, and a Part of that Whole, which is, what it is, from a Cause devoid of Reason.

But if, on the contrary, THE CAUSE OF THE UNIVERSE BE A CAUSE, HAVING REASON and knowing itself, it of course knows itself to be the Cause of all things; else being ignorant of this, it would be ignorant of its own nature. But if it know, that from ITS VERY ESSENCE IT IS THE CAUSE OF THE UNIVERSE, and if that, which knows one part of a Relation definitely, knows also of necessity the other, it knows for this reason definitely the thing of which it is the Cause. IT KNOWS THEREFORE THE UNIVERSE, and all things out of which the Universe is composed, of all which also it is the Cause. But if this be true, 'tis evident that BY LOOKING INTO ITSELF, AND BY KNOWING ITSELF, IT KNOWS WHAT COMES AFTER ITSELF, AND IS SUBSEQUENT. 'Tis therefore, through certain REASONS and FORMS DEVOID OF MATTER
that

that it knows those mundane Reasons and Forms, out of which the Universe is composed, and that the Universe is in it, as in a Cause, distinct from and without the Matter.

P. 380—AGREEABLE TO WHICH IDEAS THESE WORKS ARE FASHIONED, &c.] 'Tis upon these Principles that *Nicomachus* in his *Arithmetic*, p. 7. calls the Supreme Being an Artist—ἐν τῇ τῷ τεχνίτῃ Θεῷ διανοίᾳ, in *Dei artificis mente*. Where *Philoponus*, in his *manuscript Comment*, observes as follows—τεχνίτην Φησὶ τὸν Θεόν, ὡς πάντων τὰς πρώτας αἰτίας καὶ τὰς λόγους αὐτῶν ἔχοντα. He calls GOD an ARTIST, as possessing within himself the first Causes of all things, and their Reasons or Proportions. Soon after speaking of those Sketches, after which Painters work, and finish their Pictures, he subjoins—ὥσπερ ἔν ἡμεῖς, εἰς τὰ τοιαῦτα σκιαγραφήματα βλέπουσιν, ποιεῖμεν τόδε τι, ἔτω καὶ ὁ δημιουργὸς, πρὸς ἐκεῖνα ἀποβλέπων, τὰ τῆδε πάντα κεκόσμηκεν· ἀλλ' ἰστέον, ὅτι τὰ μὲν τῆδε σκιαγραφήματα ἀτελῆ εἰσιν, ἐκεῖνοι δὲ οἱ ἐν τῷ Θεῷ λόγοι ἀρχέτυποι καὶ παντέλειοι εἰσιν. As therefore we, looking upon such Sketches as these, make such and such particular things, so also the Creator, looking at those Sketches of his, hath formed and adorned with beauty all things here below. We must remember however, that the Sketches here are imperfect; but that the others, those REASONS or Proportions, which exist in GOD, are ARCHETYPAL and ALL-PERFECT.

'Tis according to this Philosophy, that *Milton* represents God, after he had created this visible World, contemplating

—————how it show'd

In prospect from his throne, how good, how fair,
ANSW'RING HIS GREAT IDEA—————

P. Lost VII. 556.

Proclus proves the Existence of these GENERAL IDEAS or UNIVERSAL FORMS by the following Arguments.—εἰ τοίνυν ἐστὶν αἰτία τῷ παντὸς αὐτῷ τῷ εἶναι ποιῆσα, τὸ δὲ αὐτῷ τῷ εἶναι ποιῆν ἀπὸ τῆς ἐαυτῆς ποιῆς ὑσίσ τῆτό ἐστι πρῶτως, ὅπερ τὸ ποιῶμενον δευτέρως καὶ ὃ ἐστι πρῶτως, δίδωσι τῷ ποιῶμένῳ δευτέρως· οἷον τὸ πῦρ καὶ δίδωσι θερμότητά ἄλλῳ, καὶ ἐστὶ θερμὸν, ἢ ψυχὴ δίδωσι ζωῆν, καὶ ἔχει ζωὴν, καὶ ἐπὶ πάντων ἰσοῖς αὖ ἀληθῆ τὸν λόγον, ὅσα αὐτῷ τῷ εἶναι ποιῆς. καὶ τὸ αἴτιον ἔν τῷ παντὸς αὐτῷ τῷ εἶναι ποιῆν τῆτό ἐστι πρῶτως, ὅπερ ὁ κόσμος δευτέρως. εἰ δὲ ὁ κόσμος πλήρωμα εἰδῶν ἐστὶ παντοίων, εἴη αὖ καὶ ἐν τῷ αἰτίῳ τῷ κόσμῳ ταῦτα πρῶτως· τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ αἴτιον καὶ ἡλίου, καὶ σελήνης, καὶ ἀνθρώπου ὑπέστησε, καὶ ἵππου, καὶ ὅλως τὰ εἶδη, τὰ ἐν τῷ παντί. ταῦτα ἄρα πρῶτως ἐστὶν ἐν τῇ αἰτίᾳ τῷ παντὸς, ἄλλος ἥλιος παρὰ τὸν ἐμφανῆ, καὶ ἄλλος ἄνθρωπος, καὶ τῶν εἰδῶν ὁμοίως ἕκασαν. εἰσι ἄρα τὰ εἶδη πρὸ τῶν αἰσθητῶν, καὶ αἰτία αὐτῶν τὰ δημιουργικὰ κατὰ τὸν εἰρημένον λόγον, ἐν τῇ μιᾷ τῷ κόσμῳ παντὸς αἰτία προὑπάρχοντα. *If therefore THE CAUSE OF THE UNIVERSE be a Cause which operates merely by existing, and if that which operates merely by existing, operate from its own proper Essence, SUCH CAUSE IS PRIMARILY, WHAT ITS EFFECT IS SECONDARILY, and that, which it is primarily, it giveth to its Effect secondarily. 'Tis thus that Fire both giveth Warmth*

to something else, and is itself warm; that the Soul giveth Life, and possesseth Life; and this reasoning you may perceive to be true in all things whatever, which operate merely by existing. It follows therefore, THAT THE CAUSE OF THE UNIVERSE, operating after this manner, IS THAT PRIMARILY, WHICH THE WORLD IS SECONDARILY. If therefore the WORLD be the plenitude of FORMS of all Sorts, these FORMS MUST ALSO BE PRIMARILY IN THE CAUSE OF THE WORLD, for 'twas the same Cause, which constituted the Sun, and the Moon, and Man, and Horse, and in general all the Forms existing in the Universe. These therefore exist primarily in the Cause of the Universe; another Sun besides the apparent, another Man, and so with respect to every Form else. The FORMS therefore, PREVIOUS to the sensible and external Forms, and which according to this reasoning are their ACTIVE and EFFICIENT CAUSES, are to be found PRE-EXISTING IN THAT ONE AND COMMON CAUSE OF ALL THE UNIVERSE. Procli Com. MS. in Plat. Parmenid. L. 3.

We have quoted the above passages for the same reason, as the former; for the sake of those, who may have a curiosity to see a sample of this *antient* Philosophy, which (as some have held) may be traced up from *Plato* and *Socrates* to *Parmenides*, *Pythagoras*, and *Orpheus* himself.

If the Phrase, *to operate merely by existing*, should appear questionable, it must be explained upon a supposition, that in the *Supreme Being* no Attributes are secondary, intermittent, or adventitious, but all original, ever perfect and essential. See p. 162, 359.

That we should not therefore think of a *blind unconscious* operation, like that of Fire here alluded to, the Author had long before prepared us, by uniting *Knowledge with natural Efficacy*, where he forms the Character of these *Divine and Creative Ideas*.

But let us hear him in his own Language.—ἀλλ' ἔπειρ ἐθέλοιμεν τὴν ιδιότητα αὐτῶν (sc. ἰδεῶν) ἀφορίσασθαι διὰ τῶν γνωριμωτέρων, ἀπὸ μὲν τῶν φυσικῶν λόγων λάβωμεν τὸ αὐτῷ τῷ εἶναι ποιητικόν, ὧν δὴ καὶ ποιεῖσι· ἀπὸ δὲ τῶν τεχνικῶν τὸ γνωστικόν, ὧν ποιεῖσιν, εἰ καὶ μὴ αὐτῷ τῷ εἶναι ποιεῖσι, καὶ ταῦτα ἐνώσαντες φώμεν αἰτίας εἶναι τὰς ἰδέας δημιουργικὰς. ἅμα καὶ νοερός πάντων τῶν κατὰ φύσιν ἀποτελεσμένων. *But if we should chuse to define the peculiar character of IDEAS by things more known to us than themselves, let us assume from NATURAL PRINCIPLES THE POWER OF EFFECTING, MEERLY BY EXISTING, all the things that they effect; and from ARTIFICIAL PRINCIPLES THE POWER OF COMPREHENDING all that they effect, although they did not effect them merely by existing; and then uniting those two, let us say that IDEAS are at once the EFFICIENT and INTELLIGENT CAUSES of all things produced according to Nature.* From book the second of the same Comment.

The Schoolman, *Thomas Aquinas*, a subtle and acute writer, has the following sentence, perfectly corresponding with this Philosophy. *Res omnes comparantur ad Divinum Intellectum, sicut artificata ad Artem.*

The Verses of *Orpheus* on this subject may be found in the tract *De Mundo*, ascribed to *Aristotle*, p. 23. *Edit. Sylburg.*

Ζεὺς ἄρσην γένετο, Ζεὺς κ. τ. λ.

P. 391—WHERE ALL THINGS LIE INVELOPED, &c.]

—ὅσα πέρ ἐς ΤΑ ΠΟΛΛΑ κατὰ δὴ τινὰ μερισμὸν, τοσαῦτα καὶ ΤΟ ΕΝ ἐκείνῳ πρὸ τῆ μερισμῶ κατὰ τὸ πάντῃ ἀμερές· ὃ γὰρ ἓν, ὡς ἐλάχιστον, καθάπερ ὁ Σπεύσιππος ἔδοξε λέγειν, ἀλλ' ΕΝ, ΩΣ ΠΑΝΤΑ. *As numerous as is THE MULTITUDE OF INDIVIDUALS by Partition, so numerous also is that PRINCIPLE OF UNITY by universal Impartibility. For it is not ONE, as a minimum is one, (according to what Speucippus seemed to say,) but it is ONE, as being ALL THINGS.* Damascius περὶ Ἀρχῶν, MS.

P. 408—THE WISEST NATIONS—THE MOST COPIOUS LANGUAGES.] 'Tis well observed by *Muretus*—*Nulli unquam, qui res ignorarent, nomina, quibus eas exprimerent, quæsierunt.* Var. Lect. VI. 1.

P. 411—BUT WHAT WAS THEIR PHILOSOPHY?] The same *Muretus* has the following passage upon the ROMAN TASTE FOR PHILOSOPHY.—*Beati autem illi, et opulenti, et omnium gentium victores ROMANI, in petendis honoribus, et in prensandis civibus, et in exteris nationibus verbo componendis, re compilandis occupati, philosophandi curam servis aut libertis suis, et Græculis esurientibus relinquebant. Ipsi, quod ab avaritia,*

ADDITIONAL NOTES.

tia, quod ab ambitione, quod a voluptatibus reliquum erat temporis, ejus si partem aliquam aut ad audiendum Græcum quempiam philosophum, aut ad aliquem de philosophia libellum vel legendum vel scribendum contulissent, jam se ad eruditionis culmen pervenisse, jam victam a se et profligatam jacere Græciam somniabant. Var. Lect. VI. 1.

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Page 4. for *αποτίθεται*, read, *αποτίθεται*. P. 29. for *Prisc. L. IX.*
 read, *Prisc. L. XI.* P. 87. for *κακηγορούμενον*, read, *καληγορούμενον*. P.
 96. for *Proposition*, read, *Preposition*. P. 107. Note for (d) read (e).
 P. 259. Note for *σλλακῶ*, read, *σλλαχῶ*. P. 262. for *Mostar*, read,
Moster.

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The Reader is desired to take notice, that as often as the author quotes V.I. p. &c. he refers to Three Treatises published first in one Volume, Octavo, in the year 1745, and of which a second Edition is now preparing.

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